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Abstract 
This thesis offers a systematic engagement with the theological hermeneutics of Hans 
Frei.  The two key conceptual categories are “the logic of belief” and “the content of 
God”.   
 
The former refers to the grammatical ordering of theological statements: Frei is 
concerned to distinguish grammatical logic from ontology, and to establish the actual 
starting point for any given theological enterprise.  Frei’s own preference for a “linear” 
and “cumulative” method built upon the starting point of a realistic narrative reading 
of the gospels is unpacked and explored.   
 
The second category, “the content of God”, refers to Frei’s search for an account in 
which God has actual reality, as opposed to a mere metaphysical abstraction.  Indeed, 
for Frei, the arrival – or failure to arrive – at a ‘concrete’ account of God is the test of 
any theological starting point, as evidenced in the ability or otherwise to do exegetical 
justice to the narrative shape of the crucifixion-resurrection sequence. The thesis 
demonstrates that for Frei, the starting point in the logic of belief must be the identity 
of Jesus Christ as revealed in scripture, and only on that basis can a concrete content 
of God be posited.   
 
In so doing, the intention is to set Frei very firmly within his mid-twentieth century 
context, in particular his engagement with and ultimate rejection of existentialist and 
Neo-orthodox theology.  Accordingly, the thesis traces the development in Frei’s 
thinking of these two conceptual categories, from his doctoral thesis on Barth’s early 
theology up to and including his twin publications, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative 
(1974) and The Identity of Jesus Christ (1975).  Later works by Frei are also 
considered in relation to these.   
 
The thesis does not stop at the mid-twentieth century, but illustrates the continued 
relevance of Frei’s hermeneutical theology into this century, putting him in 
conversation with a number of systematic and biblical theologians.  Suggestions are 
made as to his applicability to modern theological concerns, including the debate 
surrounding the being and action of God: a field where he has yet to be deployed 
successfully. 
   1
INTRODUCTION 
 
 When you are criticising the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct your attention to 
 those intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary to defend.  There will be 
 some fundamental assumptions which … the epoch unconsciously presuppose[s].  Such 
 assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming … With 
 these assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible, this 
 group constitutes the philosophy of the epoch.
1
 
       Alfred North Whitehead, 1925.  
  
 Very often, especially in theology, scholars start off from shared convictions, a “common 
 sense” in the best sense of that term, shared views and a shared sensibility, and then 
 relentlessly press some element in that amalgam, untying one knot after another, until at 
 some psychological point a common vocabulary and a shared sensibility turn into a technical, 
 often esoteric special-school outlook.
2
 
       Hans W. Frei 
 
1. The Questions 
 
Revelation is all very well.   
 
But the invocation of a doctrine of revelation when speaking of the God known to 
faith immediately opens out a host of related questions.  One set of these questions is 
epistemological.  God speaks: but how do we hear?  Where do we hear?  Even, does 
it matter if we hear or not?  The second set of questions is ontological.  God speaks: 
but who is this God who is speaking?  What is the content of this revealing God?  
What is the relation between God’s revelation, and God’s own self; or between 
epistemology and ontology?  And if we even get thus far, a third set of questions is 
grammatical and doctrinal.  Having been the recipients of revelation – having been 
given insight into the being of God – how are we then to explain the process?  In 
what order should we arrange our thinking about God?  Should we speak first of 
                                                 
1
 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, (Cambridge, 1925), 71. 
2
 Hans W. Frei, “Epilogue: George Lindbeck and The Nature of Doctrine”, in Theology and Dialogue: 
Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce D. Marshall, (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 275–82, 276.  
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ontology?  Or is it more logical to speak first of the knowledge of God?  What faulty 
human words should we use to speak about the almighty and living God?  And if we 
cannot adequately express in doctrine what we have heard, does revelation have any 
effective meaning at all?     
 
These three sets of questions, epistemological, ontological, and grammatical, 
together represent something of the breadth and scope of Hans Frei’s work.  A 
theologian of supreme analytical skills, his concern from the beginning was with the 
doctrine of revelation, in its various liberal and postliberal guises.  His instinct was 
always to probe beneath: on what basis is that statement predicated?  Hence even the 
title of his 1956 doctoral thesis: The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl 
Barth, 1909–1922: the Nature of Barth’s Break with Liberalism.
3
  Not content with 
understanding Barth’s theology, he wanted to understand where Barth’s theology had 
come from.  The originality of Frei’s thesis lies initially in its focus on Barth’s early 
theology, from Barth’s first published contribution to the periodical, Zeitschrift für 
Theologie und Kirche
4
 in 1909, through his ‘break’ with the liberal tradition, and 
culminating with the publication of the second edition of Der Römerbrief.
5
  This was 
a significant pre-dating of Barth’s ‘early theology’ as it was commonly understood in 
the English-speaking theological world, in which the English translation of Der 
Römerbrief in 1933 had marked the beginning of Barthian studies.  Frei, therefore, is 
not so much interested in Barth’s later supposed conversion away from dialectical 
theology, a move which Hans Urs von Balthasar
6
 had located in Barth’s 1931 book 
on Anselm.
7
  Rather, Frei’s interest is in Barth’s initial conversion to dialectical 
                                                 
3 
Hans W. Frei, The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl Barth, 1909–1922: The Nature of 
Barth’s Break with Liberalism, (Yale University: Doctoral Thesis, 1956). 
4 
Karl Barth, “Moderne Theologie und Reichsgottesarbeit”, in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 
(1909,), 317-321. 
5
 Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief.   (Munich: Kaiser, Christian, 1922).  English Translation: Karl Barth, 
The Epistle to the Romans, (London: Oxford University Press, 1933). 
Unless specifically identified as a reference to the 1st edition from 1919, any subsequent reference to 
Der Römerbrief should be understood as referring to this second edition. 
6 
See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth, Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, (Köln: J. 
Hegner, 1951).  English Translation: Hans Urs von Balthasar,  The Theology of Karl Barth: 
Exposition and Interpretation, (San Francisco: Communio Books, Ignatius Press, 1992).   
7
 Karl Barth, Fides quaerens intellectum: Anselms Beweis der Existenz Gottes im Zusammenhang 
seines theologischen Programms, (Münich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1931).  English Translation: Karl 
Barth, Fides quaerens intellectum: Anselm's proof of the existence of God in the context of his 
theological scheme (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1975). 
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theology, and the shift in understanding of the doctrine of revelation that that 
entailed.  After a gap of nearly twenty years, during which time he contributed only 
essays and articles, Frei’s next major publication was the 1974 book, The Eclipse of 
Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics
8
: 
another exercise designed to establish how we got to where we are.  Such projects of 
excavation are absolutely symptomatic of Frei’s careful, probing, analytical method. 
 
2. Current scholarship on Hans Frei 
 
Frei has been credited with founding an entire ‘school’ of ‘postliberal’ theology. 
Certainly, he was the first to use the term ‘postliberal’ “in the relevant sense”
9
, to 
denote the break with nineteenth century liberal theology as instituted in 1922 by the 
publication of Karl Barth’s Der Römerbrief.
10
  Later, the term was picked up by his 
friend and colleague, George Lindbeck, who reproduced it in his 1984 title, The 
Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age.
11
  Between them, 
Frei and Lindbeck taught a whole generation of theologians at Yale Divinity School, 
with the result that their influence is pervasive in current theology, so that their ideas 
are in evidence even when they are not directly referenced.   
 
A complicating factor is that the postliberal school of theology is sometimes also 
known as the “Yale School”.  Whether the Yale School does in fact exist or not is 
disputed: George Hunsinger, a former student of Frei’s, claims that it “enjoys little 
basis in reality, being largely the invention of theological journalism”.
 12
  Meanwhile, 
                                                 
8
 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Hermeneutics.  New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1974.  
9
 George Hunsinger, “Postliberal Theology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, 
ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 42–57, 45.  For Frei’s first 
use of the term “postliberal”, see Frei, The Doctrine of Revelation, 430. 
10
 This history of Barth’s break with liberalism has been well documented, first of all by Frei himself 
in his doctoral thesis, and later by Bruce L. McCormack in Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic 
Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909–1936, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).  As 
such, it need not be repeated here.   
11
 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, (Kentucky: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1984). 
12
 Hunsinger, “Postliberal Theology”, 42. 
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David Ford prefers to be cagey on the issue, referring merely to a “so-called” Yale 
School.
13
  Certainly, it is true that the candidates for inclusion in this school, students 
and/or colleagues of Frei and/or Lindbeck, are a diverse bunch: Hunsinger mentions 
as possible contenders Brevard Childs, David Kelsey, Paul Holmer, Stanley 
Hauerwas, William Placher, Bruce Marshall, Ronald Thiemann, Kathryn Tanner, and 
himself, among others. Nevertheless, its theological ‘opponents’ seem to be able to 
identify the Yale School with more certainty: Bruce McCormack identifies a defining 
characteristic of the ‘Yale theologians’ as being a “preoccupation with exegesis”
14
 
and an ad hoc “realistic narrative” hermeneutic.15  In addition, even sympathetic 
readers such as Paul DeHart
16
 or Mike Higton can name and define a ‘Yale School’, 
although Higton is rightly careful to distinguish Frei from the more general 
category.
17
  Meanwhile, Robert Jenson describes Frei as the “chief heremeneuticist in 
the recent "Yale school" of American theology”
18
; while John Allan Knight is able to 
write in one phrase of “Hans Frei and the ‘Yale School’ of narrative theology he 
inaugurated”.
19
  Whether the ‘Yale School’ exists or not seems to be very much a 
matter of whose opinion one solicits.  
 
Beyond this confusion of labels, the issue is further complicated by the fact that 
Frei’s influence is not confined to any one area of theology.  As a Barth scholar, for 
example, he is at the centre of much current debate over the correct interpretation and 
appropriation of that theologian.  Sometimes he is aligned with Barth and thus 
                                                 
13
 David F. Ford, “Hans Frei and the Future of Theology”, Modern Theology 8:2  (1992), 203–214, 
207. 
14
 Bruce L. McCormack, “Forward”, in Richard E. Burnett, Karl Barth’s Theological Exegesis, 
(Grand Rapids. Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), ix–xi, ix.   
15
 McCormack, “Forward”, x. 
16
 See Paul J. DeHart, The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 
17
 “George Lindbeck’s book The Nature of Doctrine is often taken as a manifesto for a supposed ‘Yale 
school’, comprising Lindbeck himself, David Kelsey, Ronald Thiemann, Garrett Green and several 
others.  The work of the late Hans Frei (1922–1988) is normally seen as central to this school, and his 
difficult writings are often explained by recourse to, and assumed to be adequately represented by, 
The Nature of Doctrine.”  Mike Higton, “Frei’s Christology and Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic 
Theory”, in Scottish Journal of Theology 50 (1997), 83–95, 83. 
18
 Robert Jenson, Systematic Theology, Volume 2: The Works of God, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 275. 
19
 John Allan Knight, “The Barthian Heritage of Hans W. Frei”, in The Scottish Journal of Theology 
61 (2008), 307–326, 307. 
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condemned, as when Francesca Aran Murphy labels him disparagingly as a “story 
Barthian”
20
.  At other times his whole interpretation of Barth is called into question, 
and the condemnation this time is for getting Barth wrong.  Bruce McCormack, for 
example, devotes some footnote space to refuting Frei’s reading of the first edition of 
Der Römerbrief, that Barth had not yet fully broken with liberal-style 
“relationalism”
21
, and in more general terms, consistently ‘blames’ Frei for what he 
perceives as a general misreading of Barth in North American theology.
22
  On the 
other hand, George Hunsinger credits Frei’s doctoral thesis with being “still the best 
study of Barth’s theology available in English at the level of conceptual analysis and 
richness of cultural-historical detail”
 23
; while Frei is praised by David Ford for his 
interpretation of Barth’s theology which “allowed Barth to be given a fresh, 
provocative reading different from most ‘Barthians’ and ‘anti-Barthians’”.
24
   
 
However, Barth studies is only one of the theological fields where Frei’s voice 
continues to be heard.  Putting Barth to one side, Frei remains one of the most 
influential hermeneuticians of our time.  Kevin Vanhoozer, for example, credits Frei 
with “convincingly” documenting “the devastating effect of the critical method on 
the theological interpretation of Scripture” in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative
25
, 
while Nicholas Wolterstorff takes a considered and critical view in a number of 
                                                 
20
 Murphy, Francesca Aran, God is Not a Story, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 151. 
21
 McCormack, Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 147n.64. 
22
 See, for example, “Revelation and History in Transfoundationalist Perspective: Karl Barth’s 
Theological Epistemology in Conversation with a Schleiermacherian Tradition”, in Orthodox and 
Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008), 
21–39.  Here, McCormack names Frei as one who wrongly understands Barth “as a narrative or 
“intratextual” theologian” albeit “more cautiously” than he names Lindbeck (23n.5).  Moreover, this 
interpretation has given rise to a “present” situation in which “Barth is most often understood as a 
nonfoundationalist narrative theologian and, for some, a precursor of postmodern, even 
deconstructionalist tendencies” (22–3).  McCormack, by contrast, is more interested in interpreting 
Barth according to his 19
th
 century heritage. 
23
 George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth:The Shape of his Theology, (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 286n. 
24
 David F. Ford, “On Being Theologically Hospitable to Jesus Christ: Hans Frei’s Achievement”, in 
The Journal of Theological Studies 46, (October 1995), 532–46, 532. 
25
 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Scripture and Tradition”, in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern 
Theology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 149–69, 151. 
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articles.
26
  Meanwhile, Frei’s recovery of the ‘literal sense’ of the biblical narratives 
has had far reaching implications for theology and exegesis, not least with reference 
to Lindbeck’s concept of “intratextuality”.
27
   Frei is also of great relevance to those 
theologians whose interest is in methodology
28
, while his biblical hermeneutics have 
been the shared subject of three full length comparative monographs, the first by 
David Demson
29
 in 1997, then by John David Dawson
30
 in 2002, and finally by 
Richard Topping
31
 in 2007.   
 
Moreover, on the back of his biblical hermeneutics, Frei’s name is referenced 
frequently in the realm of christology, of biblical interpretation, and of studies in the 
historical Jesus.  Biblical scholar David Lee has produced a full-length book on the 
theological reading of Luke’s Gospel according to Frei’s methods.
32
  Meanwhile, in 
the recent interdisciplinary project, Seeking the Identity of Jesus: A Pilgrimage
33
, 
Frei is cited alike by academics in the fields of systematic theology and of biblical 
history and interpretation: in the former camp he is appropriated by William Placher 
and Katherine Sonderegger; and in the latter by Marcus Bockmuehl, Joel Marcus, 
Dale Allison Jr, Francis Watson, and A. Katherine Grieb.  Lastly, Frei has proved of 
                                                 
26
 See, for example, Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Will narrativity work as lynchpin?  Reflections of the 
hermeneutic of Hans Frei”, in Charles M. Lewis (ed.), Relativism and Religion (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1995), pp. 71–107. 
 
27
 By “intratextuality”, Lindbeck is noting the Reformed principle of scriptura sui ipsius interpres 
(The Nature of Doctrine, 118), and extending it to embrace the use of Christian language within the 
Christian community: “Meaning is constituted by the uses of a specific language rather than being 
distinguishable from it.  Thus the proper way to determine what “God” signifies, for example, is by 
examining how the word operates within a religion and thereby shapes reality and experience rather 
than by first establishing its propositional or experiential meaning and reinterpreting or reformulating 
its uses accordingly”  (114) 
28
 See, for example, Marguerite Abdul-Masih, Edward Schillebeeckx and Hans Frei: A Conversation 
on Method and Christology, (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2001). 
29
 David E. Demson, Hans Frei and Karl Barth: Different Ways of Reading Scripture (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997). 
30
 John David Dawson, Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Christian Identity in Boyarin, 
Auerbach, and Frei, (California: The University of California Press, 2002). 
31
 Richard R. Topping, Revelation, Scripture and Church: Theological Hermeneutic Thought of James 
Barr, Paul Ricoeur and Hans Frei,  (Aldershot : Ashgate, 2007). 
32
 David Lee, Luke’s Stories of Jesus: Theological Reading of Gospel Narrative and the Legacy of 
Hans Frei, (Sheffield : Sheffield Academic Press, 1999). 
33
 Gaventa, Beverly Roberts & Hays, Richard B. eds.  Seeking the Identity of Jesus: A Pilgrimage.  
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008).   
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interest to the field of homiletics.
34
  In particular, Charles Campbell’s book, 
Preaching Jesus
35
, as well as suggesting what a truly ‘postliberal’ sermon might look 
like, also manages to be one of the most insightful introductions to Frei’s theology 
available. 
 
The reader, then, should expect Frei’s name to appear in any number of theological, 
biblical, hermeneutical, and homiletical treatises.  Moreover, he is the continuing 
subject of many shorter essays and articles, some of which are listed below.
36
  
However, there are few full length studies available which encompass the whole of 
Hans Frei’s theology.  Campbell’s particular focus aside, currently the only one 
available is Mike Higton’s Christ, Providence & History.
 37
  The stated purpose of 
this book is to explore how Frei “painstakingly calls theologians to a public task”
38
; 
the unspoken project may perhaps be seen as an attempt to redeem Frei’s theology, 
with its emphasis on the specific narratives of the Christian faith and the 
distinctiveness of Christian language
39
, from accusations of sectarianism.  There is a 
strong tendency within ‘postliberalism’ or the ‘Yale School’ towards an almost 
entirely self-referential conceptualisation of church and theology.  For all that this is 
an option which Frei rejects under the fifth of his “Types” of Christian theology, he 
is vulnerable to this kind of accusation whenever he is associated too closely with 
                                                 
34
 Notable recent examples include Richard L. Eslinger, “Tracking the Homiletical Plot”; and David 
Buttrick, “Story and Symbol: The Stuff of Preaching”, in What’s the Shape of Narrative Preaching: 
Essays in honor of Eugene L. Lowry, ed. Mike Graves & David J. Schlafer (St Louis: Chalice Press, 
2008), 69–86 and 99–114 respectively.   
35
 Charles Campbell, Preaching Jesus: New Directions for Homiletics in Hans Frei’s Postliberal 
Theology, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997). 
36
 See, for example, Jason A. Springs, “Between Barth and Wittgenstein: On the Availability of Hans 
Frei’s Later Theology”, in Modern Theology 23, (2007) 393–413; M. A. Higton, “Hans Frei and 
David Tracy on the Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Christianity”, The Journal of Religion Vol. 79, 
566–91; William W. Young  III, “The Identity of the Literal sense: Midrash in the Work of Hans 
Frei”, in Journal of Religion Vol. 85 (2005), 609–33; and others cited in this introduction. 
37
 Mike Higton, Christ, Providence & History: Hans W. Frei’s Public Theology, (T&T Clark Ltd, 
2004). 
38
 Higton, Christ, Providence & History, 1. 
39
 See Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 
1992).  Of particular interest is his description of his preferred “Type 4: Karl Barth” (38–46), in which 
Frei agrees with Barth, that “Theology is Christian self-description first” (38).  For this reason, he 
refutes all ‘external’ bases for the theological enterprise, and largely approves of Barth’s insistence, 
that “fundamental theology – or as he [Barth] calls it, Prolegomena – is internal to, part of, the 
dogmatic enterprise”.  (39) 
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some of his peers.  After all, it is a short road from George Lindbeck’s theories of 





Whether Frei, Lindbeck, or indeed Hauerwas, deserves to be categorised as 
‘sectarian’ or otherwise is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is not intended to be 
an apologetic for postliberal theology in general.  However, where the subtlety and 
distinctiveness of Frei’s thought has been lost through his inclusion under the 
‘postliberal’ or ‘Yale School’ labels, it has been necessary at times to extract him.  
Not every follower of a founder’s principles has fully understood those principles, 
and even if they have, they are free to adapt them for their own ends.  Moreover, for 
all that Lindbeck and Frei shared concern with church language and practices, they 
did in fact approach the task of theology from quite opposite starting points: 
 The logic of Frei’s theology tended to move from the particular to the general, and from the 
 confessional to the methodological; the logic of Lindbeck’s theology moved more or less in 
 the opposite direction.
41
 
Hunsinger’s point here about the grammatical logic of Frei’s theology is no mere 
formal difference, but is central to Frei’s whole project, so that he should rightly be 
differentiated from Lindbeck from the start.  In addition, as pointed out by Mike 
Higton, Frei’s approach was determinedly christocentric, whereas “Lindbeck 
manages to present the whole of his cultural-linguistic theory without Christology 
appearing as anything other than an illustration”.
42
  Lastly, although Frei himself 
largely approved of Lindbeck’s project, this was not an unqualified approval.  Frei’s 
abiding concern for theological realism led him to be ever so slightly wary of 
Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic theory of doctrine: theology is, but is also so much 
more than, grammatical logic.  Hence Frei confesses, “half under my breath … to 
some qualified sympathy for the moderate propositionalists”
43
 who, upon reading 
The Nature of Doctrine, might protest that what Lindbeck “says about doctrines as 
second-order rules is sufficiently kin to doctrines as first-order propositional 
                                                 
40
 See in particular Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian 
Social Ethic, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
41
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42
 Higton, “Frei’s Christology and Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic Theory”, 94. 
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 Frei, “Epilogue”, 279. 
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statements that he could allow second-order doctrines about the Trinity, atonement, 
etc., to have the character not only of intra-systemic but ontological truth 
statements.”
44
  For all their similarities, it is crucial to this project to note that the 
differences between Frei and Lindbeck – and with Lindbeck, much of the postliberal 
tradition – are situated precisely within the category of the grammatical order of 
belief with which we are so concerned.     
 
3. The Doctrine of Revelation: A brief historical survey 
 
Let us say it again: revelation is all very well. 
 
Certainly, it is the epistemological foundation of all specifically Christian doctrines: 
those which pertain to the knowledge of God and God’s works which do not fall 
under the heading of ‘natural theology’, but which are the particular preserve of the 
Christian religion.  Further, the doctrine of revelation is the essential epistemological 
corollary of the equally foundational ontological premise: that of the being and 
sovereignty of God.  In other words, there can be no other starting point for a 
specifically Christian theology than this: that God’s being, absolute and transcendent, 
is known to us only in gracious revelation.  Thus the great Confessions of the 
Reformed faith
45
 all begin with a side-by-side assertion of the two. For example, the 
Westminster Confession (1646) states this most unequivocally at the very start, in 
one sentence relegating the vexed question of natural religion to secondary status, 
and declaring scripture to be the one, truest source of revelation: 
 Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence do so far manifest  the 
 goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to leave men unexcusable; yet are they not 
 sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of His will, which is necessary unto 
 salvation. Therefore it pleased the Lord, at sundry times, and in divers manners, to reveal 
 Himself … and afterwards … to commit the same wholly unto writing; which makes the 
 Holy Scripture to be most necessary …
46
 
                                                 
44
 Ibid. 278. 
45
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Only once revelation has thus been established as the source of our knowledge of 
God, does the Confession then proceed to the content of that revelation in the next 
chapter: “Of God, and of the Holy Trinity”.  Similarly, The Scots Confession (1560) 
in its Preface establishes Scripture as “the mouth of God”, before embarking on the 
first chapter, “Of God”.  The Belgic Confession (revised version 1619) reverses the 
procedure, beginning with “Article 1: De Natura Dei”, before proceeding to “Article 
2: De Cognitione Dei”.  Meanwhile, The Second Helvetic Confession devotes two 
whole chapters to Scripture and its interpretation before finally arriving at the unity 
and triunity of God in Chapter 3.  Whatever way round these Confessions approach 
the task of theology, it is clear that though they cannot both be spoken of at once, and 
must therefore have their own chapters, yet for all practical purposes, the being and 
the knowledge of God are inseparable. 
 
Following on from the wide-ranging deistic movements of the Enlightenment, the 
theologians of the nineteenth century rediscovered the doctrine of revelation with 
something of a sigh of relief.  Although it had to undergo many modifications to 
render it acceptable to modern ears – most notably the divorce of revelation from 
Scripture – nevertheless, as Schleiermacher and his liberal descendents found,
47
 the 
doctrine was useful.  Here, in this ancient doctrine, was on offer an epistemological 
scheme which could preserve whole God’s transcendence from the dissection skills 
of the scientific historian. 
 
The twentieth century picked up the liberal concern with revelation, and once more 
shook it about.  Indeed, in a lecture to theology students in 1975, Frei posited under 
the heading, “Contemporary Issues in Theology”, that “the great pervasive issue 
1920–1970 was what is revelation?”  Expanding on his theme, he continued, “What 
kind of knowledge is it?  Before Christian theologians talked about God, they tried to 
                                                 
47
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settle (the) question of knowledge of God.”
48
  And as Frei explained to his students, 
after the 1922 publication of Der Römerbrief, the question of the knowledge of God 
was assumed by most Protestant theologians to be answerable only within a 
dialectical matrix, in which “relationship to God (was seen as) totally indirect, across 
an absolute barrier man could not cross”: 
 ‘Revelation’ in [the] first place was contact with God [which] man cannot provide for 
 himself: Not a heightening of ordinary insight.  Secondly, revelation does not take away the 
 barrier but miraculously crosses it: Man remains forever limited: Revelation (is) not direct, 
 special or mystical insight.  (It must always come to man as event ‘now’; Man never 
 possesses it, only receives it.  Revelation [is] never behind him.)  Thirdly, revelation then 
 means a trusting abiding in non-knowing of God.  God is hidden in his revelation.
49 
In short, the project of the ‘dialectical’, or ‘krisis’
50
 theologians was to eliminate any 
preconditions in this world for revelation, and so to pass control of the knowledge of 
God back into the hands of God.  Therefore, despite its most comprehensive 
rebellion against the central liberal idea of an immanent, or generally available 
revelation, the ‘post-liberal’ twentieth century never abandoned its concern with the 
revealing God.  The doctrine of revelation, thus redefined, was as useful in its turn to 
the generations of ‘krisis’ theologians as it had been to their ‘liberal’ forebears, intent 
as they were now on wrenching apart God and world.   
 
Revelation, then, is all very well: but how revelation is understood to function 
epistemologically; and the relation of revelation to the being of the God who reveals; 
and the grammatical rules concerning how we should order our understanding of 
God in revelation – these are all up for grabs.  To illustrate: is revelation general in 
nature?  Available to all humanity?  Available only in scripture?  Indeed, is the 
meaning of scripture itself available to all humanity, or only to those who have been 
divinely inspired to read with faith?  Is revelation still a divine speech-act even if no 
one hears it?  And once revelation has been heard, can it then be humanly owned?  
                                                 
48 
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 ‘Krisis’ is a term introduced to theology by Barth in Der Römerbrief.  Briefly, it is used to describe 
the plight of a humanity which is unable to cross the dialectic between world and God.  The krisis is in 
fact God’s ‘No!’ to any attempt on our part to do so: “We stand here … before a penetrating and 
ultimate KRISIS, before the supremacy of a negation by which all existence is rolled up.”  (Barth, 
Romans, 91.)  The new generation of theologians who embraced Barth’s dialectical scheme became 
known in English as ‘the theologians of crisis’. 
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Ontologically, is God immanent in all humanity?  Immanent in all creation?  Or did 
the krisis theologians get it right when they said that revelation is always 
transcendent because God is always transcendent?  Grammatically, how should we 
formulate our understanding into a doctrine?  For example, what tense should we use 
to talk about revelation?  What does it mean to say that ‘God has spoken’?  And how 
should we order our predicative statements?  Can we say that Jesus is God?  Or that 
God is Jesus?  Or that God is in Jesus?  Can we do theology without supernatural 
revelation?  Is the philosophical inquiry the same as the theological one?  Or if we do 
need revelation before beginning the theological enterprise, with which moment of 
revelation should we begin?  Then, in creation?  Then, specifically in Christ?  Or 
now, in the present existential moment of revelation-for-us?  This quick list does not 
begin to exhaust the questions about revelation with which the tradition has grappled. 
 
4. Religion (Natural and Revealed) 
 
Two years after the publication of his doctoral thesis, Frei was commissioned to 
contribute a short essay to a textbook compilation, A Handbook of Christian 
Theology.  This was a pocket-sized, semi-popularist publication with the ambitious 
subtitle, Essential Information for Every Christian.
51
  Small though the format is, this 
volume crams into its dense print over one hundred essays by an impressive cross-
section of the day’s leading theologians: names that are instantly recognisable even 
now include Jaroslav Pelikan on “Dogma” and “Dogmatics”
52
; Reinhold Niebuhr on 
“Freedom”, “The Self”, and “Sin”
53
; Paul Tillich on “Kairos”
54
; and a young George 
Lindbeck on “Thomism”
55
.  True to its stated intention, this book encompasses an 
array of hot theological topics, some of which have stood the test of time better than 
others.  While deliberately Protestant in bias
56
, there is no obvious theological 
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agenda, and contributors, while doubtless chosen for their expertise, seem to have 
been given considerable freedom of approach as they variously grapple with issues 
of ethics, ecclesiology, church history, and doctrine.   
 
The promising young theologian, Hans Frei, was allocated the unenviable task of 
summarising, in around 3500 words, the Christian understanding of revelation.  The 
end product appears in the volume under the heading, “Religion (Natural and 
Revealed)”.
57
  It is not known whether the actual title was given to him in advance, 
or whether he chose it for himself, or whether it was a later editorial decision.  
However, it seems fair to assume that it was not entirely of Frei’s own choosing, for 
a quick read of this short essay is enough to confirm that what we have here is a 
remarkable exercise in the thorough-going negation of a title. 
 
To begin with, the essay offers absolutely no account of a theology of natural 
religion; no discussion of its history, main tenets, or principal proponents.  Frei 
begins with the assumption, on which he claims there is broad, even universal 
agreement in contemporary theology, that the Christian faith is founded upon the 
divine revelation in history, and specifically upon the historical event that was Jesus 
Christ.  He points out that, for nineteenth and twentieth century theologians alike, 
there is no such thing as “natural religion” or “religion in general”: for “religion, 
without a specific historic content, was merely an empty form”.
58
  Christian theology 
had in some way to deal with the historic specificity of Jesus Christ, and there could 
be no account of the knowledge of God on any other grounds. 
 
Thus, swiftly, Frei disposes of natural religion: perhaps his essay would have been 
better entitled, “Religion (Revealed)”.  But in doing so, he outlines the broad 
principles of agreement between nineteenth century ‘liberal’ theology, and the 
dialectical theology of the mid-twentieth century ‘postliberal’ scene.  For all that 
these twentieth century theologians had rebelled most comprehensively against the 
                                                 
57 Hans W. Frei, “Religion (Natural and Revealed)”, in A Handbook of Christian Theology: Essential 
Information for Every Christian, edited by Marvin Halverson & Arthur Cohen (London & Glasgow: 
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previous century’s dominant approach, there was one nineteenth century emphasis 
that they had not overturned: that the historical Jesus-event was the single most 
fundamental moment of divine revelation in history.  On this point the two centuries 
were in full agreement. The voices of dispute were raised only when it came to 
explaining how that historically-past event has significance for us in our historical 
present.  However, even on this topic the two camps are not as opposed as many of 
the latter theologians believed.  Frei points out the broad consensus between the 
centuries, that “despite its indissoluble ties to a specific past event, revelation must 
come to present recipients as a present event”.
59
  Neither the fiercely-combative 
twentieth century ‘dialectical’ theologians nor the urbane nineteenth century liberals 
would have disputed this point. 
 
Frei’s useful survey of historical theology here describes for us how Schleiermacher 
and the nineteenth century liberals had their own accounts of the essential 
compatibility between God’s speaking and our ability to hear, whether that 
compatibility is attributable to an inbuilt ‘God-consciousness’ or to some other God-
given human faculty.  However, for the twentieth century dialectical theologians, 
emphasising as they did the infinite distance between God and creation, this relation 
was a far more fraught issue, and one which had effectively divided the postliberal 
movement into two distinct and often opposing schools.   
 
As stated above, Der Römerbrief marks almost the precise moment when the 
twentieth century rejected the liberal ‘immanent’ understanding of revelation, and 
turned instead to a ‘dialectical’ doctrine of an utterly transcendent, wholly objective 
God.  Moreover, in the fierce dialectical schema of Der Römerbrief, far from being 
harmonious with human experience, the revelatory acts of God are received rather as 
almost violent incursions into the natural world order.  With this 1922 publication, 
the Protestant theological world was at a word divided into ‘old-school’ liberals and 
the dynamic young krisis theologians.  However, thereafter, things were not so  
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binary.  Barth continued on his own particular ‘actualist’
60
 path, and then later 
supposedly ‘softened’ the ferocity of his dialectical method and polemic by 
incorporating a great appreciation of analogy.
61
  However, in the intervening years 
since the publication of Der Römerbrief, an unforeseen (by Barth) development was 
the emergence of a school of theology which, like Barth, was uncompromisingly 
dialectical, and yet in other respects, very ‘unBarthian’ indeed.  Christian 
existentialism
62
 had scarcely been noticed by the English-speaking theological world 
before 1940; since then, however, it had very quickly gained ground, until by the 
time Frei came to publish his thesis, it was the single most dominant movement in 
academic theology.  Moreover, Frei’s own doctoral supervisor and mentor at Yale, 
H. Richard Niebuhr, is broadly categorised in this essay as an existentialist 
theologian
63
, and was perhaps even the first to impact powerfully on the American 
theological scene.  His influence on Frei was powerful, and not easy for the young 
theologian to escape. 
 
Frei’s little essay neatly illustrates that in 1958, he is as yet uncommitted to any 
particular school of theology.  Perhaps he is merely seeking to give a balanced 
account of religion (natural and revealed), but it is clear that he has not yet aligned 
himself wholly with his contemporary dialectical theologians, whether of the 
Barthian or of the existentialist variety.  Moreover, he shows an unfashionable 
appreciation of the nineteenth century liberals and refuses to dismiss them out-of-
hand.  If anything, one might conclude that Frei is intent on appreciating whatever is 
of value from any of these theological schools: a generous approach to theology 
which was to be a hallmark of his later career. 
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Moreover, at this early stage in his career, Frei was still very much working under 
the mentorship of Niebuhr, whose influence is obvious in this essay.  True, he had 
made the break with his mentor a year earlier, when he had contributed two essays to 
a volume on Niebuhr’s theology
64
, which essays are as critical as they are 
appreciative.  However, in “Religion (Natural and Revealed)”, the ‘existentialist’ 
influence still seems to be winning over a more actualistic account of revelation.  
This is evident in Frei’s concern, not so much with the transcendent aspect of the 
divine speech-act (although, to be fair, that may be a ‘given’ for him, an almost 
“unconscious presupposition”).  Rather, his concern is with how this speech-act 
impacts upon its human listeners.  After all, as he points out, revelation is scarcely 





This concise, one-line summary raises what seems almost a truism: that the divine 
self-disclosure, in whatever shape or form it comes to us, must have a content; and 
that content must be intelligible and significant.  Of course, any intelligible speech-
act must say something: but this is not quite Frei’s point here.  In theological terms, 
revelation is the self-disclosure of God.  Now, the content of self-disclosure is of 
course the Self; and so the content of divine self-disclosure must be the divine Self, 
actually and truly revealed.  When God speaks, it is the content of God’s own Self 
that is being described to us.  Any account of revelation, then, is an attempt to 
grapple with the fundamental epistemological question, What can we say about God?  
If natural religion is outlawed from the start, then the only source of our knowledge 
is God’s self-revelation.  This was axiomatic for dialectical theologians of whatever 
brand, working as they all were in the aftermath of Der Römerbrief .  This emphasis 
was an understandable reaction to liberal theology’s preoccupation with human 
receptivity and its immanent account of revelation.  However, the danger of the 
dialectical scheme is that it posited so strongly the speaking of God, that it struggled 
to give an account of how that revelation ever became “intelligibly significant” to the 
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human hearer.  Hence Frei criticises what he sees as a certain abstraction at the heart 
of Barth’s dialectic: if God’s revelation is not “intelligible”, then it has no content, 
and so barely qualifies as ‘revelation’ at all. 
 
Frei’s proposal in this essay is that the existentialist version of dialectical theology 
might have a credible answer to this puzzle of revelation.  He describes how, for 
Niebuhr and his fellow existentialist theologians, “Revelation is the ‘I-Thou 
encounter’ par excellence” in which “the ultimate structure with which the self is 
here in contact is personal.  Religion is a Subject-subject encounter”.  This is a clear 
attempt to speak about the transcendence of the revelatory moment in terms of its 
impact on the human subject: while not ceasing to be transcendent, nevertheless 
revelation by this account occurs on a level which we can at least conceptualise.  
However, even-handedly, Frei then contrasts this approach to the problem of 
revelation to Barth’s own epistemological solution.  As he explains, while Barth 
“rejects the direct attribution of a ‘personal’ dimension to God, asserted by the 
existentialist theologians”, he finds his own way forward in a heavy reliance “on a 
concept of analogy, i.e., correspondence within dissimilarity”.
66
  This concept of 
analogy in Barth had been a key topic in Frei’s doctoral dissertation, and one towards 
which he was favourably disposed: as Frei understands it, a divinely-authorised 
analogy allows accurate enough speech about God while yet preserving the 
dialectical unlikeness of God and creation.  Nevertheless, Frei remains critical in this 
essay of what he sees as Barth’s tendency towards Idealistic abstraction, and wonders 
whether Niebuhr’s understanding of “two types of history”, as outlined in The 
Meaning of Revelation
67
, might not provide a “middle road” for theologians between 
“unrevelational history and unhistorical revelation ... be they called secular and 
sacred or objective and existential”.
68
   
 
For the moment it seems that Frei is not yet ready to make a judgement between the 
various understandings of the doctrine of revelation that were on offer: he leaves the 
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point unresolved in this essay, though he later rejects Niebuhr’s conciliatory option 
of “two types of history”.  However, Frei’s insight here, that revelation must have an 
intelligible content if it is to be more than merely a thunder booming across the 
dialectical void, is an early invocation of the hermeneutical question that was to 
occupy him for the rest of his career.  As stated above, a God who reveals, reveals 
knowledge of God’s own content: so if revelation has occurred at all, then we must 
be able to say something concrete about God.  Add to that the theological consensus 
of the nineteenth and twentieth century, that Jesus Christ is the single most 
fundamental moment of divine revelation in history.  In that case, the ultimate 
epistemological question, What can we say about God?, is answered by pointing to 
God’s self-disclosure in Jesus Christ; and so the epistemological question transfers 
across to, What can we say about Jesus?  However, Jesus is not directly available to 
us in his historical specificity, and so we are dependent for our knowledge of him 
almost entirely on the gospel accounts.  Accordingly, the epistemological lens must 
pull back yet further, so that the question, What can we say about God?, finally 
transforms into, How should we read the gospels?   
 
In framing the epistemological question thus as a hermeneutical one, Frei is taking a 
step in behind of the dominant dialectical theology, and might even be seen as 
aligning himself with the unfashionable nineteenth century liberal tradition.  This is 
because hermeneutics seems to occupy a position very much at the human end of the 
dialectic, given that it is concerned with our understanding, and even our receptivity.  
Thus a focus on hermeneutics threatens to make God’s revelation dependent on our 
reading of God; and moreover, seems to promise an access to the knowledge of God 
that is generally available to anyone who picks up a Bible, and works out how to read 
it.  After all, the arch-liberal Schleiermacher “is regularly identified as the founder of 
modern hermeneutics”.
69
  The attraction of hermeneutics for Schleiermacher was that 
it promised a ‘scientific’
70
 methodology (that is, one which is generally applicable) 
for the decoding of any personal communication, so that all hearers or readers of 
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such a self-revelation might have a semi-direct access to the mind of the ‘revealer’.  
Theologically, this meant that God, as ‘author’ of the entire universe, has revealed 
therein and so must in some way be generally available to all human ‘readers’ of 
God’s artistic handiwork.  Hence the knowledge of God needs no special revelation.  
Even Jesus Christ is of dubious revelatory status, significant not in himself, but only 
when conjoined with the general awareness of God in our consciousness.  Hence 
Schleiermacher locates revelation as the moment “when the historical event and the 
special religious awareness (or the direct presence of God) are fully united at some 
point in human experience”.
71
  The offensiveness of this position to the dialectical 
theologians need not be spelled out again; and it is an offensiveness which is closely 
aligned with a hermeneutical approach to revelation. 
 
Now, Frei is far from adopting this position.  He is well aware of the limitations of 
the nineteenth century approach, observing ruefully that “nineteenth-century 
theologians were never able to agree about the point at which objective event and 
concrete subjectivity (or living faith) became one”.
72
  Furthermore, Frei is generally 
accepting of the kind of Barthian actualism which insists that divine revelation is not 
dependent on any human receptivity.  This insistence is designed to resist the 
suggestion that revelation, once received, can ever become a human possession – a 
religion – as Schleiermacher understood it.  In aligning himself thus with his 
dialectical contemporaries, Frei has indeed most thoroughly negated his own title, so 
that even the abbreviated suggestion, “Religion (Revealed)”, would now be wholly 
inappropriate.  Yet Schleiermacher’s reframing of the epistemological question (How 
do we know God?) as a hermeneutical one (By what method might we read correctly 
God’s revelation?) is much closer to Frei’s approach than the radical divorce and 
distance proposed by dialectic theology.   
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5. The start of a project: Frei on Revelation and Grammatical Logic 
 
Even in the midst of this broad sketch of theological history and principles, Frei is 
setting out his own particular stall.  Revelation is all very well.  But Frei’s concise, 
even rather obvious summary, that revelation must in some way embody “a content 
that may become intelligibly significant for its human recipients”, externalises a 
number of sometimes hidden assumptions surrounding the doctrine of revelation.  To 
begin with, divine revelation can have meaning only insofar as it is first of all 
‘hearable’ (let alone ‘heard’) by its “human recipients”.  Secondly, the divine speech-
act, if it is to be understood as God’s self-revelation, and not simply the expression of 
some truth about the universe which might have been epistemologically accessible 
by some more ordinary means, then it must be genuinely communicative of an 
ontological reality that is the “content” of God’s self-referring words.  Thirdly, and 
most crucially for Frei’s abiding project, this communicated content, if it is to be 
genuine knowledge, must be “intelligible”, that is, able to be formulated by us 
humans in recognisably grammatical terms.   
 
In other words, already in this early essay, Frei is beginning to tease out the 
interweaving epistemological, ontological and grammatical implications of that most 
foundational doctrine of revelation.  Revelation is all very well, but as he is working 
out, it is not so foundational an assumption as all that.  Certainly, there is a formal 
logic to its adoption as a first principle: if we assume an absolute dialectical distance 
between world and God, of course we could say nothing about God, had God not 
crossed that distance and revealed in this world.  But nevertheless, we already have 
drawn up criteria for what qualifies as revelation.  God may speak in freedom, when 
and how God chooses.  But if God’s speech is to qualify as ‘revelation’, then as 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics point out, it is bound by some of the rules of 
conversation.  We have to be able to hear the speaker.  We have to believe and 
experience the speaker in some sense to be ‘real’.  And we should be able to repeat 
back to the speaker the significant content of what they have said, but this time in our 
own words.  But the issue for Frei, as for Barth and the twentieth century krisis 
theologians, is that all these ‘conditions’ for revelation can be no human conditions 
imposed on the divine.  The dialectic does not work in that direction: that would be 
the wrong grammatical order.  Rather, they must be considered as conditions 
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established by the divine itself, precisely in and with the moment of revelation.  In 
other words, if Jesus is the supreme self-revelation of God, then we expect Jesus 
intelligibly to reveal the content of God, precisely because God, in Jesus, has created 
that expectation by fulfilling it in one and the same act.  The formal logic of 
‘revelation first, theology second’, segues into christological simultaneity.  Jesus, the 
Word, is the foundational rational content of all the various understandings of the 
doctrine of revelation.  Or to put it another way, the doctrine of revelation, in 
whatever form it appears, is not so much a prolegomena, as already an interpretation. 
 
Towards the end of Frei’s life, this early insight becomes crystallised in the 
posthumously published and unfinished Types of Christian Theology.  Here, Frei 
distinguishes between “first-order theology”, which is the faith-confessions of the 
Christian community, and “second-order theology”, which is the doctrinal statement 
of these faith-confessions.  He writes, “there is what we have just called the logic, or 
grammar, of the faith, which may well have bearing on the first-order statements, an 
endeavour to bring out the rules implicit in first-order statements.”
73
  However, and 
importantly, this is not a one-way street: the task of doctrinal formulation is not only 
to express the faith, but in discovering the difficulties of expression, may also help to 
shape the faith.  The creeds of the church, for example, which are certainly 
“confession(s) of specific beliefs” recited in worship and utilised in theology as 
broad hermeneutical guidelines, are themselves doctrinal statements whose 
grammatical logic has been most carefully worked out. 
 
The problem is that there is frequently a mismatch between grammatical logic and 
the ontological actuality it seeks to describe.  Some events happen simultaneously; 
some beings or natures co-exist in absolute unity; some seeming predicates, such as 
‘exists’, turn out not to be predicates at all.
74
  In such and similar circumstances, 
given that it is impossible to speak of two things at once, the speaker must make a 
choice of grammatical ordering if they are to be at all intelligible – even if this is a 
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distortion of the actuality.  This is the eternal problem faced when theologising about 
the Trinity, for example: the grammatical necessity of speaking separately about the 
three does not correspond to any ontological separation.  Nevertheless, the choice 
made as to the logical ordering of the Father, Son, and Spirit, is no random ordering, 
but a prioritising of sorts.  Arius’ heresy was of course to load this grammatical 
ordering with too much ontological weight, and interpret it as designating a 
chronological and hierarchical priority.
75
  However, that is not to say that the 
grammatical ordering carries no ontological weight at all: even the orthodox 
Athanasian treatment prioritises the ‘Father’ as the source of the being of the ‘Son’ 
and ‘Spirit’, so that the grammatical ordering corresponds to some kind of 
ontological priority, though not (as with Arius) a chronological or hierarchical one.  
If the order were to be posited grammatically as Spirit, Father, and Son, for example, 
the inevitable result would be some quite different theological conclusions.  
However, the subtlety of the Trinitarian grammar is that, in and with this sense of 
priority, is also given an insistence upon the simultaneity of at least two of the 
persons, Father and Son.  Given that a father cannot be a father without an offspring, 
the grammatical logic of the one contains the necessity of the other, while also 
preserving a vital order, so that it is almost impossible to speak of Son first, and then 
Father.   
 
This example of Trinitarian grammar illustrates nicely two almost opposite 
contentions.  Firstly, it illustrates that grammatical ordering is no random choice, but 
does carry with it some ontological weight.  Grammatical order is shaped by 
ontological order, and accordingly, ought to correspond to revealed truths.  Secondly, 
however, the example of Trinitarian grammar demonstrates that grammatical order is 
not the same as ontological order.   There is a vital dialectical separation between the 
two, in line with the dialectical separation between God and world.  If the 
grammatical logic corresponds to the ontological actuality in any way, this is through 
grace alone, and such a correspondence is better thought of as analogical rather than 
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as univocal.
76
  As the example of the Trinity demonstrates, a failure to distinguish 
between grammatical logic and ontological actuality can lead to a whole host of 
theological misunderstandings, not to mention heresies. 
 
The same problem of logical ordering emerges in relation to the doctrine of 
revelation.  Revelation and God: which to speak of first?  In recent years, this 
question has been at the heart of much theological controversy in the Barthian 
traditions, as two principal and opposing camps consider whether God’s being is 
eternally Trinitarian before God’s decision to reveal (in an actual, though not a 
temporal sense), or eternally Trinitarian precisely in God’s decision to reveal.  This 
debate was kick-started by Eberhard Jüngel, who in 1966 published the short 
monograph, Gottes Sein ist im Werden, later translated into English as The Doctrine 
of the Trinity: God’s Being is in Becoming.
77
  With the aim of avoiding metaphysical 
speculation, Jüngel tackles the ‘content’ of God from the angle of that most 
metaphysical of doctrines, the Trinity.  His objective was to extrapolate from Barth a 
more focussed Trinitarian ontology, in which God’s being is “ontologically 
localized”
78
 in the dynamic act of ‘becoming’: 
 God’s being is in motion from eternity.  God’s being is moved being: ‘Being is the act of his 
 revelation.’  (CDII/2, 257.)  At the same time, however, God’s primal decision teaches us to 
 understand God’s being concretely ...
79
  
Jüngel, then, around the same time as Frei is producing his mature theology, is 
likewise concerned to locate a concrete account of the content of God.  Since then, 
the topic he inaugurated has mushroomed into an abstruse and hugely complicated 
debate, as the current generation of Barthian scholars finds itself considering whether 
there an ontological distinction to be made between a ‘pre-existent’ Son, the Logos 
asarkos, who elected to enter our history, and the historical person Jesus Christ the 
Logos ensarkos.
80
  While in epistemological terms, our knowledge of the Son begins 
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with the historical Jesus of Nazareth, we are nevertheless grammatically obliged to 
speak of the pre-existent Son first.  The question becomes whether this necessary 
grammatical logic bears any direct relation to the order of being. 
 
Some of the details of this debate will be considered later, as it is one to which Frei 
has a significant contribution to make.  For this is Frei’s crucial insight: that there are 
different kinds of logic at work in the theo-logical task.  Ontological logic is one, but 
the epistemological logic is another, and grammatical logic yet a third.  Sometimes 
these different logics will overlap considerably, or run parallel to one another, to the 
point where they are frequently confused.  The result is a theological muddle where 
the logical thread is so tangled that the reader is hard pressed to locate the cut end.  
Frei’s self-imposed and lifelong task, whose genesis is seen here in his thesis and in 
this early essay on “Religion (Natural and Revealed)”, is to locate the actual starting 
point for any given theology, and from there to unravel the tangles and lay out the 
grammatical order of belief in its most linear form.  Only then can we bypass the 
usual assumption of revelation (in whatever form) as the starting point, and see 
clearly not only where any given theological system
81
 really begins, but also where it 
ends.  For only once we have reached the end point – the content of God – are we in 
a position to make a judgement as to the success and value of the system. 
 
This brief introductory summary can scarcely do justice to the complexity of the 
theological scene through which Frei is just beginning to steer his course, let alone 
give more than a hint of Frei’s abiding relevance.  The essay considered above is 
short, its claims are sweeping, and its theological position is as yet hesitant: this 
introduction likewise.  But it sets out neatly the positions of Frei’s three principal 
academic ‘fathers’ – Friedrich Schleiermacher, Karl Barth, and H. Richard Niebuhr – 
who together dominate the theological inheritance with which Frei must grapple if he 
is to arrive at a synthesis of critical appreciation and independent conclusion.  And 
even more importantly, the essay points to the interrelation of hermeneutics and of 
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epistemology, always at the base of every theological endeavour, and so 
symptomatic of Frei’s endless probing beneath, for the assumptions, the foundations, 
the frameworks which underpin and give rise to every theological stance.   
 
6. Outline of Work 
 
This thesis offers a systematic engagement with the theological hermeneutics of 
Hans Frei.  The short and early essay described above provides the two key 
conceptual categories which will shape the exploration of Frei’s theological project: 
that of the content of God, and Frei’s search for a means of talking about it. 
Moreover, the content he seeks, if it is to deserve the label of ‘content’ at all, must be 
a concrete content: typically, all metaphysical speculation is disallowed.   
 
Intertwined with these traditional ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ categories will 
be the discussion of the abiding issue of logic in its ontological, epistemological, 
grammatical, and formal senses, as Frei sets himself the task not only of untangling 
the confused logic of some of his theological opponents, but of establishing his own 
clear order of belief.  The thesis demonstrates that for Frei, the logical starting point 
for the order of belief is the identity of Jesus Christ as revealed in scripture.  It is on 
that basis alone that a positive and concrete content of God can be posited.  This 
aspect of ‘untangling’ ontology and grammatical logic in particular is central to the 
project of the thesis, and to Frei’s continued relevance. 
 
In doing this, the intention is to set Frei very firmly within his mid-twentieth century 
context, in particular his engagement with, appreciation of, but ultimate rejection of 
contemporary existentialist theology.  Indeed, given that much of his own project 
was formulated in direct opposition to the key existentialist theologians of his time, 
there will be frequent engagement with their arguments, in the belief that these will 
throw Frei’s own position into greater relief.  Against this mid-twentieth century 
theological context, the shape and urgency of Frei’s task will become clear. 
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The thesis does not stop at the mid-twentieth century, however, and will illustrate the 
continued relevance of Frei’s hermeneutical theology with reference to how 
existentialist modes of thought survive into this century.  In the process, it will also 
become clear how Frei continues to be appropriated and misappropriated in 
contemporary debates, whether these be in the fields of biblical studies or of 
systematic theology.  Moreover, suggestions will be made as to his applicability to 
modern theological concerns, including the debate surrounding the being and action 
of God: a field where he has yet to be deployed successfully.  Once again, this 
applicability will centre around Frei’s clear-sighted distinction between ontological 
and grammatical logic alongside their essential relation. 
 
The thesis concentrates on Frei’s theological development from his first works 
through to the twin publications of The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (1974) and The 
Identity of Jesus Christ
82
 (1975).  These latter two works I take to be central to Frei’s 
theological hermeneutics, and I follow Mike Higton in my tendency to read his later 
work as “a clarification of the kind of academic theology that will best be able to 
assist the Christian practice of figural reading, and so best able to acknowledge the 
providential ordering of history in Jesus Christ which that practice confesses”.
83
  In 
particular, The Identity of Jesus Christ will be read for its account of the resurrection 
as key to the positing of a concrete content to the identity of God. 
 
The material is arranged into five chapters.  The first of these considers in detail the 
three principle alternative accounts of the doctrine of revelation which were available 
to Frei at the start of his career: those of Schleiermacher, Barth, and H. Richard 
Niebuhr.  From these accounts Frei acquired many questions and some answers, but 
wholeheartedly embraced none of them, not even Barth’s.  In our own consideration, 
we will be considering exactly what it was that Frei judged as deficient in each 
approach, in respect particularly of their ability to present an account of God which 
had some actual concrete content.  His own way forward will then become clearer. 
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The second chapter focuses in on one particular essay: Frei’s Preface to the 1975 
publication of The Identity of Jesus Christ.  The value of this Preface is that it sets 
out concisely and with some clarity exactly why Frei chose to approach his 
theological task in precisely this hermeneutical fashion.  Here the topic of logic in its 
various guises becomes vital, which, taken together, make up what Frei terms “the 
order” or “the logic of belief”.
84
  Topics include Frei’s understanding of prolegomena 
and methodology, his opposition to existentialist theology in the shape of Neo-
Orthodoxy, his refusal of apologetics as a ‘poor substitute’ for realist theology, and 
his rejection of the concept of the hermeneutical circle in favour of a ‘linear’ and 
‘cumulative’ realistic narrative hermeneutic.  This latter point is central to Frei’s 
conceptualisation of theological grammar. 
 
Chapter 3 takes that linear and cumulative model for understanding Frei’s 
hermeneutics, and engages it specifically with his reading of scripture, as set out in 
The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative.  Frei’s concept of a ‘realistic narrative’ 
hermeneutic, introduced in Chapter 2, is here fleshed out with an account of what 
that looks like in application.  The figurative reading of scripture is shown to be vital 
to the maintenance of its unity, which turns out to be a necessary precondition for the 
doctrine of revelation, if God is not to be separated from God’s Word.  The chapter 
then proceeds to a consideration of another, related kind of unity: that of the unified 
self.  At this point the chapter moves into a preliminary discussion of Frei’s concept 
of personal identity as outlined in The Identity of Jesus Christ.  Logically, a being 
who is both fully divine and fully human, is inconceivable.  However, Frei illustrates 
how such seeming contradictions are held together with ease through the medium of 
a linear and cumulative realistic narrative.   
 
The fourth chapter deals with the climax of Frei’s theological system, which is his 
account of the resurrection as key to the identity of Jesus Christ.  Frei’s Anselmic 
formulation, that Jesus is the one who cannot be thought of as not living, is examined 
for coherence.  Consideration is then given to two alternative approaches to the 
resurrection: one by N. T. Wright as an example of a historical reading, and the other 
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by Paul Tillich as an existentialist account which is still highly relevant today.  In 
doing so, the advantages of Frei’s ‘literary’ approach become more apparent, as does 
the reasoning behind his theological choices.  Finally, we return to the doctrine of 
revelation to see if we do now indeed have an account of the concrete content of God 
according to Frei’s realistic narrative exegesis of the resurrection. 
 
Lastly, the fifth chapter focuses on the presence of Jesus Christ: how this is 
inseparably rooted in the gospel account of the resurrection, and how this works in 
terms of grammatical and ontological logic.  The chapter begins with a consideration 
of the grammatical and ontological implications of Frei’s ‘Anselmic proof’, in which 
he defines Jesus Christ is ‘he who cannot be thought of as not living’.  Bultmann’s 
alternative account of the ‘livingness’ and presence of Jesus Christ is held up for 
comparison.  A section is devoted to Frei’s understanding of the role played by 
analogy in theological talk, and how this too is grounded in the biblical account of 
the resurrection. Then finally, the role of the Holy Spirit is also considered, as is the 
eschatological dimension of Frei’s theology. 
 
The aim of the whole is to present the coherence and interconnectedness of the 
various aspects of Frei’s theological hermeneutics, which taken together constitute 
what I have termed his ‘theological grammar’.  The intention is to set out clearly his 
conception of the logic of belief and its relation to the content of God, which is the 
both the starting point and the end of all our theologising.  In doing so, it is hoped 
also to demonstrate the continued value to today’s debates, of Frei’s clear-sighted 
analysis of the relation between ontology and grammatical logic.   
 29  
Chapter 1   The Content of God 
 
1. The Doctrine of Revelation: The Available Options 
 
The aim of this chapter is to begin to examine the questions surrounding any given 
doctrine of revelation, as suggested at the start of the Introduction.  If Frei’s instinct 
always is to probe beneath, to the hidden assumptions underpinning a doctrine, then 
there is a need to illustrate how this probing looks in practice.  Accordingly, an 
examination will be made of the three principal accounts of revelation which were 
available and potentially congenial to Frei at the start of his theological career: that 
of Friedrich Schleiermacher, to represent the 19
th
 century liberal option; that of Karl 
Barth, the topic of Frei’s doctoral thesis; and that of H. Richard Niebuhr, Frei’s own 
Doktoratsvater and representative of the mid-20
th
 century ‘existentialist’ option.
1
   
 
Albeit at different times in his career, Frei did each of these theologians the honour 
of a supremely careful and clear-sighted reading, untangling their assumptions one 
from the other, and laying bare their theological processes.  In the course of 
examining Frei’s accounts of his theological predecessors, and despite his level-
headed appreciation of the strengths of each, it will become clear that of the three, his 
life-long preference is for Barth’s approach.  Already, however, a conclusion can be 
drawn: if Frei did not wholeheartedly embrace any one of their theologies, then he 
must have perceived something deficient in the actual starting point which he found 
to be underlying their assumed starting point in a doctrine of revelation.  In each 
instance, Barth included, Frei deduces that where the assumed starting point is 
concrete enough, the actual starting point is in fact an abstraction. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter will demonstrate that the problem lies, not in any particular 
framing of the doctrine of revelation, but in the adoption of any version of this 
doctrine as a starting point for theology.  To remind ourselves: Frei is searching for a 
                                                 
1
 ‘Existentialism’ as a theological movement is defined and described in detail in the section in this 
chapter which deals with H. Richard Niebuhr. 
 30  
way of ordering theology which will lead to a concrete account of the content of 
God.  Or rather, such a concrete account is not so much the end point as itself the 
starting point for theology, for an abstract starting point will not at some future date 
arrive at a concrete end, and vice versa.  On the contrary: a theological ‘system’ is 
either concrete or abstract, all the way through.  The question of the logic of belief – 
what the actual epistemological starting point should be, and in what order the 
content of God should be expressed – will be addressed more specifically in Chapter 
2.  However, the failures in grammatical order which Frei perceives in these three 
alternative accounts of the being and knowledge of God will be examined here, in the 
course of which the direction of Frei’s own theological project will become clearer. 
 
When considering the three major schemes available to Frei, it may seem a little 
perverse to begin with Barth.   Chronologically, of course Schleiermacher has to take 
precedence, and it is hard to appreciate the twentieth century dialectical theologians 
without some understanding of what they were reacting against.  Accordingly, the 
decision to begin with Barth necessitates some initial brief description of the liberal 
tradition, which might have found its place in a previous account of Schleiermacher’s 
doctrine of revelation. 
 
However, the chosen order is appropriate given that the focus here is on Frei’s 
theological development.  Barth’s doctrine of revelation was the topic of his first 
major theological work, and marks the beginning of his life-long, though not 
uncritical, appreciation of Barth’s work.  Immediately afterwards, he began to 
engage directly in print with Niebuhr’s theology, producing in 1957 the two lengthy 
essays for Faith and Ethics, which subject Niebuhr to a thoroughly critical 
examination.  The following year saw the brief consideration of Niebuhr in “Religion 
(Natural and Revealed)”.  Thereafter, however, with the exception of a late, 
appreciative paper on his public theology
2
, Frei scarcely ever returns to Niebuhr: his 
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own theological project is no longer beholden to his Doktoratsvater, and his major 
works neither make mention of him nor betray much by way of his influence. 
 
It may well be that at this early stage, Frei accepted without much demur his older 
contemporaries’ dismissal of Schleiermacher.  However, as his career progressed, 
Frei came to a greater appreciation of Schleiermacher’s profound theological skills – 
not least because of the three, it was Schleiermacher who was the most innovative 
hermeneutician.  Frei devotes some attention to Schleiermacher in his two early 
essays on Niebuhr, but it is not until The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative that he accords 
him his first in-depth exploration.  Indeed, the last two chapters of this wide-ranging 
study are devoted almost exclusively to Schleiermacher: that they are highly critical 
chapters need not detract from the fact that Frei was now taking Schleiermacher 
seriously as a dialogue partner.  For the remainder of his career and up to his death in 
1988, Frei continued to wrestle with Schleiermacher, and in the process to grow in 
appreciation of the once-despised nineteenth century liberal. 
 
2. The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl Barth 
2.1 The Break with Liberalism 
Therefore, as Barth was Frei’s starting point, so he will also be ours.  There is an 
added advantage in this choice, which is an appealing simplicity to the Barthian 
doctrine of revelation, uncluttered as it is by human subjectivity, and unfettered by 
the compulsion to establish first and foremost the epistemological questions of how 
and when and where God speaks.  That God reveals Godself in speech-acts: that is 
for Barth the simplest and most foundational premise of all theology, and faith is not 
so much a human response to revelation, as an aspect of revelation in and of itself.     
 
This essential, though profound, simplicity is therefore highly useful to our purposes.  
Of course, there is theological complexity – the sheer volume of Barth’s doctrinal 
output is testament to that – but this complexity is nevertheless founded on the 
simple, two-word, ontological statement: Deus dixit – God has spoken.  Although not 
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formulated as such at this stage, this is the underlying premise of Der Römerbrief
3
, 









 In his liberal days Barth had been convinced that there is a direct connection between God’s 
 historical self-manifestation in Jesus Christ and the inward, religious experience of the 
 Christian individual.
6 
For all Hermann’s profound differences to his predecessor, it is clear that both Frei 
and Barth understand him as belonging to a strand of theological thinking which has 
descended – by a sometimes tortuous route –  from Schleiermacher.  In other words, 
Herrmann was consciously working within a non-Idealistic, anti-Hegelian tradition, 
with a concept of God as profoundly personal.  The ‘liberal’ doctrine of revelation as 
held by Schleiermacher was a complex thing, and its nuances will be explored 
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shortly.  However, it is enough for our present purposes to note with Frei this general 
emphasis: that for Herrmann, as for Schleiermacher, there exists a “basic unity 
between Jesus Christ and present Christian faith or religion; between objective, 
historical, concrete divine presence and the subjective spontaneity of response”.  Frei 
goes on to add that for the liberal tradition, “the normative element in Christian faith 
lies in this relation.  It is at once revelation and religion”.
7
  Accordingly, Frei places 
the very early Barth firmly in this same tradition, as one who insists that God is 
“immediately present to the believing individual”
8
 – even though Barth’s unease with 
his tradition is traced by Frei right back to his first published essay.  
 
This, then, was Barth’s conventionally liberal starting point.  The interest for Frei in 
his doctoral thesis is the process by which Barth moved away from this sophisticated 
‘immanent’ understanding of revelation to the ‘opposite’ doctrine of an utterly 
transcendent, wholly objective God.  Frei sees Barth’s ‘conversion’ to krisis theology 
as beginning with a series of very practical questions which cut to the heart of the 
liberal doctrine of revelation.  At the start of his doctoral thesis, he reports how 
Barth’s 1909 essay evinces a strong suspicion that “religious individualism and 
historical relativism”
9 
form a poor basis for the practical work of the pastor.  It seems 
to Barth, that over the years since Schleiermacher had introduced the concept of 
universal God-consciousness, there had been a kind of slide in the liberal theological 
tradition, to the point where there is no longer  any “universally valid ordo salutis, 
nor any universally valid source of revelation which one person could demonstrate to 
another”.
10
  If religion is to continue down this entirely individualistic line, then there 
will remain no external ontological reality, and no “normative concepts”, not even 
reason, to which modern theology can refer its language.  Ultimately, the result 
would be to empty the concept of God of all content, to make void theology’s own 
discourse, and to reduce the preacher to silence. 
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Barth’s first question, then, is primarily epistemological, concerning the tension 
between faith and reason – between which there should be little tension if God is 
indeed revealed and immanent.  His second question, as identified by Frei, is more 
properly grammatical and doctrinal.  If revelation does occur in the meeting of God’s 
self-revelation and the receptiveness of the human mind, then how should the 
theologian or preacher actually describe this moment of intersection?  Frei 
paraphrases Barth: “What is its recipient mode?  Where, in the inner geography of 
the human soul does it actually occur?”
11
    
 
Barth, then, is asking about the how and the where of revelation.  His third question, 
as identified by Frei, concerns the what and the when.  This is a profoundly 
ontological question, concerned with the very being of God in revelation-in-history.  
Frei illustrates how this third line of questioning, implicit in Barth’s 1909 essay (as 
the issue of ontology is implicit in all discussions of epistemology), now becomes 
thoroughly explicit in his second major theological outing
12
 in 1912:    
 How can the absolute be ingredient in a totally relative event?  How can the immediacy of a 
 divine-human contact be realised in an intermediary ‘agency’, namely, history?  Furthermore, 
 how can a positive, purely factual event of the past which is quite external to the internal 
 experience of an individual become the basis of his internal experience?
13 
Thus Frei encapsulates Barth’s probing approach to the problem of revelation even 
before he broke with liberalism.  However, despite these early questions, there was 
one liberal assumption which Barth did not question until much later: the 
reasonableness of revelation.  In brief, revelation as immanent and available to all 
and in all is indistinguishable from general and inherent human reason.  For the 
liberal theologians, this essential reasonableness was “beyond question and the 
indisputable starting point for all theologizing”.
14
  This held true to such an extent 
that, if revelation could not be rendered “intelligibly significant” in suitably ordered 
and rational language, then the clear judgement was that there had in fact been no 
revelation.   
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Barth’s break with liberalism came when he finally focussed his questioning on this 
foundational assumption about revelation, which is grammatical at its core.  
Accordingly, what Barth set out to do in Der Römerbrief was to prove that theology 
could be done without a doctrine of immanent revelation; that in fact, the concept of 
immanent revelation had been a blind alley down which theology had wandered.  
Revelation, he was to claim in direct contradiction, had to be purely transcendent if it 
were to be called revelation at all.  This was no mere variation on a liberal theme, but 
a complete and radical remaking of the very basis for our knowledge of and talk 
about God. 
 
2.2 Revelation in Der Römerbrief and Church Dogmatics 1 
So far we have considered how Frei reads Barth’s early worries about the liberal 
tradition.  Now, however, we jump to ‘the end of the beginning’, the writing and 
publication of Der Römerbrief in 1922.
15
  This was the work which was to put Barth 
firmly on the theological map, and which largely set the agenda for twentieth century 
Protestant theology, for good or for ill.  It was controversial not merely in terms of its 
content but also in terms of its method, which was the diametric opposite of the 
smooth, interlocking systems of the liberal theologians. 
 
What distinguished Der Römerbrief from the start was its insistence on the utter 
transcendence, not merely of God, but most particularly of God’s revelation: 
 That God speaks … is something strange, peculiar, new; … This ‘otherness’ cuts sharply 
 through all human sense of possession and semi-possession, even through all sense of not-
 possessing … The voice of God which is His power (i.16) is and remains the voice OF GOD 
 … God is free.
16
 
This utter transcendence of revelation meant the epistemological removal of God 
from consciousness or experience.  God is now on the far side of the dialectical void, 
which can only be crossed by an act of sheer grace on God’s part.  This act of grace 
is what we call revelation, and is best characterised as God ‘speaking’.  Later, in 
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Barth refuses to ‘clutter’ his starting point of deus dixit with anything like the 
epistemological baggage of Schleiermacher, or even of the Reformers.  Indeed, in 
some senses, the deus dixit is the negation of epistemology: it is a pure act of God, 
and as such needs neither reason nor precondition.  Even the traditional Reformed 
starting point of scripture is heavily qualified: 
 The Bible, then, is not in itself and as such God’s past revelation … The Bible, speaking to 
 us and heard by us as God’s Word, bears witness to past revelation.
18
 
Hence scripture is indeed epistemologically useful, but only in a secondary sense: it 
might point us to God, but in itself had no power to reveal God.  This was Barth’s 
attempt to remove even scripture from possessive human hands, and restore 




Frei was to spend many more years working out the implications of this rebellion 
against liberal epistemology – indeed, this virtual rejection of the category of 
epistemology altogether.  Yet even at this early stage, he raises the question that, if 
God is so “totaliter alter, transcendent in the sense of being metaphysically and 
morally removed from the creature”
20
, then on what basis can humans even begin to 
talk about him?  At least in the liberal tradition a constructive theology was possible, 
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so that when I experience God in my consciousness of my utter dependence, then I 
can truly and even objectively talk about God on the basis of what I have 
experienced.  Such a God has a content which is indeed intelligibly significant – or 
rather, the intelligible significance is the content.  But is it really the case, as von 
Balthasar claimed, that Der Römerbrief constitutes “the ‘hell’ of religion”
21
 – that is, 
that it constitutes the impossibility of knowing God?  If so, then Frei worries that that 
would be not so much ‘freedom’ on God’s part as utter silence, even non-existence, 
both for God and for us.   
 
Of course, in one sense von Balthasar is absolutely right: Barth does posit the “hell” 
of all religion in that his starting point is ontological rather than epistemological.  
Eschewing a prolegomena such as Schleiermacher’s, Barth plunges into theology 
after in the manner of the book of Genesis: “Beginning … God.”    Ontologically, 
God has spoken.  This transcendent actuality is the “primary reality of life”
22
, and the 
precondition for all grammatical and doctrinal talk about God.  Epistemologically, 
we are therefore stymied, for neither experience nor the biblical witness constitute 
the predicate in deus dixit.  Rather, the predicate, ‘has spoken’, refers to Jesus Christ 
alone: 
 The true theme of the biblical witness is the second of the concepts, God’s action in His  
 revelation, revelation in answer to what God does, and therefore the predicate in our 
 statement.
23
   
Moreover, the faith which enables us to receive Christ-as-revelation is not to be 
located in some inherent receptive capacity in all humanity, but is itself “a predicate 
of the Word of God”.
24
  Accordingly, in terms of strict grammatical logic, we must 
posit revelation-without-precondition as prior to faith, as grammatically the subject 
is prior to the predicate, even though in actuality the bestowing of faith is entirely 
simultaneous with the act of revelation.  Therefore, although Barth’s ‘prolegomena’ 
is the ontological statement, Deus dixit, this rightly should not be seen as a doctrine 
of revelation at all.  To consider “God has spoken” as a doctrine, and the 
foundational one at that, would be to start at quite the wrong end of the logic of 
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belief: that is, with our reception of that revelation and our ability to express this in 
grammatical terms, rather than with God in Godself.  Indeed, it is this understanding 
of revelation as a ‘non-doctrine’ which lies at the root of Frei’s negation of his title in 
“Religion (Natural and Revealed)”.   
 
The arrival at the being of God is therefore not the end-point of a logic which begins 
with the assumption of revelation.  Rather, the being of God in itself is the 
precondition of all our knowing, and thus is the “starting point for the whole doctrine 
of revelation”.
25
  In short, where liberal theology began with the mode of knowing 
God, and from that derived insight into the being of God, Barth begins with the being 
of God, and from that derives insight into the mode of our knowing.  In other words, 
the correct logical and grammatical order is ontology first, then epistemology.    
 
2.3 Frei’s Analysis of Barth 
Frei’s worry, evident in his restless insistence in “Religion (Natural and Revealed)” 
that the concept of God must have a content, is that an account which begins with the 
simple being of God is to posit a very speculative starting point for theology.  This 
holds even when the subject (the deus) is inextricably bound up with the predicate, 
(the dixit), for grammatically, the subject must be posited first, and hangs there as an 
abstraction until the predicate ‘fleshes it out’.  Just as the Trinitarian order of 
expression left room for Arius to insert a wedge between Father and Son, so too 
Barth’s order of expression leaves room for other theologians to lever apart God and 
the historical Jesus of Nazareth.  This question of the grammatical logic of belief 
later becomes an even more pressing worry for Frei, and will be considered in detail 
in the next chapter.   
 
However, Frei is fully aware that Barth is far from espousing some abstract 
metaphysics.  On the contrary, the God who confronts us, who says ‘No!’ to all our 
attempts to possess and understand, can be no mere metaphysical entity, but must be 
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real, in some way “concretely personal”.
26
 Such an objective God cannot help but 
have a content, and if we have any sort of knowledge of God at all, then that can only 
have come about because of a divine act of revelation.  This ‘relational objectivism’ 
has usefully been described by George Hunsinger: 
 By nature, as we have seen, God is hidden from us absolutely.  There is no way from us to 
 God.  We are separated from God by an ontological divide.  Yet, as we have also seen, God 
 is not separated from us in precisely the same way.  It belongs to the sovereign freedom of 
 God that God can cross over the divide in an act of self-revelation.  This self-revelation can 
 only mean, however, that God takes form for us in terms of the creaturely sphere – the only 
 kind of terms we can apprehend.  By taking form in this apprehensible way, God becomes a 
 genuine object of our knowledge; yet by doing so in terms of the creaturely sphere – the 
 sphere of that which is not God – God becomes a unique object of knowledge and remains 
 hidden in the midst of revelation.
27 
This revelation may be necessarily indirect, but God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ 
was nevertheless a true revelation, giving us real and concrete knowledge of the 
content of God: 
 God’s being in relation to the human creature was no different from God’s being in relation 
 to itself.  God’s identity in history was essentially the same as God’s identity in eternity, for 
 otherwise God would not have engaged in an act of self-revelation, that is, God’s essential 
 identity would not have been disclosed.
28 
If this is so, then as Hunsinger points out, a process of inference becomes possible, 
whereby God can be truly inferred from the modes in which God reveals Godself in 
our history.  So from God’s free giving of Godself in revelation, we can infer some 
concrete content to God, that is, that God is eternally free and at the same time 
eternally self-giving.  Ontologically, we can say that God is the God who reveals in 
Christ, and what God reveals in Christ is epistemologically rich and true, a concrete 
means to concrete knowledge of the concrete content of God.  As one would expect 
from the logic of grammar, the predicate does indeed ‘flesh out’ the subject. 
 
Yet, as Barth most ably illustrated, it remains the case that the epistemological task is 
fraught with all the problems of human hubris, presumptuousness and inadequacy.  
Moreover, for all that God’s revelation is true, the moment we creatures get our 
hands on it and try to encapsulate it in language and doctrine, we go horribly wrong 
in all sorts of directions.  That is why according to the dialectical method, knowledge 
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of God in revelation is snatched away the same moment it is given – for just imagine 
the damage we could do if God ever gave revelation over to our possession!  Indeed, 
the damage that we can and did do to God’s revelatory Word is quite clearly 
illustrated by the narrative of the cross.  Rather, the moment that we think we have 
grasped God’s revelation is the moment when God’s ‘No!’ resounds, and we are 
confounded once more.  So what we have with Barth is revelation-but-not-revelation, 
revealed-but-hidden, simultaneously unveiled-and-veiled.  The body bursts from the 
grave; the living God breaks free of all our grammar. 
 
3.  The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of H. Richard Niebuhr  
3.1 The Beginnings of Christian Existentialism 
By 1955, when Frei finally published his doctoral thesis, the “bombshell”
 29
 impact 
of the second edition of Barth’s Der Römerbrief had been softened by a distance of 
some thirty-three years.  In contrast to its initial reception, the debate by the 1950s 
had lost some of its heat: enough time had passed for its bold dialectical approach to 
be assimilated into theological discussion, whether in rejection or in qualified 
acceptance.  The explosion was further muted by what was perceived as Barth’s own 
subsequent move away from dialectical theology to a much less fierce ‘analogical’ 
account of the relationship between humanity and God.  
 
Nevertheless, this ‘bombshell’ which Barth had lobbed with such devastating 
accuracy was still reverberating.  Understandably, the initial impact had been on 
European theology, but the debate continued to spread over the following decades.  
By the 1930s, Barth had a firm footing in the English-speaking theological world of  
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F.W. Camfield
30 
 and H. R. MacKintosh
31
, who, to their credit, were also keenly 
aware of the developments in Barth’s thinking as expounded in Die Kirchliche 
Dogmatik I.  In 1941, H. Richard Niebuhr admitted in the preface to The Meaning of 
Revelation that “Ernst Troeltsch and Karl Barth have also been my teachers”.
32 
 Later 
in the 1940s, Barth came to the more hostile attention of A.M. Fairweather in 
England, and Cornelius Van Til at Westminster Theological Seminary in 
Philadelphia, the former flying the flag for natural theology by insisting that “God is 
significantly present throughout our environment”
33
, while the latter was determined 
to label Barth as a “new modernist”.
34 
 In the 1950s, two considered works by G. C. 
Berkouwer
35 
came probably too late to be referenced by Frei, but his thesis did have 
the benefit of Hans urs von Balthasar’s book, referenced several times.   
 
Of the above, it is Niebuhr’s short monograph which most rewards attention when 
the topic is Hans Frei’s theological development.  Niebuhr was, of course, Frei’s 
mentor and doctoral supervisor, and his elegant book shows something of Frei’s own 
interest in the history of theology, as he explains how during the Enlightenment the 
doctrine of revelation gave way to a ‘doctrine’ of reason.  Not that revelation had 
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ceased to be a doctrine as such: rather, it was understood to be identical to reason.  
However, in the face of what he perceives to be an on-going liberal contempt for the 
doctrine, Niebuhr contends that it is time to move revelation back to the centre of the 
theological stage.   
 
The Meaning of Revelation was hailed by contemporary reviewers as a highly 
successful treatment of the doctrine.  However, the book is particularly noteworthy in 
that it marks one of the earliest statements of Christian existentialism in the 
American theological context.  In his opening chapter, Niebuhr describes how the 
question of the “meaning of revelation” has made “a reappearance in contemporary 
theological discussion”
36
, to the bemusement of the liberal tradition.  He describes a 
fear that this debate marks a return to an old “fruitless warfare between faith and 
reason”, and an accompanying “reversal in the enlightenment of religious thought”.
37
  
That he was not alone in this evaluation of the theological climate of 1941 is 
evidenced by two of his reviewers: George W. Davis attributes “the resurgence of 
interest in revelation” to the “centricity awarded to the concept by the crisis 
theologians”
38
; likewise, John M. Moore writes of a “resurgence of a theology of 
revelation in recent years”, commenting how this movement “has seemed to many to 
be a sheer attempt to turn back the clock and revive the outmoded concepts of a by-
gone age”.
39
  Interestingly, Moore attributes this to a “failure of nerve” on the part of 
a few “discouraged” theologians who – given the ‘crisis’ of the 1941 war-time 
context – have “retreat[ed] from reason”.
40
  Old-style liberalism had not yet died out 
in America. 
 
What these reviewers have patently failed to grasp, is that Niebuhr’s book is 
predicated on exactly the same dialectical krisis that they deplore in Barth.  It is only 
his concurrent emphasis on the human reception of revelation which has lulled them 
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into a false security, that this is a restatement of the liberal position.  That is why, in 
light of the perceived “threat to reason” posed by the “crisis theologians”, Niebuhr’s 
book is greeted with a broad enthusiasm for its cogent statement of a position 
described (though not by him) as “existentialist”.  Although he clearly recognises 
existentialist modes of thought in Niebuhr, Moore as yet lacks this continental 
European terminology, and attempts to label Niebuhr’s position as “objective 
relativism”.
41
  Davis likewise easily picks out the key tenets of Niebuhr’s 
existentialist position, but nowhere uses the term itself, while George F. Thomas 
prefers Niebuhr’s own description of “critical idealism”.
42
  As it happens, of all 
Niebuhr’s reviewers, it is Paul Tillich alone who uses the actual term “existentialist”, 
recognising the book for what it is and lauding it as “the introduction into existential 
thinking in present American theology”.
43
  Working from a continental theological 
perspective, Tillich is equipped, as the others are not, to recognise Niebuhr’s thought 
as following in a tradition which has come down from Kant via Marx, Kierkegaard, 
and Heidegger and – crucially – he includes Barth in this list.  Niebuhr’s book, 
Tillich states confidently, succeeds in illustrating once and for all that “‘Theology of 
revelation’ is existential theology”.
44
   
  
In identifying what is new and particular about Niebuhr’s approach in The Meaning 
of Revelation, we will come close to a definition of the kind of Christian 
existentialism which was so dominant when Frei began his career. Tillich pinpoints 
three aspects of Niebuhr’s thought which, taken together, place him firmly in this 
category.  The first is Niebuhr’s acknowledgement of the relativity of all claims to 
truth, which can be ‘actual’, pro nobis, only as they are experienced in our existential 
situation.  This means that the revelation of God, no matter how thunderous, remains 
a powerless abstraction until we receive it by faith in our present historical moment.  
The practical conclusion which Niebuhr draws from this historical relativity is that 
we can posit no revelation – not even Jesus Christ – as ultimate: or rather, we can 
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confess him as ultimate pro nobis, but cannot insist on his ultimacy for other people 
and other faiths.   Niebuhr therefore refuses to follow Barth’s location of the 
revelatory event as Jesus Christ himself, describing how “a definition of revelation in 
terms of the person of Jesus is manifestly inadequate”.
45
  This is why, for Niebuhr, 
theology cannot be done ‘dogmatically’.  Despite his acknowledged indebtedness to 
Barth, this is what lies at the root of Niebuhr’s self-differentiation from his “teacher”.  
For Niebuhr, the grammar of dogmatism, such as he understands Barth as espousing, 
consists of nothing but empty metaphysical statements, divorced from the Christian’s 
faith experience and bearing no relation to any kind of ontological reality, human or 
divine. 
  
The second, related point which Tillich detects is that this experiential account of 
revelation necessitates a dual understanding of history.  Tillich fully comprehends 
Niebuhr’s distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ history, between “history as 
lived” and “history as seen”.
46
 He also comprehends why Niebuhr locates revelation 
in ‘internal’ history, given that Niebuhr understands revelation as the event which 
makes sense of our existence: 
 Sometimes when we read a difficult book, seeking to follow a complicated argument, we 
 come across a luminous sentence from which we can go forward and backward and so attain 
 some understanding of the whole.  Revelation is like that.
47 
It is worth noting that Niebuhr is transferring to the person of Jesus the same non-
revelatory quality that Barth – and indeed Calvin – apply to scripture.  Where for 
Barth, the Bible has no revelatory meaning in itself until we receive it by the Holy 
Spirit, for Niebuhr, even the Jesus-event has no objective meaning in itself, but has 
meaning only as it becomes meaning for us.  Nevertheless, as Tillich perceives, 
Niebuhr’s existentialism “does not exclude, but strongly demands external history”.
48
  
In other words, and in true dialectical fashion, Jesus’ external historical actuality 
remains for the Christian existentialist the necessary logical ‘precondition’ of the 
internal event – just as the ‘external’ words of the Bible text are the logical 
‘precondition’ of their illumination. 
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Lastly, Tillich recognises in Niebuhr the classic dialectical emphasis on God as 
Absolute Subject, without whose revelation there would be no knowledge of God at 
all.  Not that for Niebuhr there is any concrete content we can predicate of God, who 
remains ontologically Wholly Other, and thus beyond all grammatical expression 
even in the epistemic event of revelation.  Hence, we can never say that we know 
God; far better to say that we are known by God.  Indeed, revelation can be firmly 
located in the existential moment when we know ourselves to be thus known.   
 
The result for Niebuhr, and for Christian existentialist theology as it developed, is 
that the believer has a far more participatory role in revelation than in the Barthian 
scheme.  For Barth, the faith of the individual is part and parcel of the revelation of 
God in itself; by contrast, for the Christian existentialist, while faith is certainly given 
in the moment of revelation and not possessed in any sense, nevertheless knowledge 
of God comes about only in the moment when the individual says ‘Yes!’ to God’s 
self-revealing.  (Barth’s individual is unable to say ‘Yes!’)  However, the knowledge 
gained thereby, that one is known by God, is knowledge not so much of God as of 
the human self.  In other words, the being and content of God in the existentialist 
scheme remain as epistemologically unavailable as if there had been no revelation at 
all.  This is no lacuna, but is in fact a central tenet of existentialist theology, as will 
become apparent in later chapters, particularly Chapter 5. 
  
While he does not make great use of the movement’s specialist vocabulary, there is 
nevertheless enough conceptual evidence in The Meaning of Revelation for us to 
concur with Tillich’s assertion that Niebuhr is attempting “to interpret the idea of 
revelation in existential terms”.
49
  Whether Niebuhr himself would have been happy 
with the label is another matter: with his emphasis on the church community he was 
much less individualistic than most ‘secular’ existentialism.  In addition, his faith in 
God’s unifying power meant that he refused the idea of a dialectic that was absolute, 
whether that dialectic was between internal and external history, between the Self 
and meaning, or between the world and God.  It was Frei himself who pointed out in 
a later essay, that Niebuhr was “usually restless with full, residual dualisms, moral as 
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well as epistemological”.
50
  Nevertheless, The Meaning of Revelation is a persuasive 
presentation of the Christian existentialist position at one of its principal points of 
entry into American theology, and a key influence on Frei. 
 
3.2 Neo-Orthodoxy: A Definition 
Frei spend the years immediately after the publication of his doctoral thesis wrestling 
with this Christian existentialist inheritance from Niebuhr, and with its contemporary 
manifestation as the ‘Neo-Orthodox’ school.  At this point, some attempt must be 
made at a definition of terms.  The central tenets of existentialist theology have 
already been outlined above, as defined by Tillich in reference to Niebuhr.  
Furthermore, in “Religion (Natural and Revealed)”, Frei identifies a wide spectrum 
of thinkers and theologies who nevertheless can be loosely grouped together under 
the heading, ‘existentialist’: not only ‘obvious’ candidates such as Kierkegaard and 
Martin Buber, but also Emil Brunner, Karl Heim, John Baillie, H. H. Farmer, H. 
Richard Niebuhr, and Hendrik Kraemer. However, Frei separates these out from the 
krisis theologians such as Barth and Tillich, who ground the knowledge of God not 
so much in the ‘I-thou’ encounter, but in “the act of God, identical with His being”.
51
   
 
It is this second group of theologians who comprise what became known as the 
‘Neo-Orthodox’ school of theology.  In the same volume, there is another little essay 
by Langdon Gilkey
52
 which usefully defines for us this particular mid-twentieth 
century movement.  Gilkey sees Neo-Orthodoxy as a broad movement, with Barth on 
the “orthodox” wing and Tillich on the “liberal”, united nevertheless by “the desire 
to reinterpret Christian doctrine in terms of the transcendence of God and of His 
grace, and in terms of the inability of natural and cultural man to save himself.”
53
  
However, this common inclusion of Barth in the category, ‘Neo-Orthodox’, is 
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perhaps as unfortunate as the inclusion of Frei in ‘The Yale School’.  The all-
encompassing label has the effect of ironing out vital differences, particularly given 
that the central tenets of Neo-Orthodoxy were based on the reading in English of 
Barth’s early theology.  However, this meant that the Neo-Orthodox movement 
overlooked such vital aspects of Barth’s theology as his re-working of the doctrine of 
election and the development of his much more explicitly christological 
prolegomena.
54
  Moreover, as the movement develops, it becomes harder and harder 
to separate out Christian existentialism from Neo-Orthodoxy.  Certainly, Niebuhr is 
commonly included in the list of the Neo-Orthodox; Tillich frequently makes use of 
existentialist categories, especially that of “authenticity”
55
; and Rudolf Bultmann, a 
supremely dialectical theologian and an early comrade of Barth’s, is highly 
influenced by his colleague at Marburg, the existentialist philosopher Martin 
Heidegger.
56
  The spectrum which Gilkey identifies is more than a spectrum: it is in 
fact an almost entirely different set of priorities subsumed under some superficial 
similarities.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, the proposal is to exclude Barth from the 
category, ‘Neo-Orthodox’.
57
  The principal reason for this exclusion is that Frei’s 
mature theological project was increasingly carried out in clear opposition to the 
Neo-Orthodox school
58
, while at the same time he never abandoned his allegiance to 
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Barth.  Rather, ‘Neo-Orthodox’ will be used as a descriptor of a theological position 
which takes from the early Barth the principle of the absolute dialectic between God 
and world, but combines it with two particular expressions of existentialism.  The 
first of these expressions is the concept of the ‘I-Thou’ subject-subject encounter 
learned from Kierkegaard and Buber
59
; and the second is the anxiety about the 
meaning of human being and existence, as typified by Heidegger.  Accordingly, the 
terms ‘Neo-Orthodox’ and/or ‘existentialist’ theology/theologians will henceforth be 
used synonymously unless otherwise stated, and should be understood as defined 
here.  However, when the term ‘dialectical theologians’, or ‘krisis theologians’ is 
used, this should be understood as including both Barth and the Neo-
Orthodox/existentialist schools. 
  
3.3 H. Richard Niebuhr and the Logic of Belief 
For all that Frei, with the exception of Niebuhr, rarely tackles its proponents directly 
in print, the Neo-Orthodox school gradually became the theological opposition which 
was to inspire his most creative resistance and strongest positive statements.  
Nevertheless, he begins with an appreciation.  In his 1957 essay, “Niebuhr’s 
Theological Background”, Frei spends some time tracing the epistemological issues 
at the core of the development of Neo-Orthodoxy, pointing out that through all their 
variations, the dialectical theologians were nevertheless gnawing away at the same 
questions which had first been posed by Kant.  To summarise with cruel brevity his 
epistemological thesis
60
, Kant undid some of the previous sharp distinction between 
the knowing Subject and the Object which is to be known, pointing out that our 
knowledge of the Other is always filtered through our own perception.  Therefore, 
God-an-sich cannot be known, not even in revelation.  It follows then, that for all 
that the Subject God may indeed possess absolute ontological reality an sich – and 
no one is denying that – for us, that Subject can never be an object of concrete 
knowledge.  In grammatical terms, this means that God has been removed from the 
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logical chain, being neither the subject of the predicate of revelation, nor an object 
for our knowledge.  This has some potentially devastating results for the theological 
enterprise, for it means that nothing can be said of God that is metaphysically ‘true’, 
so that apart from the most uncompromising kind of apophaticism, we are now 
struggling to say anything theological at all. 
 
As Frei explains, the existentialist theologians took this epistemological problem 
very seriously.  Barth had taught them that Kant was right to say that we can have no 
knowledge of God as he is in himself, but added the vital proviso: except as he gives 
himself as Object to our knowledge through revelation: 
 Barth insists that our only knowledge of God is due to the fact that as abiding Subject, Agent, 
 or Spirit, God nevertheless has made Himself a unique object for human understanding in the 
 incarnation of Jesus Christ – and this miraculously without relinquishing His Freedom as 
 absolute, untrammelled Agent over created agency and human reasoning.
61 
For the existentialists, however, this did not fully resolve the problem.  They agreed 
absolutely with Barth’s point about transcendent revelation being the only source of 
our knowledge about God, but did not accept Kant’s hypothesis, that a person, a 
living self, could be an object along the same lines as any inanimate object, or 
‘thing’.  For God to be Object in this sense would be for God to be less than animate: 
it would mean to remove God from God’s own Subject-Self as “the center of free, 
self-originating activity”
62
, so that God would effectively cease to ‘be’.  This is 
because ontologically, for an existentialist theologian, “an individual is nothing but 




Therefore, it is only as Subject that God can be known in relationship – and unless 
there is a relationship, there is only speculative metaphysics and no actual 
knowledge.  Niebuhr himself expressed this clearly in 1956, the year before Frei’s 
analysis: 
 Theology ... considered as a pure science does not have as its object God in isolation ... The 
 God who makes himself known and whom the church seeks to know is no isolated God.  If 
 the attribute of aseity, i.e., being by and for itself, is applicable to him at all it is not 
 applicable to him as known by the Church.  What is known and knowable in theology is God 
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 in relation to self and to neighbour, and self and neighbour in relation to God.  This complex 
 of related beings is the object of theology.
64 
As Frei explains, “At this point (Niebuhr) feels the claims of the nineteenth century 
to be justified ... one cannot allow a speculative, empty ontology to separate God’s 
objectivity, his freedom and Lordship, and absolute priority in revelation, from his 
relationship with us”.
65
  This is the area where, despite his declaration that Barth had 
been his “teacher”, Niebuhr most departs from Barth.  To put it baldly, Barth begins 
with ontology, with the divine side of the dialectic; by contrast, while assuming 
exactly the same dialectic, Niebuhr begins with epistemology, the human side of the 
dialectic.  While the existentialists differ radically from the liberal theologians in 
their keenness to assert a theological realism, it seems that Barth’s version of the 
reality of God is that little bit too extreme for them, based on the same kind of 
metaphysical abstraction which Kant argued can never yield any kind of practical 
knowledge.  ‘Real’ in existentialist terms can only mean ‘real in this world’: if God 
is somehow too real an sich, then God ceases to be real-for-us, and so loses all ability 
to communicate.  But if we describe God in the existential encounter, then that 
description is at the least relatively true and accurate – and so that is where theology 
must begin.  The meeting – the clash, even – of Absolute Subject with our own 
relative subjecthood in the act of communication and decision, is the prolegomena 
for the existentialist theological programme. 
 
This relativity of the existential encounter is vital to Niebuhr’s understanding of 
revelation.  As both an observer and a participator in God’s revelatory history, the 
individual is essentially a relative creature subject to relative truths.  As such, the 
existential person has no absolute being an sich, let alone any absolute knowledge of 
reality: 
 The understanding that the spatio-temporal point of view of an observer enters into his 
 knowledge of reality, so that no universal knowledge of things as they are in themselves is 
 possible, so that all knowledge is conditioned by the standpoint of the knower.
66 
Niebuhr attributes this concept of the historical relativity of the human subject to his 
reading of Troeltsch: 
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  He [Troeltsch] has helped me to accept and to profit by the acceptance of the relativity not 
 only of historical objects but, more, of the historical subject, the observer and interpreter.
67 
This means that as historical subjects, neither the individual Christian, nor the 
church, nor yet the theologian, has any absolute and unchanging apprehension of 
truth, not even when given through revelation.  As had the nineteenth century 
theologians before him, Niebuhr has “discovered that Christianity is not a ready-
made eternal constant but a genuine product of historical change”.
68
  To be 
“constant” is to be transhistorical, to be metaphysical, to be a concept only, with no 
reality.  Even God must be denied this attribute of absolute immutability and 
impassability, at least when it comes to revelation.  Crucially, this means that neither 
history nor revelation can be subsumed under a uniform method of interpretation.  
There can be no overarching hermeneutical theory, given that both history and 
revelation are acts of God, and therefore both are a series of one-off and unrepeatable 
events.  Niebuhr, as did Frei after him, abhors a system.   
 
This refusal of metaphysics has implications for Frei’s search for the concrete 
content of God, for it means that a possible recourse to the traditional divine 
attributes has been ruled out.  This again is a key point where Niebuhr departs from 
the early Barth, although in this case he actually anticipates one of Barth’s later 
moves.  Die Kirchliche Dogmatik  II/1, published the year before The Meaning of 
Revelation, contains a section on the “perfections”
 69
 of God: an exposition which 
Bruce McCormack attributes to “to the presence of residual elements of classical 
theism (and the ancient metaphysics which made it possible)”.
70
   Continuing, 
McCormack suggests that it was not until volume II/2 of the Church Dogmatics, with 
its detailed treatment of the doctrine of election, that Barth finally becomes a truly 
“post-metaphysical” theologian – and this was published the year after.  Eventually, 
of course, Barth comes to see what Niebuhr recognised before him, that the ‘divine 
attributes’ as traditionally understood are yet another human attempt to tell God what 
God is and ought to be.  As Colin Gunton explains, Barth ultimately concludes that 
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“it is not a matter of what we attribute, but of what he [God] reveals himself to be.”
71
  
Given that Frei shared this anti-metaphysical stance with Barth and Niebuhr, which 
was in its turn inherited from Schleiermacherian theology, the divine attributes do 
not offer him a means of describing the content of God, lacking as they do both 
ontological and existential reality.  
 
Like Barth, Niebuhr held to the conviction that God’s self-revelation is never a 
given, never a constant, but always an act.  However, Niebuhr’s innovation – where 
he departs from Barth and also from many of his fellow existentialist theologians – 
was to try within the dialectical schema to rehabilitate the liberal perception of the 
presence of God in reason, culture and history, without making the old liberal ‘error’ 
of surrendering the sovereign otherness of God.  It was a shaky tightrope to walk, 
made all the more difficult by Niebuhr’s refusal to locate revelation absolutely in the 
Jesus event.  Frei describes how, almost uniquely for a dialectical theologian, 
Niebuhr is “theocentric rather than Christocentric ... for we always face God”.
72
  
Indeed, for all the Jesus event acts as foundation, model, and guarantor of revelation 
– Tillich’s point in his review about external history being the necessary pre-
condition of internal history – Niebuhr’s ‘radical monotheism’ meant that he could  
view this particular revelatory act neither as ultimate nor as absolute: 
 A definition of revelation in terms of the person of Jesus is manifestly inadequate.  The 
 problems which it raises are insuperable.  How can we have personal communion with one 
 who exists only in our memory and in the monuments, the books and sentences, which are 
 the body of our memory?  How can the letter and the document become a carrier of personal 
 life unless they are part of the expressive body of a now living spirit?  When we pursue this 
 inquiry we are inclined to say that the living being with which we have fellowship is really 
 the church of Jesus or the spirit of the church.  The latter becomes the real incarnation of the 
 person of Jesus and faith is directed toward the community itself.  What is revealed in our 
 history at the decisive point is not the person of Jesus but the fellowship of the church ... But 
 this way lies disaster.
73.
 
Historical relativity meant for Niebuhr, that God’s revelation could not be limited to 
the Jesus-event, for that would be to threaten the absolute subjecthood of God.  There 
is therefore a tendency with Niebuhr, which is fairly unique in existentialist theology 
although entirely consistent with it, to play down the importance of Jesus Christ: his 
importance to the individual faith-experience is not the same as postulating his 
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universal significance.  Hence, when Niebuhr talks about ‘presence’, he means not 
the presence of Jesus Christ (who exists only in “memory” and “monuments”), but 
the presence of God.  Accordingly, Niebuhr has little account to give of the 
resurrection: Jesus is not actually living as such, except in the sense that in the 
revelatory moment he has become our history.  But he is not an objective presence to 
us.  Only God is present in the moment of revelation, “more fundamental and more 
certain than Jesus or than self”.
74
   
 
Therefore, where Barth saw Jesus as the revelation of God, for Niebuhr is it more 
accurate to regard him as a revelation, unrepeatable and miraculous certainly, but not 
particularly to be distinguished from all other unrepeatable and miraculous revelatory 
events.  Nevertheless, Niebuhr holds that Jesus retains a certain importance for the 
Christian as an ‘external’ and necessary precondition, not of revelation itself (which 
is conditional only on God’s will), but of our understanding of how God works in our 
world: 
 The God who reveals himself in Jesus Christ is now trusted and known as the contemporary 
 God, revealing himself in every event; but we do not understand how we could trace his 
 working in these happenings if he did not make himself known to us through the memory of 
 Jesus Christ’ nor do we know how we should be able to interpret all the words we read as 
 words of God save by the aid of this Rosetta stone.
75 
So for Niebuhr, the Jesus-event acts as a ‘guarantor’ of revelation in the present 
historical moment.  Jesus is therefore better understood, not as revelation-in-himself, 
but as a kind of hermeneutical key to revelation in history, so that any experience of 
revelation can, for the Christian, be referred back to that event, and so take its place 
in a shared grammatical and doctrinal framework for understanding and 
interpretation.   
 
However, rather than providing doctrinal knowledge of God an sich, revelation is 
better understood as exactly that moment in our history “through which we know 
ourselves to be known from beginning to end”.
76
  Further, from the standpoint of that 
personal encounter, the theologian can detect God’s providential presence in all 
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history, which itself is known by God “from beginning to end”.  Epistemologically, 
then, Niebuhr posits a dual starting-point for the knowledge of God: the experiential 
and internal history of the individual, which takes its place within the history of 
culture and church.  This is no immanent revelation in the world: for Niebuhr, the 
dialectic still holds, and we have no immediate apprehension of the inner life of 
either Jesus or God.  But we do have a revelatory encounter with the Subject God in 
our own inner life, and that meeting is immune to abstractive classification.  For this 
reason Niebuhr contends that the appropriate way of theologising can never be 
doctrinal or propositional, still less apologetic, but must always be confessional and 




3.4 Frei’s Analysis of Niebuhr 
Our interest, however, is not so much in Niebuhr himself, as in Frei’s understanding 
of Niebuhr, and what over time he came to accept and reject.  We can infer some 
disquiet with his mentor’s theological programme simply from the existence of Frei’s 
1975 book, The Identity of Jesus Christ: Niebuhr, by contrast, is uninterested in Jesus 
of Nazareth as a person, and insistent always on revelation being understood as God 
in action.  Not that Niebuhr would deny that the revelatory act that was Jesus reveals 
God.  But in accordance with his particular dialectical understanding of the ‘event’ of 
revelation, this identity of God with the Jesus-event cannot be continuous for us in 
our time.  God’s revelation to us now is not dependent on his revelation then, and 
when we encounter God, it is God we encounter, not Jesus.  Thus, as Frei later 
observes, while Niebuhr swallowed whole the principle of the dialectic, he “could 
not swallow ... the startlingly consistent Barthian identity of universal divine action 
with divine action in Christ alone”
78
, and so took the dialectical ‘event-theology’ of 
revelation in a direction which Barth never countenanced. 
 
There is much, then, that Frei disliked, or came to dislike, about Niebuhr’s theology.  
However, there is also much that he admired and imported into his own theological 
enterprises.  He approves wholeheartedly of Niebuhr’s emphasis on the historically 
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unique subjecthood of each individual person: concepts which he explores in depth 
in The Identity of Jesus Christ.  He admires also the way in which Niebuhr’s 
theological writings actually embody what Frei was trying to say about ad hoc 
methodology, how form should be dictated by content, and not the other way around:  
 The Meaning of Revelation, for example, keeps the reader in an actual intellectual motion 
 reduplicating that of the book, and just as real ... Form and content are so completely 
 appropriate to one another that the style is assimilated to and shaped by the thought.
79
   
Moreover, the ‘confessional’ aspect of Niebuhr’s theology was highly congenial to 
Frei, although ultimately he prefers Barth’s objective and doctrinally rich version 
over Niebuhr’s content-light relational approach.  There is also Niebuhr’s refusal of 
metaphysics and of the divine attributes as constituting the content of God.  And 
finally, Frei appreciates Niebuhr’s perception of the relativity of history: the ‘system’ 
which Niebuhr refused was no mere methodology, but the kind of Hegelian project 
which sought to account for all history and for God’s own self in one all-
encompassing scheme, so collapsing the uniqueness of both.  For Frei, this would 




However, we have to ask whether Niebuhr’s existentialist answer to Frei’s question 
about the content of God is genuinely a more concrete account.  Barth had assumed 
an ontological starting point by emphasising that ‘God has spoken’ – a subject and a 
predicate which for Barth are inseparable, given that the predicate ‘has spoken’ refers 
to the revelation which is Jesus Christ.  However, what Niebuhr does is separate out 
the deus and the dixit, so that the dixit becomes epistemological rather than 
ontological.  Thus, by denying the ultimacy of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ, 
which is the same as denying the ontological identity of God and Jesus, Niebuhr has 
in effect divorced God from God’s own speaking.  This removes God, even in the 
moment of self-revelation for us, to an unknowable dialectical distance.   
 
While Frei initially expressed the hope, in “Religion (Natural and Revealed)”, that 
Niebuhr’s “two types of history” might provide a way forward, he came to realise 
that the question about the content of God is a futile one in the existentialist scheme.    
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In “The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr”, Frei asks, “What does it mean [to 
Niebuhr] to know the content of the Word of God?”  And then he answers for him: 
“It means less a concrete apprehension of the person than it does a negative 
knowledge of ourselves as being known, being believed in, being valued. Such a 
notion,” he continues, “can tell us nothing about the content that is revealed, except 
by the most tenuous sort of inferential judgement.”
81
  In other words, Niebuhr has 
denied the very possibility of apprehending, let alone describing any content to God: 
his epistemological starting point leads to no knowledge of the being of God at all, so 
that the grammatical and doctrinal question never even gets asked.  This did not 
necessarily worry Niebuhr, who disliked doctrinal formulations and saw himself as 
working in a confessional theology.  Indeed, he would have decried the very idea of 
attributing content to the God who confronts us as Other.  But it is Frei’s judgement 
that this non-acceptance of Jesus as God’s full revelation results in a curiously empty 
idea of God who, even in the very act of revelation, effectively reveals nothing.  Not 
only did Niebuhr have no answer to offer Frei, but he assumed also that it was 
foolish to search for an answer, when there was clearly no answer to be found. 
 
4. The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher 
4.1 Schleiermacher and Frei: An Uneasy Similarity 
Frei takes his time before turning to the ‘founder’ of nineteenth century liberal 
theology.  As “Religion (Natural and Revealed)” demonstrates, Schleiermacher is so 
out of theological fashion in 1958, that it is almost axiomatic that he be dismissed as 
an irrelevance.  Nevertheless, and perhaps to Frei’s surprise, in his reactions to and 
against both Barth and Neo-Orthodoxy, he occasionally finds himself sharing a 
theological platform with Schleiermacher.  In rather the same way that Barth adopted 
Hegelian-style language and categories as part of his resistance to Schleiermacherian 
relationalism, so too Frei, in his opposition to dialectical theology in its existentialist 
form, found himself almost obliged to work within the old liberal categories.  In 
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particular, he skirts dangerously close to a liberal-style ‘life of Jesus’ in The Identity 
of Jesus Christ; and meanwhile, his interest in biblical hermeneutics was always 
going to take him within earshot of the siren call of general revelation.  Just as Barth 
struggled to express his dialectical theology while yet resisting Idealism, so too had 
Frei ever to resist the answers that had already been proffered by Schleiermacher. 
 
Perhaps for this reason, Frei’s first major treatment of Schleiermacher’s biblical 
hermeneutics, in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, is harsh.  Here Frei judges that 
Schleiermacher had utterly failed in his attempt to find a transcendent hermeneutical 
method which could be applied equally to all texts and all revelatory utterances.  He 
is particularly savage on what he perceives to be Schleiermacher’s failure to develop 
a hermeneutic adequate to the task of reading realistic narrative in general, and the 
gospel narratives in particular.  Previously in Eclipse, Frei had demonstrated how, 
under an Enlightenment rationalist hermeneutic, the narrative meaning of the gospels 
had been obscured by “the search for the subject matter beyond the text”.
82 
 
Particularly after Kant, not even the Bible could be regarded as exempt from a 
hermeneutic of universal reason, in which scripture becomes an historical 
phenomenon open to investigation.  This hermeneutic of reason necessitates that if 
the Bible is to be judged as having any ‘meaning’, then it must first of all be 
explicated according to historical-factual criteria, so that its content and context 
might be recognised and explained.  The second step, if ‘meaning’ is to be 
maintained, is then to apply the explicated text to the modern context – if indeed that 
could be done.  D. F. Strauss’ pastoral concern with the problems of preaching a 
‘mythology’ which one no longer believed to be ‘factual’ in any sense, marks what 
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The problem this posed for the following generation of theologians was profound.  
As Dan Stiver comments, “Theology in modernity faced a catch-22 of either 
sacrificing the mystery of God to meet objectivist standards or of sacrificing the 
cogency of belief in God altogether to place theology in a risk-free fideistic zone of 
private belief”.
84
  Schleiermacher was in absolute accord with the Enlightenment 
demand for an objective and rigorously academic basis for theology, particularly in 
his development of a new faculty system for the University of Berlin.
85
  At the same 
time, it was vital to him, as a Christian and pastor, that theology did not surrender 
entirely to the demands of rationalism, but maintained both the inviolable 
subjectivity of religious experience alongside the inviolable subjectivity of God.   
 
Schleiermacher’s innovate response to the conundrum was to restate the 
epistemological question of the knowledge of God as a hermeneutical one.  Not that 
he could return to a “pre-Kantian stance, for which either knowing or understanding 
would be a merely isomorphic internal reproduction of given external data”
86
: that is, 
an understanding of the simple sense of the words and a faith in their ability directly 
to convey meaning.  Nevertheless, Schleiermacher found the Enlightenment one-
word, one-referent model far too static for his more dynamic conception of meaning, 
and further, judged it to be too bound to historical phenomena to be spiritually 
useful.  And so it was Schleiermacher who, post-Kant, renewed the focus on 
hermeneutics in order to make the point that, even if all other subject-matters are 
indeed self-evident to a hermeneutic of universal reason, this does not apply to God.  
This is because God can be no external ‘object’ to be subjected to scientific scrutiny; 
for, as Schleiermacher described it in faithful Kantian terms, “anything that is 
outwardly given must be given as an object exposed to our counter-influence, 
however slight that may be.”
87
  To conceive of God as an object is therefore to make 
a logical nonsense of the whole idea of God. 
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Schleiermacher’s alternative proposal in The Christian Faith – that masterpiece of 
systematic theology – was that revelation should be understood as a consciousness of 
absolute dependence, which then becomes for us “a consciousness of God.”
88
  In his 
anxiety to protect religious experience from scientific cause-and-effect rationality, 
Schleiermacher refers such religious experience, not to a natural, but to a “divine 
causality”.
89
  However, this causality is “original”, qualitatively no different from the 
cause of the entire universe.  “In the same sense,” he writes, “Paul calls even the 
world the original revelation of God.”
90
 Therefore revelation, while remaining a 
‘gift’, is entirely contiguous with the processes and progress of nature and 
civilisation, built as it is into the very fabric of the world.  As a result, revelation does 
not contradict reason, even while it adds something new, for even a supernatural 
revelation must be explicable according to the rational logic of grammar, “subject to 
the same laws of conception and synthesis as regulate all speech”.
91
   
 
Furthermore, the ability of humankind to receive revelation is an inherent one, given 
at creation: as Schleiermacher observes, “even the Protevangelium, by linking the 
prediction of Christ directly to the Fall, declares entirely against the idea that human 
nature is somehow incapable of taking up into itself the restorative divine element 
and that the power to do so must first be introduced to it.”
92
  The alternative is for 
God to be entirely arbitrary, contradicting the causality which had been established 
by God in the first place.  Therefore Schleiermacher understands even the divine 
element in Jesus as merely the fullest flowering of the possibility which is inherent in 
all human nature, “grounded in its original constitution and prepared for by all its 
past history”.
93
  Otherwise, God’s favouring of Jesus in this way breaks rather than 
confirms the divine causality.   
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Here, then, we have the basis of a general hermeneutic.  This general hermeneutic is 
grounded not on universal reason, nor yet on any theory of a universal language, but 
rather, in the universal grammatical modes of interpretation that can be applied to 
any act of communication.  In brief, Schleiermacher’s “hermeneutic of 
understanding” takes the following form.
94
  Whenever a listener hears a 
communication, what is envisaged is a meeting of equals.  The speaker and listener 
are in a reciprocal relationship, while yet remaining entirely separate entities, so that 
each ‘other’ has “a kind of determinate, independently describable character”.
95
  (Not 
for Schleiermacher a Hegelian-style synthesis: he is in his own way as dialectical a 
theologian as his 20
th
 century detractors.)  Yet an attempt at communication has been 
made on the speaker’s part, while the hearer on their part is attempting to understand.    
It is through this dialectical meeting of equals-yet-opposites that understanding 
emerges.   
 
In describing this encounter as it occurs in all attempts at communication, 
Schleiermacher is positing a universal hermeneutic of understanding, as applicable to 
divine revelation as it is to any human communication.  Moreover, this ability to 
understand a communication from God was implanted by God at the beginning in all 
our consciousnesses.  Therefore, it is appropriate to envisage some kind of ‘meeting 
of equals’ when God communicates with humankind, otherwise revelation would be 
an absolute impossibility.  On that basis, it is clear to Schleiermacher that we are 
concerned to understand a Subject God, whose consciousness resembles our own.  
Therefore, when God reveals – which God does universally and generally, to all and 
in all – the result is universal faith: to a greater or lesser degree, we are all conscious 
of our dependence on God.  And because this consciousness of dependence is 
universal, faith can indeed be examined academically.  However, because God is a 
Subject, whom we hear subjectively, this examination cannot be conducted 
according to objective scientific criteria.   
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Throughout The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher is struggling to hold in balance an 
account of revelation as the immanence of God in every person’s consciousness, 
alongside the traditional Christian affirmation of Jesus Christ.  Schleiermacher does 
indeed have a doctrine of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ and his absolute necessity 
for our salvation, but not even Jesus could be regarded as a miraculous inbreaking of 
the divine into history – for that would be to violate utterly the ‘otherness’ of God.  
This is not to say that the Redeemer did not have a real existence in history: 
Schleiermacher insists that “the ideal must have been completely historical in him”
96
, 
so that the person of Jesus cannot be abstracted as a consciousness apart from a 
physical existence.  (That would be to posit a purely metaphysical being: an 
ontological abstraction without any corresponding epistemological dimension.)  But 
real though he was, Jesus redeems, not by his life, death, and resurrection, but by 
means of his supreme God-consciousness, which has given future generations a kind 
of conduit to God.  Epistemologically, then, we know God, not through the 
resurrected presence of Jesus Christ, nor in the objective historical and supra-
historical events of his life, but through God’s revelation to our consciousness.  
 
Thus Schleiermacher transfers revelation across from objective history to the 
subjective realm.  Nevertheless, he would claim that ‘subjective’ experience is fully 
historical, and therefore not so subjective as it might at first appear: ‘subjective-
realist’ might be a fair term.  Indeed, his whole dogmatic system is built upon the 
‘reality’ of the human faith experience – something clearly much more ‘real’ than is 
God.  But neither is he saying that God is not ontologically ‘real’.  It is only that 
God’s reality is so far beyond human comprehension, that we cannot start our 
theology from that reality, but only as we experience it.  In other words, 
Schleiermacher is vehemently antimetaphysical, and rejects any theology which 
begins with a divine ontology.  As the structure of The Christian Faith illustrates, 
doctrine must be constructed retrospectively, according to the development of our 
consciousness of God, even to the extent of following in our theological system the 
order of that development.   Thus the human consciousness of God becomes the 
epistemological starting point for all our attributions of content to God.   
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4.2 Frei’s Analysis of Schleiermacher 
The epistemological question had therefore shifted under Schleiermacher.  As he 
presents it, the question becomes, not how we can know God? (for God is not an 
object to be known), but how we can hear God’s self-communication?  The point is 
to find a way of hearing God’s revelation so that we have concrete knowledge of the 
content of God-the-speaker, but do not in the process violate God’s sovereign 
subjectivity.  For all his profound disagreement with Schleiermacher's subjectivist 
approach, the great kinship between Frei and Schleiermacher is that, in a different 
way and for a different time, Frei too considers the epistemological question to be a 
hermeneutical one. 
 
As detected by Frei, the practical result of this general hermeneutical method is that 
the gospel accounts of the life of Jesus Christ are no longer constitutive of his 
identity.  Indeed, it would have been easier to have arrived at an understanding of his 
supreme God-consciousness without the litter of contingent events which the 
synoptics in particular pile up around him.  So, for all God’s ‘inner’ presence to his 
God-consciousness, and for all that Jesus was completely historical, it turns out that 
God was never ‘actually’ present at all in our history.   Rather, history must be ‘got 
rid of’ if we are to penetrate through to God’s being.  Tellingly, Schleiermacher is 
rather astonishingly dismissive of the Old Testament as a whole, firmly rejecting the 
accounts it gives of God’s direct and miraculous interventions in human affairs.  
Similarly, he tends to regard the miracles of Jesus as mythical expressions of the 
disciples’ faith rather than as actual happenings.  For Schleiermacher, God’s ultimate 
revelation was to Jesus’ supreme God-consciousness, which sounds like a positive 
statement – until one realises that it means that revelation has nothing to do with 
Jesus’ actual physical being, nothing to do with what he did and said, and certainly 
nothing to do with the ‘accidental’ events of his historical life.  As a result, Jesus’ 
identity as redeemer has no relation whatsoever to his death and resurrection, despite 
every insistence of scripture to the contrary.   
 
Hence Frei’s conclusion, that while Schleiermacher succeeded in protecting the 
concept of God from historical-rational critique, he did so at a price.  Nevertheless, 
Schleiermacher’s honourable attempt to give an account of God’s revelation as both 
 63  
immanent and profoundly historical has been useful for Frei in that, together with his 
critic Strauss, he did at least identify the key elements necessary for a doctrine of 
revelation in history.  Essentially, if revelation is regarded as the historically-fixed, 
irrevocably-past Jesus event, and that alone, then God has nothing to say to us in the 
present.  As Schleiermacher himself put it, “A thing no longer really exists, but 
becomes a mere matter of history, when it can exercise no further activity.”
97
  
However saving or atoning that event might have been, if revelation is not also a 
present event then God has once again retreated into a deistic mode and has no 
communication with his creation.  Ontologically, he would be a mere metaphysical 
abstraction, scarcely deserving of the appellation of ‘being’.  This was the danger 
Frei perceived at one extreme end of dialectical theology, which paid attention only 
to the event of revelation, and not to the human reception of it.  Somehow, if Frei 
was going to embark on his own scripture-based hermeneutical account of the 
content of God, then a test of its success would be if it could give an account of 
revelation now, as well as then. 
 
5. Concluding observations 
 
Of the three main understandings of revelation available to him, not one of them 
taken on its own entirely answers Frei’s concern about the content of God.  Where 
Barth provides the dialectical underpinning, the ontological realism, and the 
correspondingly realist christological basis for any doctrine of revelation, 
nevertheless there was what seemed to be a down-playing of epistemology to deal 
with.  In Chapter 2, we shall see how this was not quite the case; but for the moment, 
at least in Barth’s early theology, it is not quite clear how revelation becomes 
“intelligibly significant” for us.  Niebuhr, of course, had a more positive account of 
human receptivity, and a useful insistence that revelation must take a present pro 
nobis form if it is to be called revelation at all.  However, as Niebuhr himself 
contends, this prioritising of epistemology leads to knowledge, not so much of God, 
but of the self as known by God.  For Niebuhr, the content of God an sich is 
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epistemologically unavailable.  Of course, both Barth and Niebuhr were trying to 
escape the inadequacies of Schleiermacher’s immanent account of revelation, but 
that liberal theologian did at least provide an epistemological path to a God whose 
presence was abiding, personal, and hermeneutically available – even if only after a 
great deal of effort on our part. 
 
The point has been made, that if Frei did not wholeheartedly embrace any of the 
three main understandings of revelation that were available to him, it was because he 
found something deficient in their accounts.  While all three assumed a starting point 
for theology in a doctrine of revelation, however that doctrine was conceived, Frei 
has perceived that in actuality, none of the three begin with God’s revelation in Jesus 
Christ.  Schleiermacher’s actual starting point is not God, but an inherent human 
receptivity to God, which is the precondition of any revelation.  With Barth, the 
situation is more complicated, for Barth knows that God’s revelation in Jesus Christ 
is the precondition to all his speaking about God.  However, when it comes to the 
grammatical order in which he arranges his theology, Barth begins with the pure 
ontological subject, posited prior to any revelation, and therefore an abstraction.  
Barth is only saved from ending as he began, in an abstract account of God, because 
despite the assumption of his own logic of belief, his actual starting point is the 
concrete revelation that was Jesus Christ.  But for those existentialist theologians 
such as Niebuhr, who signed up to the abstract starting point of Romans and the 
Church Dogmatics, the end result is an entirely unknowable, content-less God. 
 
We acknowledge nevertheless that throughout Frei’s career, Barth’s theological 
position remained the one with which he had most sympathy.  In the course of that 
career, it becomes apparent that in many, even most respects, Frei is absolutely in 
agreement with Barth’s ontological prolegomena.  For Frei as for Barth, there could 
be “no discernible transition” from the human to the divine, although “there is of 
course a transition the other way, because God has reconciled man to himself”.
98
  
This concept of the absolute sovereignty of the Subject God, independent of human 
perception, is a central assumption for Frei. 
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However, if we believe that God has indeed spoken in a way that is “intelligibly 
significant for its human recipients”, then we are obliged by that fact of that 
revelation to embark upon a process of right hearing and right reading.  This is the 
difficult and fraught epistemological task, and crucially, Frei understands it as a 
hermeneutical one.  Even at this early stage in his academic career, he is able to 
assert that if Barth is indeed right that “our relation to him is founded solely on his 
freedom to be for us in grace and revelation”, then “to know this is to discover it in 
one source only – in Scripture”:
99
  
 It is simply true that we do need the letter of Scripture to tell us of revelation.  We have no 
 independent information of this normative object.
100 
In other words, if God cannot be known relationally, either in history or in our own 
inner experience, then scripture is the theologian’s last refuge.  In particular, it is our 
only available objective account of the one primary predicative revelation that was 
Jesus Christ himself.  We may indeed claim to have an inner experience of or 
relationship with Jesus, and Frei is far from disparaging this, but that can be no 
foundation for theology.  God’s revelation must correspond to God’s being.  This 
means that Jesus must possess his own actuality, his own autonomy, which in turn 





It is exactly at this point that Frei detects the gap in Barth’s theology.  If Jesus Christ 
is indeed the ‘concrete content’, or the predicate, of God, then that begs the question: 
what is the ‘concrete content’ of Jesus?  Frei was later to make this his grand project: 
adding a fleshly Jesus of Nazareth to what he saw as Barth’s overly abstract starting 
point.  There are some hints even as early as Frei’s doctoral thesis about this future 
direction.  “Biblical realism,” he observes, “aided Barth in the formulation of a 
concrete rather than formal notion of transcendence.”
102
  However, Frei is not yet at a 
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stage where he can write his own positive content of the human figure who was also 
the Word of God.   He describes the Biblical Realism project, upon which Barth 
drew quite heavily, as “largely a preacher’s movement”, in that it has “no specifiable 
thought form” and “is apt to sound quite banal side by side with the subtleties of 
academic theology and philosophy”.
103
  One might detect a similar worry in Frei, that 
any such project of his own would be open to the same accusations.  There is even a 
hint of academic embarrassment at the need he perceives to tackle the biblical 
accounts from a ‘preacherly’ point of view, which will inevitably entail wrestling 
with such non-philosophical issues as the inspiration of scripture, and the rightness or 
otherwise of a ‘literal’ reading, with the danger always of “being misunderstood for a 
Fundamentalist”.
104
     
 
Furthermore, if Frei intended to write a ‘content’ of the revelation that was Jesus 
Christ, then he was more than aware that he would be working within a very liberal 
tradition.  The development of Higher Criticism had given rise to a number of very 
earnest 19
th
 century attempts to write an historically-accurate ‘Life of Jesus’, not 
least of these being Schleiermacher’s own attempt.
105 
  That, however, had first of all 
been picked apart most effectively by Strauss in The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of 
History
106
 (1865); and then later, the whole trend had been subjected to Schweitzer’s 
razor critique.
107
  This meant that such a project would be a dangerous undertaking 
indeed for a post-Barthian theologian.  Nevertheless, as Frei came to see it, the 
problem with Schleiermacher's account lay not in the undertaking itself, for the 
project was an honourable one.  Rather, the problem lay in the inability of 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics to deal adequately with the narrative form of the 
gospel accounts.  If Frei could sort out the hermeneutical approach, then the project 
might once again be revived, and so offer an account of the content of Jesus Christ, 
who is the content of God’s self-revelation. 
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At this early stage Frei is still hopeful that Barth and Niebuhr, taken together, might 
somehow balance each other’s weaknesses: Niebuhr’s account of the meeting of 
Persons in the historical moment might perhaps counteract Barth’s tendency to 
ontological abstraction.  It seems that Frei had hopes of Niebuhr’s particular brand of 
historical existentialism, that it might provide a “middle road” between the inviolable 
objectivism of both God and World which Barth had imported from the Kantian 
tradition: 
 Many theologians held that revelation, as unique act, becomes embodied in unique historical 
 events.  But in that case revelation seems to strike into history as a foreign element.... In this 
 situation there may be promise in the endeavour to find a middle road between unrevelational 
 history and unhistorical revelation, by stipulating two types of history, be they called secular 
 and sacred or objective and existential.
108 
However, in the course of the subsequent decade, Frei was to become increasingly 
dissatisfied with Niebuhr’s account of “two types of history”, which seemed to him 
to posit a separation between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ which is unjustifiable, whether with 
reference to history, to text, to identity, or to God’s being and revelation.  His 
discovery of Auerbach’s Mimesis
109
, with its gripping account of the development of 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition of realistic narrative, was to provide Frei with one way 
around this dialectic.  Following from that, his reading of Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept 
of Mind
110
, with its devastating critique of existentialist assumptions, provided him 
with another means of critiquing ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ as false dichotomies. 
 
This long rumination on the problem of the content of God ultimately comes to a 
head for Frei, with the side-by-side publications of The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative 
in 1974, and The Identity of Jesus Christ in 1975.  In the first of these twin 
publications, Frei sets out to explore a more satisfactory account of textual meaning, 
in which the ‘real’ content of the Bible is not hidden somewhere behind the narrative, 
but is in fact constituted precisely by these externally-narrated happenings.  In related 
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fashion, in The Identity of Jesus Christ, he explores how a person’s identity is neither 
an ‘inner’ nor a ‘transcendent’ thing, but is constituted precisely by their ‘external’ 
words and deeds.  When these two approaches together are applied to the story of 
Jesus as narrated in the gospels, we have the beginnings of a ‘doctrine’ of revelation 
as worked out by Frei: one which he hopes will avoid the problem of abstraction, and 
will instead give a satisfactory answer to his early question about the content of God.  
But before that can happen, Frei has to do some untangling of the three strands of 
logic that constitute the theo-logical enterprise: ontological, epistemological, and 
grammatical.  Only then can he establish his own starting point for the logic of belief. 
  69  
Chapter 2  The Logic of Belief 
1. ‘Prolegomena’ 
1.1 A Starting Point for Theology 
In the previous chapter the focus was Frei’s hunt through his theological 
predecessors for a doctrine of revelation which could provide some positive content 
to the concept of God.  There it was observed that, if the dialectical revolution was 
right to reject subjective relationalism as the source of our knowledge of God, then 
scripture remains the only objective source of ‘information’ about God’s actions in 
history.  Frei’s insight is that the task of listening to the revelation of God – always a 
hermeneutical issue, as Schleiermacher rightly identified – now becomes the specific 
task of the right reading of scripture.  In other words, biblical hermeneutics has taken 
up the grammatical position of the starting point for the theological enterprise, 
displacing the existential encounter, the consciousness of God, and even Barthian-
style ontology.  Scripture, and not some pre-conceived ‘doctrine’ of revelation, must 
become for us the foundation and starting point for all theology, including the 
doctrine of revelation itself.  In other words, Frei’s contention is that we cannot even 
say that God has spoken, until we can say, this God has spoken, this specific, 
identifiable, content-full God.    
 
The positing of biblical hermeneutics as foundational to theology is not to be 
confused with ‘foundationalism’.  ‘Foundationalism’ refers to the practice of 
theologians from the Enlightenment onwards of establishing a philosophical basis for 
theology in the form of a ‘prolegomena’.  For ‘prolegomena’, Robert Jenson’s 
definition will suffice:  
 In the modern period it has often been supposed that the prolegomena to theology must 
 enable the enterprise, that the axioms and warrants needed to set specifically theological 
 cognition in motion must be antecedently established.”
1
   
As Frei outlines in Types of Christian Theology, the intent of a prolegomena was to 
fix the theological method according to a theory of rationality or interpretation drawn 
                                                 
1
 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology Volume 1: The Triune God, (New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 3. 
  70  
from outside theology, perhaps in philosophy or in anthropology.  Frei explains the 
reasoning thus: 
 Philosophy may be regarded as being a foundational discipline which, rather than giving us 
 information, provides us with the criteria for meaning and certainty, coherence as well as 
 truth, in any area of human reflection.  In other words, the rules of correct thought are 
 invariant and all-fields-encompassing.  In the light of its foundational status, philosophy 
 arbitrates what may at any time and anywhere count as meaningful language, genuine 
 thought, and real knowledge.
2
 
Even Schleiermacher, who argued so convincingly that theology had its own internal 
logic, nevertheless founded the system of The Christian Faith on the anthropological 
principle of the “feeling of absolute dependence”
3
 in all humanity.  However, with 
the advent of Barth, such a modernist approach to theology became highly suspect.  
As Dan Stiver points out, from a ‘postmodern’ (or ‘postliberal’) perspective, the 
whole idea of a prolegomena in the foundational sense has become untenable: 
 At the fading of modernity, it has become clear in theology that methodology, or, as it is 
 often technically called, prolegomena, was central to its assumptions.  As many have pointed 
 out, modernity generally relied on a secure foundation and then a secure method to build on 
 to the foundation – at least that was the goal.  Postmodernism is the result of repeated failure 
 to achieve such a lofty ideal.
4 
Barth’s point is, that theology is not only an internal church discipline, but that it is 
founded on and accountable only to God.
5
  As such, there can be no universal 
philosophical method which can be applied to the task from ‘outside’. Rather, 
theological method must be derived from the task itself, as something that is always 
ad hoc, provisional, and subject to God’s judgement.  Accordingly, although the term 
‘prolegomena’, has survived into the post-Barth era, it now has a much more 
chastened definition.  Robert Jenson’s is typical: “The most prolegomena to theology 
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So when we state that, in Frei’s view, biblical hermeneutics are foundational to the 
theological enterprise, this is simply to say that they are the starting point for 
theology, derived not from outside but from within the faith-discourse itself.  Frei’s 
hope is that the right reading of scripture will provide the content of the God-who-
has-spoken, on the basis of which he then might proceed to a doctrine of revelation 
and to further theologising.  Of course, this entertains the possibility that scripture 
will not and cannot do this – and if so, then the risk Frei is taking is that theology has 
no foundation whatsoever, and is as meaningless an abstraction as the God after 
which it gropes.   
 
However, what Frei is attempting is a kind of pre-theology: his intention is to 
establish the starting point for theology, and not to construct an explanatory system 
in itself.  At this point, it is important to note that Frei has no pre-conceived doctrine 
of the authority of scripture, and does not begin with an understanding of the Bible as 
the Word of God – for that in itself would be to posit a doctrine of revelation before 
the actual reading of scripture.  Rather, if any aspect of the three-fold Word
7
 is to be 
identified as revelation, whether that be scripture, Jesus Christ himself, or the act of 
proclamation, or even some other such construal, then that conclusion must arise out 
of the scriptural accounts, and not be imposed upon them.   
 
What we have then, alongside his search for a concrete content to the doctrine of 
God, is Frei’s growing awareness that where a theological scheme has failed to 
provide such a content, it is because it has in some sense started in the wrong place. 
Therefore his task, as he understands it, is to work out what is the correct starting 
point in what he terms sometimes “the order” and sometimes “the logic of belief”.
8
  
His mature theological project, climaxing in The Identity of Jesus Christ, is to 
examine whether scripture can indeed provide that starting point, if it read according 
to a hermeneutic which is responsive to the demands of the text. 
 
                                                 
7
 Barth considers “The Word of God in its Threefold Form” in CDI/1, 88–124. 
8
 Frei, Identity, 58. 
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1.2. Preface to The Identity of Jesus Christ: Frei’s Hermeneutical Agenda 
 
When Frei published The Identity of Jesus Christ
  
in 1975, it was with the 
accompaniment of a ‘Preface’ in which he sets out very usefully his theological and 
hermeneutical agenda.  This preface had been many years in the making.  In 1966, 
Frei had published “Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus’ Death and 
Resurrection”
9
, a long essay which was later largely reworked to become The 
Identity of Jesus Christ.   The preface shows evidence of much reflection on 
responses to that essay, whether favourable, hostile, or plain uncomprehending.  
Furthermore, Frei’s long hermeneutical project, finally published in 1974 as The 
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, had honed his ideas on the topic: while that book is a 





hermeneuts, it is not possible to conduct such a critique without developing a 
positive standpoint of one’s own.  With this preface, Frei is now in a position to 
make an explicit statement of the hermeneutical principles which he himself 
employed in the course of the theological ‘experiment’ which was to become The 
Identity of Jesus Christ.  As such, this preface is almost unique in Frei’s output
10
, 
which on the whole tends to concentrate on dissecting the hermeneutics of others, 
leaving the reader to read between the lines for Frei’s own preferences. 
 
                                                 
9
 Hans W. Frei, “Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection”, 
Christian Scholar 49.4 (Winter), 263–306.  This essay was republished in Hans W. Frei, Theology 
and Narrative: Selected Essays, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 45–93, and 
also in Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology, 
(Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1997), 1–49.   
Frei twice reworked the original essay in longer forms in 1967.  The first of these was “The Mystery 
of the Presence of Jesus Christ”, in Crossroads: An Adult Education Magazine of the Presbyterian 
Church 17.2 (Jan-Mar), 69–96; 17.3 (Apr-Jun), 69–96.  This version later became The Identity of 
Jesus Christ, with the addition of the Preface and an Epilogue.  On this earlier publication, Mike 
Higton remarks, “The differences between it and [Identity] are nearly all cosmetic. The final chapter 
adds a significant pneumatological, ecclesiological and political reflection to the argument of 
[‘Theological Reflections’].”   
See Mike Higton’s homepage, http://people.exeter.ac.uk/mahigton/frei/bib2.html#bib 
The second of these re-workings appeared as “Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal”,  
in Frei, Theology and Narrative, 26–44. 
10
 The only comparable work is the 1983 paper, “The “Literal Reading” of Biblical Narrative in the 
Christian Tradition: Does It Stretch or Will It Break?” in Frei, Theology and Narrative, 117–52. 
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In many ways, the purpose of this preface is to identify those hermeneutical schemes 
which Frei has in fact rejected.  Hence, it largely takes the form of an argument 
against Neo-Orthodoxy, against apologetics, against a spiritual hermeneutic, and 
against any kind of systematic application to the Christian life of the religious 
significance of scripture.  As with an earlier preface, that by Karl Barth to the second 
edition of Der Römerbrief, Frei is likewise struggling to explain himself in the face 
of the current dominant hermeneutical approach; and moreover, to do so without 
adopting its vocabulary and accompanying set of assumptions.  As such, there is a 
sometimes belligerent tone as he rejects first one hermeneutical assumption and then 
another; a tone which alternates with a cautious insistence on the theological 
limitations of his own enterprise.  Nevertheless, seventeen years after the publication 
of “Religion (Natural and Revealed)”, it is clear that Frei has resolved many of his 
uncertainty as regards the various doctrines of revelation available to him, so that 
what we have here in this preface is a cogent and positive statement of Frei’s mature 
theological hermeneutics.   
 
For all that we must examine what Frei rejects, the intention is to illustrate also what 
he accepts: what is in fact his conception of the task, form, and method(s) of biblical 
hermeneutics.  A particular focus will be on Frei’s critical engagement with the 
hermeneutics of Karl Barth, and some comparison of the two will demonstrate where 
he accepts or assumes Barthian principles, and where he questions or even rejects 
them.  In doing so, the hope is to describe Frei’s understanding of the importance of 
the “logic of belief” – in other words, to describe what he envisages is the correct 
starting point for the task of doing dogmatic theology and, once this is established, 
the correct order in which to proceed.  Only on that basis will we then be able to 
return, in Chapter 3 and beyond, to the application of his hermeneutical principles to 
scripture, and his final arrival at a doctrine of revelation which does justice to the 
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2. A Theological Experiment: Testing the Hypothesis 
 
 Hermeneutics I define in the old-fashioned, rather narrow, and low-keyed manner as the 
 rules and principles for determining the sense of written texts, or the rules and principles 
 governing exegesis.
11  
The publication in 1974 of The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative was in effect an 
exercise in ‘clearing the decks’ of Frei’s liberal hermeneutical heritage.  The preface 
to The Identity of Jesus Christ, published the following year, extends this ‘clearing’ 
into the contemporary theological scene: a scene which was dominated by the twin 
dialectical theologies of Karl Barth and Neo-Orthodoxy.  An earlier attempt to 
explore his ideas had resulted in what Frei now sees as a partial failure: he references 
specifically “The Mystery of the Presence of Jesus Christ”, which had successfully 
demonstrated the necessary co-positing of Jesus’ identity and presence, but at the 
expense, Frei judges, of leaving the way open to a subjectivist interpretation.  Now 
he realises that not only must he excise what he can of his previous ‘existentialist’ 
vocabulary and conceptuality, but for the sake of preventing misinterpretation of 
what necessarily remains, realises also that he must accompany this re-presentation 
with a preface setting out the assumptions which underpin his enterprise. 
 
Accordingly, Frei begins his preface with a description of the process of thought that 
went into “The Mystery of the Presence of Jesus Christ”.  It was, he claims, a 
“theological experiment”, and as such had left room for correction and clarification 
without necessarily undermining the central thesis.  Not only had he struggled to give 
“precise form” to the “basic conviction” which provided the foundational hypothesis 
for his argument, but that argument itself had a “certain tentative character” in that he 
was not working with a “preexistent intellectual map”, but was developing his 
thinking only “in the process of writing”.
12
  This modest assertion rather 
disingenuously conceals a deliberate approach which Frei developed when writing 
his doctoral thesis that theology should avoid any and all “preexistent” systematic 
schemes, and should rightly be done on an ad hoc basis (of which more discussion 
later).   
                                                 
11
 Frei, Identity, 61. 
12
 Ibid. 53. 
  75  
“The Mystery of the Presence of Jesus Christ” was an “experiment” also in a second 
sense, in that its purpose was to test (not to ‘prove’, except in the old sense of the 
word) the “basic conviction”, or hypothesis, upon which he had founded his 
enterprise.  This ‘testing’ was done by means of an exegesis of the gospel stories.  
Later in this chapter I shall return to the very Barthian principle of the practice of 
exegesis being the test of any theological theory.  But for the moment let the focus be 
on this “basic conviction”, which Frei states as follows: 
 ... that Christian faith involves a unique affirmation about Jesus Christ, viz., not only that he 
 is the presence of God but also that knowing his identity is identical with having him present 
 or being in his presence.
13
 
It is important to be clear that Frei has not pulled this hypothesis out of thin air, nor 
yet is there any pretence that he has discovered it by means of a purely neutral 
hermeneutic.  It is true that Frei is anxious to find a hermeneutic that will not 
“overwhelm”
14
 the narrative, but which will allow scripture to speak in its own 
terms.  However, he is quite able to answer Gadamer’s warning, that “the literary and 
hermeneutical principle of understanding texts in their own terms is … itself 
unsatisfactory and always in need of support from a generally unacknowledged 
dogmatic guideline”.
15
 Here Frei has quite clearly acknowledged his own “dogmatic 
guideline”, which is the affirmation that the Christian church has traditionally made 
concerning Jesus as the revelation of God, at which conclusion it has arrived through 
the reading of the gospels.  This is entirely in keeping with the principle of theology 
being an internal church discipline. 
 
However, it should be noted that, while the “basic conviction” precedes the reading 
of the text in strictly grammatical terms, in actuality, such a hypothesis is formed in 
and with a reading of that text.  In other words, we have a simultaneity which 
nevertheless we are obliged to express in a grammatically sequential form.  This is 
not so difficult a concept as it first appears.  In science, it is an axiom that the nature 
of the object under scrutiny dictates the nature of the hypothesis, so that the 
hypothesis is not devised in an epistemological vacuum, but is formulated according 
                                                 
13
 Frei, Identity, 53. 
14
 Ibid. 62. 
15
 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), 176.  Frei relied heavily 
on Gadamer in the course of Eclipse, particularly in the last chapters on Schleiermacher. 
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to some degree of a priori knowledge of the object.  Indeed, there is a logical ‘first 
reading’ somewhere which has formed all future hypotheses in the course of that 
reading.  Similarly, Frei’s “basic conviction” has been formulated according to some 
a priori knowledge of the gospel narratives.  However, likewise, there is a logical 
‘first reading’ of the gospels somewhere, and it is hypothetically possible that such a 
first reading might occur again, perhaps as conducted by someone from an entirely 
non-Western and non-Christian culture.  In such a case, a whole range of hypotheses 
regarding who Jesus is and what he is like would be formulated in and with that first 
reading.  The logic of belief must therefore begin with a “basic conviction”, but this 
grammatically simple starting point does not necessarily correspond directly to a 
complex ‘in-and-with’ reality. 
 
Some contrast with Barth is instructive.  For Barth, at least up to and including the 
first volume of Church Dogmatics, his ‘prolegomena’ (as opposed to Frei’s “basic 
conviction”) is the considerably more succinct Deus dixit.
16
  Barth’s theology 
proceeds on the assumption that God has spoken and has revealed Godself, so that 
theology is always a ‘thinking after’ that event.  So while Barth might examine 
critically every aspect of Christian dogmatics, he does so always in the light of that 
foundational event; but the event itself, the ‘God has spoken’, is unexamined.  It 
cannot be examined.  It is the point on which everything else is predicated; or 
perhaps it is better understood as a totality, the all-encompassing whole on which 
there is no external viewpoint.  Deus dixit is how the universe began: the theologian, 
actually as well as logically, can do no more than think after the event that is God’s 
Word.   
 
Frei begins his own logic of belief in a rather different place.  For him, the 
prolegomena that ‘God has spoken’ posits the very necessary, and indeed previous 
question, But who, then, is God?  This was his concern back in “Religion (Natural 
and Revealed)”: that this foundational assumption of Barth’s, entirely logical though 
it is, yet lacks content.  It is significant that Frei does not even use the word, 
‘prolegomena’ for his own starting point.  By contrast, his “basic conviction” has a 
                                                 
16
 As was pointed out in Chapter 1, this prolegomena later became far more unambiguously 
christological.  See 36n.17.  
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considerably more tentative character: it is not an a priori truth, but a hypothesis to 
be tested.  So where Barth begins with ‘God has spoken’ Frei turns this in to a 
hypothesis, that if God can be said to have spoken, then that can be posited only as 
God has or has not done so in the specific Word that is Jesus Christ.  Furthermore, if 
God can be conceived as continuing to speak or to reveal – if God can be conceived 
as being present to us in our time – then that presence must likewise be conceived as 
the presence of Jesus Christ.  This outlaws Niebuhr’s insistence that only God is 
present in the moment of revelation.  Quite the contrary: if we seek ‘content’ to flesh 
out the abstract concept (however ontologically ‘actual’ God might be), then we can 
seek it only in the gospel accounts of Jesus Christ.  Therefore, to answer the 
question, Who, then, is God?, we need only ask, Who, then, is Jesus of Nazareth? 
Once we know who this Jesus is, only then will we be able to say with confidence, 
that it is this God who is speaking.   
 
In effect, then, where Barth posits as his prolegomena an ontology of an abstract 
being who ‘has spoken’, and only subsequently ‘fills in’ the content through biblical 
exegesis, Frei reverses the procedure: first we must know the content, the identity of 
God through exegesis, and only then can we say with ontological confidence that it is 
this God who has spoken and continues to speak.  Of course, this ordering is merely 
a logical, grammatical ordering, appropriate to the theological task, and says nothing 
about any ontological dependence of God’s being upon God’s acts.  Nor, for that 
matter, does Barth’s ordering say anything about an ontological independence of 
God’s being from God’s acts.  Naturally, we cannot speak of God’s being but that 
God has revealed in act; although equally, we cannot speak of God’s self-revealing 
acts without speaking of God’s being.   
 
Nevertheless, despite such simultaneity of ontology and epistemology, the 
theologian’s grammatical decisions remain vitally important.  It is for just such 
grammatical reasons that Frei does not allow himself the easy option of adopting 
Barth’s prolegomena: for Frei, a ‘being who acts’ simply cannot be an a priori 
hermeneutical assumption.  After all, from where else did Barth derive his conviction 
that God has spoken but from scripture, given that he himself had outlawed natural 
theology and immanent revelation?  Rather, that God is a being who reveals is a 
conviction of faith, which is derived simultaneously with the reading of God’s story 
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in scripture, and as a theological concept grammatically can only be formulated a 
posteriori, that is, after its reading.  But logically, what the theologian absolutely 
cannot do is posit the ‘existence’ of a revealing God in advance of exegesis.  
 
This may explain why Frei opts for a “basic conviction” as opposed to a 
prolegomena.  His “basic conviction” that Jesus Christ is the presence of God, as 
derived from the faith community, dictates his particular approach to the theological 
task of establishing the content of God.  In other words, if his basic conviction is 
correct, that Jesus’ identity is identical with God’s presence, then it follows logically 
that to know who Jesus is to know who God is.  Frei’s hermeneutical task is then 
clear: how ‘correctly’ to read the gospels in order to know the ‘content’ or identity of 
Jesus, and thus through exegesis to test the hypothesis, that Jesus is the presence of 
God.  If he is indeed to be thought of as such, then the gospel accounts must provide 
the basis for that conclusion, demonstrating this co-identity to the point that Frei’s 
hypothesis can be upheld.  This is how Frei proposes, by means of exegesis, to make 
‘concrete’ the content of God.    
 
Furthermore, if the second part of Frei’s “basic conviction” is correct, that “knowing 
his identity is identical with having him present”, then knowledge of Jesus’ historical 
identity will allow us to speak of God’s revelation to us in our existential present.  In 
other words, the hermeneutical task is also to see if the gospel narratives can be read 
in such a way as to provide a satisfactory doctrine of revelation.  By using a 
correlative ‘if ... then ...’ formulation, Frei is speaking in terms of logical, not actual, 
necessity: if we can read the gospels according to an adequate hermeneutic, then 
what should result is an account of the identity of historical Jesus of Nazareth which 
will not only provide concrete knowledge of God, but will also allow us also to speak 
of the presence of Jesus to us now.  In a reverse move, this identity account then 
becomes the ‘proof’ of the chosen hermeneutic: if we have achieved such an account 
of the identity and presence of Jesus Christ, then our hermeneutic is patently 
adequate.   
 
That the Christian’s experience of God’s presence might follow an entirely different 
order in actuality is besides the point.  Frei’s insistence on the correct order for doing 
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theology is not intended to systematise the experience of coming to faith.  Once 
again, he is following a grammatical order and not an actual one: it is simply that, 
given that we cannot say two things at once, the question then becomes, in what 
order should we say them?  But this issue of the order, or logic, of belief is more 
crucial that it might at first appear, for at stake is the personal reality of God.  As Frei 
had demonstrated in his earlier examinations of the doctrine of revelation, to begin in 
the wrong place in the logic of belief inevitably leads to an abstract and contentless 
concept of God.  Frei’s project is to repair this theological rip evident in both liberal 
and existentialist theology, between God’s being and God’s revelation, or between 
ontology and epistemology.  And he intends to do so by starting in the right place, 
with a hermeneutic chosen precisely because of its ability to give a concrete account 
of identity. 
 
3. Ad Hoc Methodology 
3.1 The Fixed Form of the Inquiry 
In his preface, Frei reveals to us in advance, that his selected hermeneutical method 
for the exegetical testing of his hypothesis did in fact confirm its basic truth.  But 
further even than that confirmation, his gospel exegesis led him to an increased 
understanding of just how Jesus can be said to be God’s revelation: this, he claims, is 
an understanding which was given to him in and with the reflective reading of the 
gospels, and not in advance of it.  “It is of course true,” he writes, “that we never 
really know what we think until we actually say it.  In that sense the conviction just 
summarized gained force as the essay grew.”
17
  This rather disingenuous statement 
concerning his own thought process conceals yet another confirmation of Frei’s 
preferred ad hoc methodology. 
 
But what is an ad hoc methodology?   In order to reach a definition, it is necessary to 
do something with the idea of ‘prolegomena’ which Schleiermacher and his liberal 
cohorts did not do: to distinguish methodology from epistemology.  Where 
Schleiermacher understood the foundational epistemological statement (“the feeling 
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 Frei, Identity, 53. 
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of absolute dependence”) as a statement simultaneously of method, Frei refuses to 
systematise his own far weaker “basic conviction” with his chosen method.  Rather, 
he aligns his “basic conviction” more closely with the form of his inquiry.  The 
“basic conviction” is fixed, at least for the duration of the experiment.  Meanwhile, in 
its own way, the form the experiment must take is equally fixed.  Indeed, the form is 
fixed precisely by the nature of the ‘raw materials’ under examination, which in this 
case are the gospel narratives themselves.  Frei’s “basic conviction”, which focuses 
the hermeneutical lens on the identity of Jesus Christ, means that he is trying to 
answer the formal questions, “Who is he?” and “What is he like?”
18
  These formal 
questions, derived in themselves through gospel exegesis, dictate that the form of 
Frei’s experiment must be descriptive and chronologically linear, coinciding with the 
realistic narrative form of the gospels.     
 
At this point, Frei’s project begins to look worryingly similar to the kind of liberal 
theological project which Barth had been at such pains to escape.  Barth’s own 
teacher, Wilhelm Herrmann, and his contemporary Adolf von Harnack, likewise 
sought to establish who Jesus was, beginning with the gospel accounts of the 
historical Jesus.  Their project was to ‘uncover’ the true identity of Jesus through 
historical research and exegesis, in order to distinguish the “kernel” of truth from the 
“husk” of extraneous detail.
19
  Von Harnack believed that at least three ‘facts’ about 
Jesus could be established from the gospel accounts: 
 In the first place, they [the gospels] offer us a plain picture of Jesus’ teaching, in regard both 
 to its main features and to its individual application; in the second place, they tell us how his 
 life issued in the service of his vocation; and in the third place, they describe to us the 
 impression which he made upon his disciples, and which they transmitted.
20 
In other words, Jesus’ identity was constituted by his teachings, his obedience to 
God, and the ongoing impact of his personality.  The similarities to Frei’s project are 
alarming.  However, the similarity resides in the fixed form of the gospels.  Try as 
they might, the 19
th
 century liberals could not escape the gospels’ realistic narrative 
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 Frei, Identity, 136. 
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 This phrase was originally coined by the translator of Adolf von Harnack, Das Wesen des 
Christentums (Berlin, 1900), in reference to the essence of Christianity, and not to the identity of Jesus 
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form, and indeed, found it highly uncongenial to their own theological project, of 
locating the identity if Jesus Christ in his ‘inner’ consciousness or personality.  This 
misreading – and the dogged resistance of the texts themselves – forms the core of 
Frei’s critique in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative.   
 
The form, then, is fixed by the text, and the “basic conviction” is fixed by a project’s 
particular aim, which likewise should be derived from the text, and not from some 
external principle.  It is therefore only the method which can be described as ad hoc.  
Whenever the “basic conviction” changes, so that another hypothesis is being 
pursued, then the method will change again: what is needed to ‘prove’ one assertion 
regarding the gospels will not work to ‘prove’ another, even if the form of the 
inquiry must still be linear and descriptive.  However, when the text itself changes, 
then so too must the form of the experiment: a chronologically linear and descriptive 
form would not be so appropriate to Paul’s Epistles, for example.  In short, there is 
no universal hermeneutical method which can be applied equally to all texts, so that 
such decisions must be made on an ad hoc basis. 
 
3.2 The Theological Task 
Methodology, therefore, must be ad hoc and flexible, because this is necessitated by 
the particularity of each hypothesis and the form of each text.  However, there is a 
further component which feeds into the choice of method, and that is the issue of the 
current theological task.  What that theological task might be can never be fixed, but 
is ever changing.  This is because the theological task is the ‘human’ end of the 
search for the content of God, which ‘thinks after’ revelation and is itself neither 
revealed, nor inspired, nor canonically fixed.  For Barth, the task was to counter 
liberal immanent understandings of revelation; for Frei, by contrast, the task is to 
counter existentialist dualism.  In our time the task will have changed again.  
Therefore a key hermeneutical principle for Frei was to let the text-based hypothesis 
and form interact with the current theological task in order to dictate, on an ad hoc 
basis, the most appropriate and useful method.   
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Frei’s 1956 doctoral thesis is instructive here.  As Frei explains, Barth chose a 
violently dialectical method in Der Römerbrief for three principal reasons.  The first 
reason is Barth’s own “basic conviction”, derived from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 
itself: the uncompromising dialectic of “God is in heaven, and thou art on earth”.  
Barth explains how he “embarks” on the interpretation of Romans “on the 
assumption that he is confronted with the same unmistakeable and immeasurable 
significance of that relation as I myself am confronted with, and that it is this 
situation which moulds his thought and its expression”.  In a clear parallel to Frei’s 
own approach, Barth goes on to explain that “whether these assumptions are justified 
or not becomes clear in the course of the investigation”.
21
   
 
The second reason for Barth’s choice of his dialectical method is that the form, or 
shape, of Paul’s own argument in his Letter to the Romans is likewise dialectical, 
predicated on the freedom of God from the perceptions of humanity.  There is no 
thought given by Barth here as to how this dialectical method might be applied to 
any other text, biblical or otherwise, according to some general hermeneutical 
principle. 
 
Frei argues that the third reason Barth chose such a violent dialectical method was 
the current theological task.  This Frei summarises as follows: 
 To point to the complete newness , the miracle of the grace and freedom of God – in contrast 
 to the relational theologies of Liberalism et al. which always began with the givenness, the 
 togetherness of God and man in the relation of revelation.
22 
However, this intention in itself cannot be sharply distinguished from the 
preoccupations of his liberal teachers, who would have agreed quite happily that 
revelation can be termed ‘miracle’.  As Schleiermacher explained: 
 In one respect all Christian dogmas are supra-rational, in another they are all rational.  They 
 are supra-rational in the respect in which everything experienced is supra-rational.  For there 
 is an inner experience to which they may all be traced: they rest upon a given ... a true 
 appropriation of Christian dogmas cannot be brought about by scientific means, and thus lies 
 outside the realm of reason: it can only be brought about by each man willing to have the 
 experience for himself.
23
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 Frei, Doctrine of Revelation, 94. 
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This is the “givenness” to which Frei refers, that the term ‘revelation’ can 
appropriately be applied to any extraordinary insight which has defied the causal 
rationality of the external world and “cannot itself in turn be explained by the 
historical chain which precedes it”
24
.  What it does not refer to is a transcendent 
revelation: “any possibility of God being in any way given is entirely excluded,” 
Schleiermacher wrote, “because anything that is outwardly given must be given as an 
object exposed to our counter-influence, however slight that may be.”
25
   
 
The point to be made here is the immensity of Barth’s task.  In order to accomplish 
it, he had to make it clear beyond all ambiguity that this was a doctrine of krisis.  A 
method ill-suited to this task, even if it were otherwise appropriate to the text, might 
have allowed this eschatological hope to be interpreted along liberal lines as cultural 
progress or as some kind of ascent of man.  Adolf von Harnack, for example, while 
differentiating sharply between “the progress of civilisation”
26
 and the Kingdom of 
God, nevertheless understands the latter as providing spiritual meaning to the former:  
 Knowledge of God is the spring that is to fructify the barren field, and pour forth streams of 
 living water … the condition of all edification, and, we may also say, of all true growth and 
 progress.
27 
This same power to provide culture with its true telos was a theme of Julius Kaftan, 
in his case worked out with an even stronger futurist eschatological focus.
28
  Barth, 
intent on separating humanity utterly from this cultural-religious source of hope, 
chose as his method “an idealistic dialectic in which the ‘end’ of time and hope is to 
be identified neither with trans-noetic experience, nor with cultural hope, but with a 
pure transcendence of every intuitable or knowable here and now in time.”
29
 That is 
why Frei insists that Barth’s jaggedly fierce and uncompromising dialectic in Der 
Römerbrief should not be understood as an absolute method, appropriate in all times 
and places and applicable to all texts.  Rather, it is the perfect example of an ad hoc 
method, selected according to the conjunction of a textually-derived “basic 
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conviction”, the form of the biblical text under consideration, and a very specific 
theological task.  In short, it was temporarily useful to Barth’s purpose.   
 
Thus Frei illustrates how the dialectical method, thought by von Balthasar to be so 
intrinsic to Barth’s early theology, is in fact a highly utilitarian decision: it was useful 
to Barth at that place and time, and should not be read as his ultimate method, nor as 
his ultimate theological position.  Frei coins the phrase “methodological 
agnosticism”
30
 to sum up Barth’s preferred approach to methodology.  As 
McCormack explains, method can never be absolute, for method must work always 
with a humbling awareness of its own failure to talk about God: 
 All methodological reflection stands in the shadow of a negative sign.  Karl Barth certainly 
 had a method (or better, methods).  But it must be understood that method for him was 
 nothing more than an emergency measure adopted in the face of a disaster – not unlike ad 
 hoc laws adopted in times of national catastrophe.
31   
Barth’s innovation, and Frei’s insight, is that unlike form, method is easily 
substituted on an ad hoc basis, provided that it is not invested with too much 
theological or ontological significance in itself.  Being of this world, method is an 
ever-shifting process: a promise, but no guarantee, of enlightenment.   
 
3.3 Ontology and Theological Grammar: A Comparison with Jüngel’s 
Trinitarian Methodology 
Interestingly – and instructively – around the same time period as Frei is writing, 
Jüngel is tackling the same questions in Trinitarian terms.  The ‘form’ of the inquiry, 
he argues, is dictated entirely by the Trinitarian nature of the being of God:  
 The theological question concerning the being of God has been brought on to a path along 
 which the being of God has itself proceeded and which thereby first of all was paved and 
 made into a path ...The being of God is the hermeneutical problem of theology.  More 
 exactly: the fact that the being of God proceeds is precisely the hermeneutical problem. For 
 only because the being of God proceeds is there an encounter between God and man.  And 
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 the hermeneutical problem is grounded precisely in this encounter between God  and man 
 which owes its origin to the movement of God’s being.
32
 
In other words, God sets the terms of theological inquiry by revealing Godself as 
Trinitarian, so that the theologian’s method must follow after.  Hence, Jüngel argues, 
Barth’s setting of the doctrine of the Trinity (Revealer, Revelation, Being Revealed) 
right at the start of his Church Dogmatics is “a hermeneutical decision of the greatest 
relevance”
33
, for it is this revealed content of God which becomes the 
methodological key to all our other knowledge of God.   
 
In other words, the old divide between epistemology and ontology is virtually 
irrelevant here.  God’s being-in-itself is in fact entirely contiguous with the 
epistemological event of God’s ‘becoming-for-us’; God’s Trinitarian ‘content’ is 
identical with God’s Trinitarian ‘form’ as revealed in an event “that does not let itself 
be distinguished into form and content”.
34
  While Jüngel admits that Barth himself 
never used the phrase “being in becoming”
35
, he insists that this is an accurate 
paraphrase of Barth’s oft-repeated point, that “God’s word is identical with God 
himself”.
36
 Jüngel simply interprets “word” in the most dynamic terms possible – the 
event of “becoming”.  This is how he claims to avoid metaphysical speculation, even 
while writing about the being of God, for ‘metaphysics’ only occurs when the being 
of God is divorced from God’s revelation.  Therefore, far from being speculative, 
Jüngel contends that the dogma of the Trinity actually safeguards against 
metaphysics, because it is grounded in the action of God.  And herein is the concrete 
content of God, as Jüngel extrapolates from Barth: “If we are able to formulate this 
self-giving of God in which he is ours as concrete event, then we must also formulate 
the being of God in the event of the self-relatedness of this being as concrete 
being.”
37
  It is a simple equation.  The form and the content match.  Epistemology is 
inseparable from ontology.  If the (christological) event of revelation is concrete, 
then God is concrete. 
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Here, however, something crucial must be stated.  If the divide between 
epistemology and ontology is collapsed, then what Frei has realised is that the divide 
between ontology and grammar has been widened.  Let us define our terms as 
follows: if ontology is equivalent to “content”, and epistemology has an equivalence 
to “form”, then grammatical logic – the order in which we say things – must be 
equated to method.  As grammar, then, method is conceptual, not actual.  Ontology – 
the nature of the object under consideration – should indeed be one of the 
considerations which dictates the chosen method, but it is not identical with that 
method.  Thus the narrated identity of Jesus in the gospels forms part of the demand 
for a realistic narrative hermeneutic, but Frei does not allow the equation to work the 
other way: it is not the realistic narrative hermeneutic which tells Jesus of Nazareth 
who he is.  Likewise, the absolute ontological freedom of God is certainly one of the 
key considerations which dictates Barth’s dialectical method, but this does not mean 
that the freedom of God can be read ‘back’ from the dialectical method.  While it is 
always possible that they will coincide, ontology and grammar are not the same 
thing. 
 
4. Frei and Revelation: Contra Neo-Orthodoxy 
4.1 The Problem of the Category, ‘Presence’ 
The challenge posed by Frei’s “basic conviction” was to present an account of the 
absolute co-existence of the identity and presence of Jesus Christ; while his 
theological task was to do this without resorting to an ‘inner’, subjective account of 
revelation.  He had attempted to do just that in “The Mystery of the Presence of Jesus 
Christ”, but his preface to Identity makes it clear that he now judges that attempt as 
flawed.  The problem, as he now sees it, is that the category of ‘presence’ remains 
too deeply wedded to a concept of ‘inner’ revelation.  As such, he now states his 
regret at having resorted to such terminology at all: 
 Specifically, I would not now put nearly the same stress on ‘presence’ as a category.  It is, 
 among other things, deeply implicated in the twin dangers of a mystification and of loss of 
 morality to religion which result from making personal acquaintance or personal knowledge 
 the model for what transpires between God and man in religion or Christian faith.  I agree 
 with the recently emerged consensus among a good many theologians that ‘revelation’ is not 
 a wholly unambiguous or satisfying central concept for stating what Christianity is all about.  
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 Furthermore, the governing model for construing ‘revelation’ among modern Protestant 
 theologians, that of a ‘non-propositional’ personal encounter, is even more problematical.
38
   
Frei does not identify his theological opponents directly here.  Nevertheless, in its 
very knowing allusions to Christian existentialism, it is clear that he has Neo-
Orthodoxy in his sights as his primary opponent.  Yet at the same time, he 
acknowledges the real difficulty he has had in avoiding existentialist-style categories 
and vocabulary – just as he had earlier observed how Barth had struggled to find a 
new theological language when he had been “versed in relationalism”.  Frei observes 
regarding his own quandary: 
 By elevating the word ‘presence,’ as I did, to the level of an indispensable systematic or 
 technical concept governing theological analysis made me come at least within hailing 
 distance of the tangles I have just mentioned.
39 
Now he repudiates his earlier dependence on ‘existentialist’ terminology, while yet 
admitting that it remains almost impossible to avoid it altogether.  For example, he 
describes how he had adopted a Bultmannian-style scheme when writing about 
gnosticism, taking “the dying-and-rising-Savior rhythm to be a mythological 
representation of human self-alienation and reconciliation”.  While he now largely 
rejects this scheme, he explains this earlier ‘error’ on the grounds of “the prevalence 
in the interpretation of intellectual and cultural history of that same Idealistic-
Existentialist conceptuality which then governed ‘revelation’ theology”.
40
  
Nevertheless, the section still appears in Identity, albeit in a slightly changed form.
41
   
 
More problematically, Frei now has additional doubts as to the suitability of one of 
his technical categories for identity, that of “self-manifestation”:  
 I would want to be a little more tentative about the second, since it may suffer from some of 
 the same genetic defects as the category ‘presence’.
42
  
He even goes as far as to say that if he were to rethink the whole project, he might 
now prefer to use sociological and Marxist categories: just as Idealism offered itself 
to Barth, Marxism now offers itself and its vocabulary as a scheme of thought which 
has the advantage of being clearly opposed to existentialism.  While Frei never 
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actually followed this up, it is clear that he was still searching for a means of giving a 
more objective account of Jesus’ identity and presence. 
 
Ultimately, however, for all his theological and linguistic contortions, Frei recognises 
that in effect, his earlier essay used the category ‘presence’ rather in the same way 
that Barth used the category, ‘Spirit’: 
  In the end it came to the claim that the specifically Christian affirmation of the presence of 
 God-in-Christ for the world involves nothing philosophically more high-flown than a 
 doctrine of the Spirit ... 
43 
As a doctrine, therefore, the category can be allowed to stand, for it is not so much to 
be argued theologically, as to be affirmed by the faith community.  Frei’s criticism 
was that, rather than simply affirm the presence of Christ or the inspiration of the 
Spirit as Barth did, his theological opponents had attempted to use God’s presence as 
yet another prolegomena, in the old sense: an “indispensable systematic or technical 
concept governing theological analysis”.
44
  In other words, they had built an entire 
theological edifice on a category that was too subjective and too philosophical to 
bear its weight: 
 It was Kant’s transcendental ego, transformed into Idealist subjectivity or romantic 
 consciousness, and heightened to the point of a unique perspective on self, others, and the 
 universe at large.
45
  
By beginning with the category of God’s presence to us – an ‘inside faith’, 
confessional category – the Neo-Orthodox theologians had imagined that they had 
escaped the old modernist prolegomenal bind.  However, Frei perceives that they 
had, once again, and accidentally this time, begun with an abstraction, a concept 
without content.  He is therefore understandably wary that he may have erred in the 
same direction.  However, there is a crucial difference between Frei’s account of 
presence and the Neo-Orthodox treatment.  In effect, where Neo-Orthodoxy had built 
a theological system upon the category of presence, Frei had taken a step back in 
order to find the foundation for the claim to God’s presence in the first place.  In the 
grammatical order of belief, presence must come thereafter. 
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4.2 Frei’s Criticism of Barth 
Interestingly, although his ‘actualistic’ account of Jesus Christ as God’s revelation is 
far from the existentialist scheme, Barth does not escape criticism here.  For all that 
Frei was always and essentially Barthian in his theological preferences, he detects a 
lacuna in Barth’s presentation of revelation which had allowed this “‘non-
propositional’ personal encounter”
46
 model to be established.  In other words, there is 
a gap in Barth’s theology which had left him vulnerable to existentialist 
misinterpretation: and that gap lies precisely in the overly abstract concept of the 
speaking God that is Barth’s starting point.  This criticism applies equally to Barth’s 
later christological prolegomena, only this time the abstraction is ‘Christ’, who is at 
least initially posited without content.   
 
Frei is not a naïve reader of Barth.  He understands how Barth’s account of 
revelation is thoroughly christological, and also how his very objective account of 
revelation is founded most firmly on biblical exegesis.  Nevertheless, as Higton puts 
it expressively:  
 Frei considered, however, that although the technical machinery of this assertion was all in 
 place and running like clockwork, there was nevertheless a hollow at its centre.
47
 
Frei’s criticism is that by beginning with an account of a ‘God’ who simply ‘has 
spoken’, the very non-informative nature of Barth’s prolegomenal statement means 
that there is in effect no content to revelation as it is construed at the start.  In other 
words Barth, while asserting so strongly the actuality of God’s revelation in Christ, 
had not paid sufficient attention to the man, Jesus of Nazareth.  As Frei saw it, the 
result is that Barth struggles to hold together the two natures of Christ in one person, 
so that the divine is emphasised at the expense of the human: 
 For Barth, the tendency towards epistemological monophysitism and historical scepticism 
 resulted in an uneasy balance in Christology … For Barth the earlier tendency, at any rate, 
 was for the historical nature and content of Jesus of Nazareth to diminish beside the objective 
 reality of the eternal Word made flesh.
48
 
Accordingly, Frei reads Barth’s account as depressingly abstract, far too close to his 
Idealist predecessors, so that Barth’s approach could even be accused of 
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“epistemological monophysitism”, even if it is not monophysitism in actuality.  Frei 
is even able to question even the supposed revolutionary nature of Barth’s initial 
break with liberalism: 
 This notion of ‘presence’ seemed to me to be the distillate of the philosophical conceptuality 
 under which such otherwise very different people as Hegel, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, 
 and the dialectical theologians of the 1920s set forth their religious and theological proposals.  
 In the light of this common conceptuality the very notion of revelation, which was supposed 
 to represent a break with the sour theological grapes of the early 19th-century fathers, 
 was no more than an instance of the dialectical children’s teeth being set on edge.
49 
Should Barth be included in this condemnation?  His name is not mentioned, but 
neither is he specifically excluded.  If we do include him – and he certainly fits the 
“dialectical” category – then Frei’s conclusion is, that for all Barth’s success in 
overturning the liberal theological edifice, his philosophical inheritance is still 
apparent when it comes to the doctrine of revelation.  Basically, Barth’s very actual 
and concrete notion of revelation, at least as set out in his early theology, is for Frei 
not actual enough, not concrete enough ... and this is precisely because it is posited at 
least grammatically (though not actually) before a reading of the gospels.   
 
This Frei wants to remedy.  His return in Identity to exegesis is an attempt at a ‘de-
abstraction’ of the doctrine of revelation by grounding it in the scriptural witness.  
Thus Frei hopes to give the doctrine of God some actual content; or rather, he hopes 
to begin with the content – with who God is according to God’s own narrative – 
before even advancing to the doctrine.  In the same way (as he later illustrates in 
Identity) that Jesus governs his own predicates, so the reality of God governs the 
conceptuality.  Frei contends that the theologian can posit a ‘content’ to God through 
an exegetical reading of the gospels, precisely because to know Jesus’ identity is the 
same as to have him present, while to have Jesus present is just another way of 
saying that God is here.  A study of the concrete identity of Jesus Christ as it is 
described in the gospels should go some way towards de-abstracting the doctrine of 
God. 
 
However, Frei is distinctly wary of claiming revelation, even in Jesus Christ, as a 
starting point for the knowledge of God at all: 
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 If the cognate category of divine self-revelation were appropriate, one should say no more 
 than that God-in-Christ could not be conceived as not revealing himself or not being
 revealed, even though this means neither that he must reveal himself (as Hegel claimed) nor 
 that this is necessarily the most appropriate way to conceive of him.
50 
The point is one of simple logic: “God-in-Christ” cannot be conceived as not 
revealing Godself, because simply to say “God-in-Christ” is ipso facto to posit 
revelation.  The statement perhaps does not quite have the objective force of 
Anselm’s argument for the existence of God: the “being-than-which-nothing-greater-
can-be-conceived”.
51
  For Frei, it is merely a logical and grammatical bind, and 
nothing more.
 52
  But then, so is Anselm’s argument.  Often read as a statement about 
the actual being of God, it could equally be argued that Anselm’s ‘ontological proof’ 
is neither ontological, nor a proof.  Rather, it functions primarily as a regulative 
concept: to say that God is the “being-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived” 
is ipso facto to posit God, which makes it a logical statement and not an ontological 
one.  As Frei points out, just because “God-in-Christ” can be formulated 
conceptually, this does not lend the concept any reality.  Once again we repeat the 
point: ontology may dictate grammar, but grammar cannot dictate ontology.  The 
equation cannot be reversed.  God is not bound by the limits of our language. 
 
Frei contends that his ‘Anselmic’ formula is as far as the concept of God’s self-
revelation should go as a “cognate category” – and it may not be appropriate to go 
even that far.  Of course God could not be conceived of at all, had God not first of all 
spoken.  Of course one must posit revelation before one begins to theologise.  
However, this cannot be a starting point for theology except in the baldest of senses – 
it is a point of grammatical logic, and no more.  Frei, therefore, confines himself to 
saying this:  
 If one thinks about him [Jesus] under this rubric one cannot conceive of him as not being 
 present.  Further than that I would not go.
53
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Therefore, to use revelation as a “cognate category”, that is, a category which 
provides one with actual knowledge of God, is to go further than the grammar will 
allow.  All the doctrine of revelation can provide for epistemology/ontology is its 
basis – and, simultaneously, its outer limits, that we can say nothing beyond what has 
been revealed.  But as to content, the category is an abstraction, and in itself can 
provide no knowledge of God.  To conjecture any further as to the being of God 
predicated on this baldest of grammatical statements is to stray off the narrow path of 
theology and down the wide blind alley of human experience, precisely because the 
abstraction of God leaves us nowhere else to go.  That is why, in Frei’s view, far too 
much had been built by the Neo-Orthodox movement in particular upon this very 
empty, content-lite notion of revelation.   
 
In short, to begin with revelation is to admit that revelation has not revealed 
anything.  That Barth himself avoided this existentialist trap is owing to his 
awareness of the difference between grammar and ontology/epistemology:  
 We must now follow another order if we are to see how biblical revelation and the doctrine 
 of the Trinity are interconnected, how the second could and did proceed out of the first … 
 Historically considered and stated the three questions answered in the Bible, that of revealed, 
 revelation and being revealed, do not have the same importance.  The true theme of the 
 biblical witness is the second of the concepts, God’s action in his revelation … and therefore 
 the predicate in our statement.
54
 
In what Frei interpreted as a growing awareness of the limits of the dialectical 
method, Barth later moved to a much more biblically-grounded and actualistic 
christological starting point.  But the stated prolegomena of deus dixit, which was his 
logical starting point merely, became the logical and the actual starting point for the 
subsequent generation of existential theologians.  The impossibility of objective 
knowledge of God in this scheme inevitably threw such theologians back onto the 
subjective knowledge of God.  In this way, the personal existential encounter with 
God became the new revelation event, and hence the very shaky foundation for Neo-
Orthodox theology.   
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5. Non-Apologetic Theology 
5.1 The Order of Belief 
Frei’s opposition to Neo-Orthodoxy is apparent also in his understanding of the 
function of theology.  Crudely differentiated, theology can be seen as having two 
potential aims.  The first is to serve the Christian community by describing 
conceptually in doctrinal form its beliefs and experiences: in other words, to do 
theology from an ‘inside faith’ perspective.  The second mode of viewing theology is 
that its essential function is to persuade the non-believer of the inherent rationality of 
the Christian faith.  However, there are of course those who have never heard the 
story of Jesus, or who do not understand his role in God’s saving history.  Therefore, 
if this second function of theology is to persuade the rational non-believer (this 
function relies on a concept of a shared rationality as opposed to a shared faith), then 
it necessitates a kind of ‘translation’ of ‘inside faith’ beliefs and experiences into a 
‘outside faith’ language.   
  
The first type of theology, then, is essentially propositional and descriptive; the 
second could be termed apologetic and missional, where the purpose of theology is 
to lead a person up to the moment of faith, after which Christian experience and 
practice can take over.  As such, the two types have very little in common, and nor 
can they easily exist side by side in a theological scheme.  As Frei observes, “The 
order of belief is logically a totally different matter from that of coming to believe”.
55
  
Frei perceives also how the task of apologetics can be further sub-divided.  The first 
sub-division – to argue the inherent rationality of faith from evidence – is in fact the 
more easily dismissed: Schleiermacher had done a good job back at the beginning of 
the 19
th
 century, when he had contended that, in epistemological terms, religion was 
a special case.
56
  Thus Schleiermacher in a sense created the second sub-division, 
when he fenced revelation off from scientific critique by transferring it across into 
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the subjective God-consciousness.  As a result, the function of theology now became 
to explain where God might be located in the individual’s inner life. 
 
In Frei’s time, the Neo-Orthodox theologians had their own perspective on the task 
of theology.  Like Schleiermacher, they viewed the function of theology as 
apologetic in this second sense, so that they were similarly impatient both with 
systematic doctrinal formulations about God, and with anything approaching 





 century theology almost unscathed, this alternative ‘apologetic’ 
focus made him nervous.  In this respect, it is worth noting his careful delineation of 
the task of theology in an earlier essay: 
 I should want to draw a sharp distinction between the logical structure as well as the content 
 of Christian belief, which it is the business of theologians to describe but not to explain or 
 argue, and the totally different logic of how one comes to believe, or the possibility of 
 believing immanent in human existence, on which the theologian has relatively little to say 
 and on which he should in any case not base the structure of his theology.
57 
However, this distinction was not recognised by the Neo-Orthodox school.  They 
were not nervous about apologetics; on the contrary, apologetics was the whole 
purpose of theology.  They had learned from Schleiermacher, via Barth, that 
theology could only really be done from an ‘inside faith’ perspective.
 
 As we have 
seen, Frei himself is in accordance with this.  But at the same time, Frei detects a 
problem with this perspective.  The problem is hermeneutical, and it lies in the 
following statement:   
 There are those who claim that Christianity, whatever its professed beliefs, is accessible as a 
 viable possibility only as one learns to dispose oneself in a distinctively Christian way. 
58 
This learning of a “distinctively Christian way” – of a ‘faith-perspective’ – means 
that achieving faith becomes the vital theological point, with the result that theology 
becomes all about the human journey to that point where our story and God’s might 
coincide.  The problem with this formulation is that revelation is then logically 
restricted by the faith or unfaith of the recipients, even before it is given.  In other 
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words, God cannot reveal to us until we have achieved by some effort of our own 
enough faith finally to receive revelation.   
 
By contrast, Frei’s particular ‘inside faith’ perspective does not mean that one must 
find one’s faith before one can do theology: if revelation occurs, or has occurred, 
then the principle of God’s freedom can tolerate no preconditions.  By the same 
token, faith cannot be a precondition to the right understanding of the Bible, so that 
the idea of a ‘faith hermeneutic’ is outlawed.  Rather, Frei’s ‘inside faith’ perspective 
means for him, that a theological hypothesis requires a suspension of judgement as to 
its truth until it has been hermeneutically tested through biblical exegesis.  That this 
hypothesis is derived from the faith-community, who in their turn have derived it 
from their reading of that same scripture, is what makes it an ‘inside faith’ 
perspective; that it need not be believed before (or even after) exegetical testing, is 
what makes it less than a faith hermeneutic.  In short, what one needs before one can 
do theology is not faith, nor yet revelation, but merely a hypothesis and a Bible.  Of 
course, from the perspective of faith, revelation has already occurred: there could be 
no inquiry after the knowledge of God if God had not spoken.  But as demonstrated 
above, revelation in that case is so axiomatic, so grammatically necessary for the task 
of theology, that it barely needs consideration.  Rather, believer and non-believer 
alike are obliged to begin with the objective scriptural account of the identity and 
content of God in Jesus Christ.  Faith, if it comes at all, comes after. 
 
5.2 Barth’s ‘Faith Hermeneutic’ and the Existentialist Problem 
It is at this crucial point regarding the necessity or otherwise of a faith hermeneutic, 
that Frei once again comes into conflict with Barth.  Barth wrote little directly about 
hermeneutics, preferring (as Frei had noted) the practice of exegesis to the theory.  
Indeed, Barth has been accused of actual hostility to hermeneutics, associated as it 
was with the ‘rival’ theology of Rudolf Bultmann.
59
  Despite such hostility, Mark 
Wallace remarks how “there is a grain of truth in these evaluations insofar as Barth 
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would probably have scoffed at labelling his thought “hermeneutical” ”.
60
   However, 
from that practice, and from scattered observations, it is possible to construct an 
account of Barth’s hermeneutical approach: a task which has been undertaken in 
recent theology most notably by Bruce McCormack, and by Richard E. Burnett.
61
   
 
In a 1991 essay, “Historical Criticism and Dogmatic Interest”, McCormack describes 
Barth’s hermeneutics as “a hermeneutical edifice with three stages”
62
.  The “first 
stage of the enterprise” he identifies as “to establish what stands in the text”
63
, that is, 
to use a historical-critical method to make the plain sense of the scripture as clear as 
possible.  From this first reading, “some provisional understanding of what the text is 
about may be formed”, which then becomes a “kind of working hypothesis”
64
, as in 
Frei’s “basic conviction”.  This “working hypothesis” then both informs the 
subsequent exegesis, and is tested by it.  So far Frei would be almost entirely in 
agreement. 
 
The second stage of Barth’s biblical hermeneutic “consists in penetrating through the 
text to the mystery which lies concealed within”
65
.  The aim is to catch the same 
glimpse of God as did the biblical writer, as if one were standing exactly alongside 
him.  In such a way the revealed Word of God might be discerned in, through, and 
beyond the mere ‘words’ of scripture.  In his Preface to Der Römerbrief, Barth 
writes: 
 When an investigation is rightly conducted, boulders composed of fortuitous or incidental or 
 merely historical conceptions ought to disappear almost entirely.  The Word ought to be 
 exposed in the words.  Intelligent comment means that I am driven on till I stand with 
 nothing before me but the enigma of the matter; till the document seems hardly to exist as a 
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 document; till I have almost forgotten that I am not its author; till I know the author so well 
 that I allow him to speak in my name and am even able to speak in his name myself.
66 
In other words, as McCormack explains, Barth considers that he has only understood 
the text when he has glimpsed through the text the same “Subject-matter” as did Paul 
in his time.  Any reader, believing or otherwise, can read the text as being ‘about 
God’ in the baldest sense: yet as Barth explains in Church Dogmatics 1/2, this is no 
revelation as such until an actual glimpse of the God beyond the text has been given: 
 ... [I]n the face of this subject-matter there can be no question of our achieving, as we do in 
 others, the confident approach which masters and subdues the matter.  It is rather a question 
 of our being gripped by the subject-matter – not gripped physically, not making an 
 experience out of it and the like, although (ironically!) that can happen – but really gripped, 
 so that it is only as those who are mastered by the subject-matter, who are subdued by it, that 
 we can investigate the humanity of the word by which it is told us.
67 
This “gripping” can be no more than a glimpse of the subject matter – God is not so 
readily available to us even in scripture, and revelation is no possession of the text or 
of our hermeneutic.  Yet this glimpse is a genuine encounter, a true revelation to faith 
in which, simultaneously, the gift of faith is given.   
 
The third stage of Barth’s hermeneutical method involves returning to the text and 
attempting now “to understand it anew, this time in the light of the subject matter”.
68
  
This involves a grammatical and doctrinal restating of the text in one’s own words, 
but with one’s understanding now filtered through this revelatory glimpse of the 
subject matter.  In other words, what we have at last is a ‘faith hermeneutic’.  
McCormack judges that “the hardest step in this interpretative process is the second 
one”, given that “to penetrate to the subject matter is ... a human impossibility”
69
, and 
something well beyond the power of the exegete.  However, in another sense, this 
second stage is the easiest stage of all, precisely because it does not lie in the hands 
of the human reader of scripture, and cannot be manufactured either by the most 
devout or by the most academically rigorous approach.  Either God reveals or God 
does not.  But unless this revealing takes place, then the third ‘doctrinal’ stage is an 
absolute impossibility.  After all, Stage 1 in Barth’s “hermeneutical edifice” is an 
enterprise which can be undertaken by anyone regardless of faith-stance, while the 
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insight given at Stage 2 could at God’s discretion potentially be given to any reader, 
regardless of their previous faith or unbelief.  However, Stage 3 can be done only by 
a person of faith; and moreover, it is only now that the Bible is finally being read 
with an adequate hermeneutic.  For Barth, the biblical text simply cannot be 
understood by a non-believer.  Although Barth and the Neo-Orthodox school differ 
profoundly in their understanding of the content of revelation, both maintain a 
surprisingly similar understanding of faith as the moment of ‘conjunction’ between 
our lives and divine grace, whether this is the existential encounter in which we 
know ourselves to be known by the Other, or the hermeneutical moment in which we 
are ‘gripped’ by the Subject matter of the text.  This moment of faith then becomes 
for both, “the logical or interpretive context in which theological language and 




Many commentators have problems with Barth’s ‘faith hermeneutic’.  Anthony 
Thiselton, for example, considers the complaint, that Barth has so transferred the 
hermeneutical principle to the divine side of the dialectic – “How else will God be 
recognised except by God Himself?”
71
 – that hermeneutics as the human act of 
interpretation is effectively an impossibility.
72
  However, Frei’s issues with Barth are 
located elsewhere.  His problem with the ‘faith hermeneutic’, is that for the Neo-
Orthodox, the ‘moment of faith’ had crossed over from being simply the logical 
precondition of the doctrinal enterprise (as it was for Barth), to being the focus of 
theology in itself: 
 In other words, in this view the rationale of how one comes to believe comes to control, 
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Ultimately, Barth’s hermeneutical scheme is a matter of purely logical order: given 
that it is impossible to “recognise” God in scripture unless God has revealed to us, a 
right reading of scripture can only be made at Stage 3, logically after God has 
revealed.  But in actuality, revelation and right reading are given together, and have 
been separated out into three separate stages for the purpose of description only.  
However, the existentialists’ ‘error’, as Frei sees it, has been to equate this matter of 
mere grammatical ordering with an ontological and epistemological reality.  In their 
view, if revelation is necessary for a right reading of scripture, then revelation is not 
merely logically, but also actually prior.  Revelation is thus abstracted from the 
‘objective’ encounter with God in scripture, and thus the subjective encounter with 
God in the existential moment becomes not merely the starting point, but the whole 
subject-matter of theology.  And so, once again, entirely unwarranted ontological and 
epistemological significance had been loaded onto the light-weight cart of 
grammatical order.   
 
5.3 Frei on the ‘Faith Hermeneutic’ 
It is important to note once again, that Frei sees himself as writing from a similar 
‘inside faith’ perspective to Barth and Schleiermacher, and can envision no other 
way of doing theology: 
 The believer will talk about the relation or presence of Jesus Christ in one way, the 
 nonbeliever in another, the pilgrim in yet a third.  Essentially, what I shall write about 
 constitutes a reflection within belief.  In a sense, therefore, there is no argument to be 
 developed.  I do not make a certain assumption on which I then build an expanding series of 
 consequences or inferences leading to the discovery of some final, wholly new conclusions.  
 Also, I do not try to justify the grounds on which I make my primary assumption.  
 Concerning that assumption, I shall simply appeal to the consent of believers.
74 
For Frei, as for Barth, non-apologetic theology starts from the assumption of faith, 
rather than attempting to account for or ‘produce’ the moment of faith.  As a result, 
he sees theology as essentially descriptive and dogmatic, rather than argumentative 
and apologetic.  However, this does not mean that faith becomes a kind of gnostic 
special access to understanding.  Rather, it means simply that God’s being and 
revelation must be assumed before theology can proceed.  The alternative is to be 
stuck in apologetics for evermore. 
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However, Frei’s own take on the logic of belief, is that we cannot say that we have 
faith in God until we know who is this God in whom we have faith.  Even if we can 
say we have had a revelatory encounter with God, this ‘God’ remains an abstraction 
until we can identify some descriptive content.  And we cannot identify any content, 
we cannot know who is this God, until we read scripture, most crucially as God 
reveals in Jesus Christ, as narrated by the gospels.  Moreover, we will subsequently 
struggle to identify this ‘contentless’ God in whom we have faith with the concrete 
scriptural account of God’s story.  As Nicholas Wolterstorff observes: 
 Frei was struck by the fact that if one looked carefully at what the biblical critics said about 
 the function of the biblical narratives, and if one then asked oneself what one would expect a 
 text playing that function to be like, it turned out over and over that the texts of the biblical 
 narratives were not like that at all.  Over and over there was a singularly inept mismatch 
 between these actual texts and the function that they were said to be playing.  It was said, for 
 example, that they were mythical in their function.  But we have texts of myths from the 
 Greeks, the Romans, and the Norse, and the biblical narratives are strikingly unlike those.  
 What struck Frei, in short, was how little attention biblical critics paid to the actual narratives 
 of Scripture.
75 
For Frei, therefore, a ‘faith hermeneutic’, in whatever guise, is a logical nonsense.  
He does not dismiss the idea that there is such a thing as a personal encounter with 
the presence of Jesus: it is just that such an “ad hoc”
76
 experience cannot then 
become a “necessary (or even a necessary though insufficient) logical condition for 
the meaningfulness of dogmatic language.”
77
  This is to build a theological edifice on 
too flimsy a structure.  So neither the journey to the point of faith, nor the moment of 
revelation in itself, can be a logical precondition for the right reading of scripture, 
however it may work out in actuality.   
 
Frei, then rejects the concept of a faith-hermeneutic, and instead proposes a 
controversial model of the right reading of scripture, which – at least initially – 
bypasses the notion of revelation altogether.   While Frei’s “basic conviction” is 
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derived from ‘within faith’, from the church’s communal reading, it will be 
remembered that there is at least a logical ‘first reading’ of scripture.  On such a first 
reading, as Frei sees it, the ‘plain sense’ of the text makes it clear that the subject 
matter of the text is God.  This is no gnostic mystery available only to those who 
read in faith, but is straightforwardly given in the narrative.  Furthermore, the plain 
narrative sense of the text gives us all the information we need in order to know the 
actual ‘content’ of God’s identity as it is narratively constituted: the God of scripture 
is no mere concept, but throughout the Old and New Testament is narrated as being 
personal, emotional, and involved, the God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob.   
 
However, as Frei’s “basic conviction” states, to know Jesus’ (or God’s) identity is to 
have Jesus (or God) present, given that we cannot even conceive of any content to 
God except that God has revealed that content.  In this way Frei collapses together 
the three stages of Barth’s hermeneutic: logically, no re-reading is required, for if the 
narrative is sufficient in itself to convey the content of God, then no special gift of 
faith is necessary prior to right interpretation.  Of course, Frei would argue that faith 
is most probably given with right interpretation, and grammatically – given that we 
cannot say everything at once – should probably be discussed after right 
interpretation (not before, as with Barth).  And in actuality, the believer will no doubt 
delight in constant re-reading of scripture, and by God’s grace will thereby continue 
to achieve an ever more profound understanding of this God whom they worship.  
But simple though an initial understanding of God might be on a logical ‘first 
reading’, the reader who identifies the God of the narrative as “the God of Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob” has identified the content of God correctly, regardless of faith-
stance.  In short, the realistic narrative is the ‘true meaning’ of scripture, and the true 
content of God, which is the starting point for theology. 
 
Thus Frei contrasts the false theological grammar of the “experiential sequence” of 
faith with the much truer grammar of the “dogmatic explanation”
78 
as derived from 
scripture.  To state the point once again, Frei is not disparaging experience in any 
way.  Rather, he is talking about the fact that theology and apologetics have an 
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entirely different grammatical logic, and that the two enterprises should not be 
confused.  As he states quite categorically: 
 Whatever one’s experiential sequence, the dogmatic explanation proceeds, and proceeds with 
 confidence, in this order.
79
  
This is what Frei means by “the logic of belief”: it is about finding the correct 
starting point for theology, and proceeding from there.  It will be necessary in 
another chapter to explore quite how this logical sequence works when it comes to 
the identity and presence of Jesus Christ, particularly with reference to the events 
surrounding his death and resurrection.  However, at this stage it is enough simply to 
note what Frei is setting out to do, and his conception of the possibilities and limits 
of his scheme.  Whatever else it may be, his co-positing of Jesus’ identity and 
presence will be descriptive and not explanatory, dogmatic and not apologetic, 
‘actual’ and not experiential.  Above all, it will be founded on that vital first step: a 
correct exegetical reading of scripture which alone can provide the necessary content 
to ground the believer’s affirmation of faith in a God who is an objective reality. 
 
6. The Realistic Narrative Hermeneutic 
6.1 The Grammatical Logic of Reading 
Finally, Frei moves in his preface to an explanation of just what such a ‘correct’ 
reading of scripture might look like.  This process obviously begs some sceptical 
questions: just how do we decide what constitutes a ‘correct’ reading, and on what 
authority does Frei make the claim that his reading is more correct than another?  
However, Frei is well aware of these points of order, as his preface demonstrates. 
 
Frei’s theological proposal – that to know Jesus’ identity is to have him present, and 
to recognise him as the presence of God – rests on a method which he terms here a  
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“realistic narrative”
 80
 hermeneutic.  “Realistic narrative” is Frei’s label for the 
essential genre of the gospels, based on what he identifies as 
 one of the characteristics of the Gospel story ... viz., that it is history-like – in its language as 
 well as its depiction of a common public world ... in the close interaction of character and 
 incident, and in the non-symbolic quality of the relation between the story and what the story 
 is about.
81
   
It is no absolute category, and he makes no claims for having made an exhaustive 
interpretation of the gospels.  But what he does say is that precisely because the 
relation between the story and the referent is “non-symbolic”, that is, entirely direct 
and even literal, this means that we cannot have the ‘subject matter’ – Jesus Christ, 
and hence God – without the story.   
 
This is Frei’s crucial point about the grammatical logic of belief.  Here, Richard 
Burnett’s comment on Barth is equally applicable to Frei:  
 I would argue that Barth’s theology ... is systematic in the sense that it reflects the fact that 
 not everything can be said about God at once and that when talking about God some things 
 ought to be said before others.
82
 
In other words, where grammatical logic insists that the ‘subject’ Jesus Christ is prior 
to the predicate, which is his story, or to put it another way, ontology is prior to 
epistemology, Frei reiterated point is that grammatical logic should not be identified 
without remainder with ontological actuality.  Just because the subject necessarily 
precedes the predicate, does not mean that it can be posited independently of the 
predicate, so that Jesus Christ cannot be posited independently of his story, nor God 
of God’s content.  Therefore, while there remains a correct grammatical order for 
conducting theology, the actual order may be an entirely different thing. 
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Frei’s appreciation of the grammatical order of belief is not always understood.  In 
his “Forward” to Burnett’s book
83
, Bruce McCormack contends that the “Yale 
theologians” – Frei is not mentioned by name, but is implicated – have tended to 
over-stress the ad hoc nature of Barth’s hermeneutics, to the point that the language 
of the text has taken on an unwarranted power to “disclose meaning”.  Following this 
line of reasoning leads to a situation where language in itself has the power to “form 
persons” and “socialize(ing) new members into religious communities”.
84
  This is a 
clear critique of the ‘Lindbeck stream’ of postliberal theology.  By contrast, both 
McCormack and Burnett wish to argue that Barth did indeed have quite definite 
hermeneutical principles which certainly can be quantified into a “well-ordered 
hermeneutical approach”
85
, as described above in the discussion of Barth’s three 
“stages”.   
 
In defence of Frei, it might be argued in reply that ‘ad hoc-ness’ is merely a method 
– merely grammar – and never the ontological Ding-an-sich.  Moreover, Frei’s 
realistic narrative hermeneutic is no ad hoc free-for-all.  Rather, the term “ad hoc” 
refers to his insistence, that the test of the validity of a hermeneutic, in this instance 
as in all instances, will be the practice of exegesis, and not any kind of general 
hermeneutical theory: 
 Now insisting on the integrity and distinctive character of realistic narrative is finally less 
 important than exhibiting the case exegetically.  The crucial test is to take a significant 
 instance that appears to exhibit these features and see whether the claim is actually fruitful 
 when put into operation.  This is especially true since the suitable procedure for elucidating 
 the category – and the stories by means of it – is probably not best dignified by being called 
 a method.  As if it were composed of a series of distinctly demonstrable steps which together 
 form a whole, subject to independent description, and then, as a separate and subsequent 
 procedure, applicable to the textual materials to be exegeted!  In the instance of realistic 
 narrative interpretation the exegetical practice is indispensable to the theory of exegesis, and 
 ruled use governs the statement of the rules actually used.  Therefore the amount of theory 
 involved is minimal.  There should be enough to elucidate what is actually being done in 
 exegesis, and no more.
86
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Like Barth, Frei eschews all but the most minimal method.  He even dislikes having 
to describe his approach, preferring to demonstrate it in practice.  Exegesis – ruled 
use – will prove or disprove the integrity of his chosen realistic narrative ‘method’.  
This very practical approach is what Frei understand by the ad hoc methodological 
principle: not an absence of hermeneutical rules but simply that exegesis will be 
simultaneously the source, the practice, and the test of any such rules.  What Frei is 
concerned with is, once again, a matter of grammatical order.  The problem which 
Frei exposed in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative was that Enlightenment practice 
had given priority to the pursuit of a general hermeneutic, and when they thought 
they had found one, had used it to subjugate the biblical text.  By contrast, Frei 
claims that the text should have priority over the rule.  Indeed, the particular rule 
should be derived from the particular text in the process of reading it: from a 
recognition of its genre and from the particular demands it makes on the reader.  But 
even at that, once this rule has been ‘extracted’ from the text and formalised, it has 
gained a kind of abstractive independence from the text, which in turn potentially 
invalidates the rule.  Once again, actual exegesis will be the test even of a rule 
derived from exegesis, so that the logical ‘first reading’ is in effect ever repeated.  
This is not a random, anything-goes approach to hermeneutics, but a simple refusal 
to formulate any method – even the realistic narrative one – into a generalised system 
for interpretation. 
 
This logical ‘first reading’ should not be confused with Paul Ricoeur’s concept of a 
“second naiveté”
 87
, summarised by Charles Wood as a “conviction that theological 
interpretation of the Bible ought to lead us beyond a critical preoccupation with the 
text into a fresh encounter with the divine reality to which the text bears witness”.
88
  
For Ricoeur, this is a three-step process.  Firstly, we abandon our first childish faith 
in the literal truths of the biblical myths.  However, this abandonment takes us to a 
place of loss – the “desert of criticism” – where we cannot forget these myths, and 
are obliged to examine them critically.  After critical examination, we now “wish to 
be called again” to a “second naiveté”, in which these myths and symbols now 
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In his book on Ricoeur
90
, Mark Wallace compares Ricoeur’s system with Barth’s 
‘faith hermeneutic’.  As he notes, there is indeed a superficial similarity in their 
“tripartite hermeneutical method”.
91
  However, as Wallace is well aware, this formal 
similarity conceals a significant material difference.  In particular, Barth is not so 
inclined to dismiss the initial ‘childish’ faith, and also resists ‘translating’ these 
myths and symbols into contemporary meaning.  Frei, meanwhile, regards Ricoeur as 
employing what Kevin Vanhoozer describes as a “typical extratextual apologetic 
strategy”
92
, which means that he is at heart a ‘foundationalist’, in the best liberal 
tradition.  However, and more significantly from the point of view of this project, 
Frei’s problem with Ricoeur is that he once again fails to separate out grammatical 
logic from ontology and epistemology.  In Ricoeur’s system, “reality and language 
are united in human beings as bearers of metaphor … The ineluctable movement 
from meaning to truth … is not, in this case, the movement from history-like shape to 
possible historical referent, but from textual language to ontological referent.”
93
  
Frei’s ‘logical first reading’ (my term, not his), advocates no such abstract 
hermeneutical method.  It is a much simpler and less loaded point about grammatical 
order, and is not an epistemological system. 
 
6.2 Contra the Hermeneutical Circle 
So for Frei, working on the principle of an ad hoc hermeneutical method, actual 
exegesis will be the test of a realistic narrative reading – which hermeneutic was in 
itself dictated in the first place by his gospel exegesis.  However, the rules governing 
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this method cannot then be abstracted from the gospels only to be re-applied to the 
same (or another) text.  Method is given together with the text; they cannot be 
separated; there is no universal method, nor any means of arriving at one.  In this 
Frei is particularly anxious to get away from the 19th century concept of the 
‘hermeneutical circle’, in which the whole and the parts are understood through each 
other.  In reference to the existentialist New Hermeneutic school
94
, Frei writes: 
 … this school of thought is heavily beholden to Idealist antecedents, especially in its 
 reliance  on the notion of the ‘hermeneutical circle’.  This term means not only that in 
 utterances whole and parts have to be understood through each other, but that any explicit 
 interpretation presupposes a logically prior, low-level, or implicit understanding.  In effect, 
 this means that any interpretation rests on a shared structure of distinctively human being 
 between interpreter and what is to be interpreted.
95 
On one level, Frei dislikes the ‘hermeneutical circle’ precisely because it is a ‘outside 
faith’ philosophical principle illegitimately applied to scriptural exegesis.  But he 
extends his dislike of the ‘hermeneutical circle’ even to such hermeneutical methods 
which are derived from biblical exegesis itself.  Although such methods seem to put 
the biblical text in a position of authority over its own interpretation, what happens in 
actuality is that yet again a theory has been abstracted and universalised, and in the 
process has been made logically prior to practice.   
 
The problem Frei has with the concept of the hermeneutical circle is that it is posited 
on precisely this “logically prior, low-level, or implicit understanding”.  This means 
in effect, that the text has already been read and understood on some level before it 
has been read.  When it comes to the biblical text, this implies that we humans have 
some “implicit” knowledge of God apart from his revelation in Jesus Christ and his 
narrative identity.   
 The position in this hermeneutical philosophy [i.e., general hermeneutics], of which the 
 ‘hermeneutical circle’ is a typical aspect, is that the specifically human element, the dialectic 
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 in which man is himself and language is distinctively human, is what any exegesis must 
 uncover.  Public circumstances, social context, and structures, incidents all become 
 meaningful only as they are related, systematically and internally, to the specific self-world 
 of the text as appropriated through interpretation... When this view, with its claim to 
 omnicompetence in interpretation, is applied to realistic narrative, not only is the subject 
 matter turned into something other than the story and what it depicts, but even what is 
 supposed to be the true subject matter is nothing except in and by the relation and family 
 semblance between it and the interpreter.
96 
Frei abhors this separation of God from his narrative.  Such a separation of text and 
referent is a hallmark of the very liberal hermeneutic which Frei was trying to escape 
throughout Eclipse, and in Frei’s own time had become a feature even of such an 
anti-liberal school as Neo-Orthodoxy.  More worryingly, this separation of text and 
referent is at least an occasional problem even with Barth, who likewise suggests that 
the true ‘subject matter’ of the text (God) is somehow beyond the text: 
 We all know the curiosity that comes over us when from a window we see the people in the 
 street suddenly stop and look up – shade their eyes with their hands and look straight up into 
 the sky toward something which is hidden from us by the roof.  Our curiosity is superfluous, 
 for what they see is doubtless an aeroplane.  But as to the sudden stopping, looking up, and 
 tense attention characteristic of the people of the Bible, our wonder will not so lightly be 
 dismissed.  To me personally it came first with Paul: this man evidently sees and hears 
 something which is above everything, which is absolutely beyond the range of my 
 observation and the measure of my thought.
97 
As an analogy, Frei is unlikely to disagree with this.  He himself makes no claims 
that we somehow ‘have’ God in the biblical text, and throughout Identity describes 
its witness even to Jesus as “indirect”.
98
  Frei’s problem is the accompanying claim, 
that until God is actually glimpsed, we do not have understanding of the texts.  What 
is more, this ‘glimpse’ of God, when it happens, happens as an internal ‘faith event’.  
Hence, understanding of the subject matter is once again predicated on a faith 
hermeneutic.  The text is somehow not as sufficient as it should be, and if the text is 
not sufficient without faith for rendering God’s identity, then we have to draw on 
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6.3 Frei’s Linear Hermeneutic 
Frei’s alternative and daring proposal is that absolutely no prior faith or knowledge 
of God is necessary as a precondition for right understanding of the biblical texts.  
Any such knowledge or faith is given not prior to reading the biblical texts but, if it 
is given at all, it is given in the process of reading them: 
 Persons and publicly accessible circumstances are indispensable to each other, even as they 
 are irreducible to each other.  In their interaction they form the story and thereby 
 cumulatively render its subject matter.  They render it – and thus the sense of the text – to the 
 reader, no matter how he disposes himself toward the story on a personal level.
99 
In practice, this means that a nonbeliever, when they read the Bible, starts on exactly 
the same level playing field as the believer.  This is the importance of what I have 
termed the ‘logical first reading’.  If the nonbeliever reads rightly the narrative 
identity of Jesus Christ, forming and testing a hypothesis in the process, then even if 
they do not thereby come to faith, they have nevertheless rightly understood the 
gospel texts.  Hence Frei can conclude his preface: 
 My hope is that the exegetical and accompanying hermeneutical inquiry will show that, no 
 matter whether one is a believing Christian or not, one can make sense of the Gospel story in 
 its own right, and that making sense of it that way entails important consequences for a 
 theology based on this narrative.
100
  
The leap which may or may not happen, from right understanding of the texts to faith 
in the living God, is not Frei’s concern: his non-apologetic, ‘inside faith’ perspective 
means that he has no scheme to account for how a person comes to faith, except to 
say that the text has no power in itself to ‘produce’ faith.  But whether or not the 
nonbeliever comes to believe, they have at their disposal all the tools required for a 
right reading, not because of some inherent ‘God-consciousness’, nor yet because of 
some existential awareness of the presence or absence of God in their lives, but 
precisely because the gospel texts are sufficient in themselves to “render depictively 
to the reader their own public world, which is the world he needs to understand 
them.”
101
  Contra Barth, not even historical study of the Bible is necessary as a 
precondition for understanding the gospels.  In a way similar to how a realistic novel 
renders its imaginary world to the reader, so do the gospels in their ‘history-like’ 
depiction of the interaction of character, setting, and event.  While, for example, a 
historical knowledge of the slum conditions of Victorian London might help us to a 
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greater appreciation of the achievement of Dickens in Oliver Twist, such knowledge 
is no precondition to understanding the novel.  Quite the contrary: the novel itself 
gives us more than enough information for us imaginatively to enter its world at a 
first reading.  The gospel texts likewise. 
 
In a key observation cited above, Frei remarks how it is the interaction of persons 
and circumstances which “form(s) the story and thereby cumulatively render(s) its 
subject matter”.  The crucial word here is “cumulatively”.  What we have here, in 
opposition to the hermeneutical circle, is something more like a linear understanding 
of reading.  In such a linear model, layer upon layer of understanding is built up as 
the story progresses, by the end of which – and only by the end – we have a full 
understanding of the story’s meaning.  Perhaps the most straightforward analogy 
(although with unfortunate connotations!) would be to that most typical of realistic 
genres, the detective novel.  There comes at the end of such a novel a sense of 
completeness, as all the half-understood, barely noticed ‘clues’ at last come together 
to support the ‘fittingness’ of the truth which is finally and fully revealed.  Moreover, 
it is only at this point that the full identity of at least one of the characters – the 
murderer – is revealed.  Crucially, this final knowledge of the truth does not then 
necessitate a rereading before we can fully understand – although such a rereading 
may of course be pleasurable, and may deepen our understanding of character and 
plot.  Rather, our final knowledge of the story’s true subject matter is the product of 
many cumulative moments of ambiguous revelation as character and plot interact, 
leading up to the climactic moment of unambiguous revelation.  At this point, the 
reader’s response to that revelation is not so much surprise (though it may include 
that), as recognition of the fittingness of an ending which effectively had been 
prepared for all along.  Whatever the many differences between the modern realistic 
novel and the gospels, these similarities should be admitted.  After all, it is of the 
nature of revelation to be both ‘out of the blue’ – truly deus ex machina – and yet 
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Conclusion: Revelation, Hermeneutics, and the Logic of Belief 
 
Therefore, where Barth says that we have not fully understood the Bible until we 
have read it through the hermeneutic of faith, by contrast, Frei says that we can fully 
understand the gospel texts without bringing faith into the equation, although faith 
may indeed be given simultaneously with understanding.  Thiselton, then, is not 
entirely correct when he states that “for believing readers, whom Frei distinguishes 
from unbelievers and also from pilgrims, the identity of Jesus Christ is given in and 
through the narrative texts…”
102
  The statement needs qualification, for God’s 
revelation is first and foremost to unfaith, to the dialectically estranged world where 
everyone has said ‘No!’ to God.  Indeed, that ‘No!’ could not have become the 
existential ‘Yes!’ of the believer, except that revelation has been given.   In this way 
Frei avoids taking the very relativistic and existentialist step in which revelation can 
be spoken about only as ‘true-for-us’.  Rather, God’s self-revelation in Jesus is ‘true-
for-all’, able to be comprehended by anyone via scripture, though that in itself will 
not make faith ‘happen’.  Once again, its grammatical expression is not the same as 
the ontological/epistemological event itself, and we do not ‘have’ God in God’s 
revelation, any more than we ‘have’ Arthur Conan Doyle in The Hound of the 
Baskervilles.  The text is truly the self-expression of the author, and so truly reveals 
the author.  And yet, in Barthian terms, the ‘unveiling’ is accompanied by a ‘veiling’: 
the being of the author remains elusive, revealed in, but not ontologically identical 
with, the grammatical medium.  And of course, more so than any human author, God 
controls God’s own self-expression.   
 
Nevertheless, the world created by the text is sufficient in itself to procure that right 
understanding of God’s content on a first reading.  To insist, as Barth does, that faith 
is prior to proper understanding of the subject matter, is logically to demand belief 
before content.  Frei’s point is that the equation must be reversed, so that 
understanding must be conceptualised as logically prior to faith – otherwise, what do 
we have faith in, but an abstraction?  Once again, this is a logical and not necessarily 
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an actual ordering: Frei puts no limits on the working of God, and Barth’s three-step 
faith hermeneutic, or the existentialist version of the abstracted revelatory encounter, 
may indeed correspond very closely to the experience of many believers.   
 
For Frei, a right hermeneutic will produce neither faith nor revelation.  An 
appropriate hermeneutic is simply a matter of establishing the grammatical starting 
point for our attempts to say something about God.  God’s revelation is not in itself 
located in the text; all the text provides is the precondition for speaking about 
revelation.  To our first category, then, of The Content of God, we add the category 
of The Logic of Belief.  As will become evident in the course of the next three 
chapters, the two are entirely interdependent. 
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Chapter 3   The Realistic Narrative Hermeneutic 
1. Introduction 
Once again, it is worth reminding ourselves of Richard Burnett’s neat summary: that 
“not everything can be said about God at once and that when talking about God some 
things ought to be said before others”.  If the logic of belief is to be understood, not 
as circular but as linear, then when it comes to theological ‘system’ (for want of a 
better word), the issue of saying some things before others begs the obvious 
grammatical question, what to say first?  Acknowledged or otherwise, every 
theological system has a starting point, and given the dialectic separation of God and 
creation, that starting point is almost always located somewhere in the doctrine of 
revelation.  As pointed out in the previous chapter, the result of starting in the wrong 
place is that an abstract starting point leads inevitably to an abstract conception of 
God.   Therefore, if this conclusion is to be challenged at all, then that challenge must 
address itself to the foundational a priori assumption of that system. 
 
Of course, in the actual order of things, the historical Jesus Christ was and is God’s 
primary revelation, to which scripture bears witness.  That is a given for Frei, 
although this is not always understood.  In particular, Francesca Murphy claims that 
for “story Barthians”, such as she categorises Frei, the words of the story are not in 
any way required to “correspond” with the historical actuality: 
 It could be contended that [the story Barthians] shored up their foundation in Scripture at the 
 expense of relegating the truth of correspondence to realities outside the biblical system to a 
 second place, basing their faith solely in the intrasystematic coherence of their beliefs.
1 
True, Frei’s fellow Yale theologian, George Lindbeck, does indeed write about the 
“intra-textuality” and self-referentiality of religious language, in which “The proper 
way to determine what “God” signifies, for example, is by examining how the word 
operates within a religion and thereby shapes reality and experience”.
2
  Whatever 
might be the applicativeness of this criticism to other “story Barthians”, once again it 
is appropriate to distinguish Frei from the ‘school’ in general.  What has happened 
here is that Murphy has noted Frei’s distinction between ontology and grammar, but 
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has not understood his point about the order of belief.  For Frei, as for Barth, the 
witness of scripture remains a secondary witness to the primary historical reality 
which was God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.  In that case, the actual order is first the 
reality of the historical person, Jesus of Nazareth, and then the witness of scripture.  
The witness of scripture must indeed “correspond” to the actual Jesus simply because 
ontology comes first, and controls its predicates.  However, in the logic of belief, the 
starting point has to be scripture.  This is not to say that scripture somehow 
‘produces’ the actual Jesus: despite a necessary “correspondence”, grammar cannot 
carry that much ontological weight.  It is simply the only way to avoid the 
hermeneutical circle and the problem of a pre-existent interpretative scheme, for 
every other starting point can be nothing other than an abstract idea of Jesus, a 
Christ-without-content.   
 
Thus Frei is obliged to deduce from the text that Jesus Christ is God’s revelation (if 
indeed the text will support that hypothesis), rather than to begin with an ontology, as 
Barth does and as Murphy would prefer to do.  This is not a retreat into an 
existentialist ‘for us’ condition before revelation can be revelatory, and nor is it 
another instance of a christology-from-below.  The biblical story does not supplant 
the ‘real’ Jesus, as Murphy claims.  It is simply to admit that scripture provides our 
only record of who Jesus is.  Without scripture, he is no more than a name; without 
scripture, we would not even know his name.  We do not by this admission bind God 
to scripture, or consider God to be trapped in God’s own story.  Rather, in the 
humility of the failure of our reason, we are forced to accept that God has bound 
Godself to scripture.  Having elected to become incarnate in the medium of 
chronologically linear history, God has in effect written Godself into the human 
story, so that the realistic narrative form is peculiarly suited to the description of this 
self-storied God.  It is God’s own decree, then, that the story related by scripture is to 
be our sole access to the content of God.  While we may indeed, and with accuracy, 
locate other moments of revelation elsewhere, these ‘revelations’ have no content 
unless we identify them with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.  Thus Frei can 
maintain, that apart from scripture, God reveals nothing of any content to us; and a 
content-less revelation is no revelation at all.   
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For these reasons, Frei’s understanding of the linear logic of belief obliges him to 
start his theology with scripture: that indirect, doubly veiled, most secondary Word 
of God, whose adequacy as a medium of revelation had been questioned and doubted 
by two centuries of scholarship before Frei came to tackle the problem.  Somehow, 
this secondary Word had now to be read in such a way that the identity of Jesus 
Christ can be understood and doctrinally described.  That is why, for Frei in his time, 
revelation had become a hermeneutical issue. 
 
2. The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative 
 
Frei’s mature theological project, described in his preface to Identity, was actually 
launched the previous year with the 1974 publication, The Eclipse of Biblical 
Narrative.  This book can be read as an exercise in critical historical theology: Frei 
painstakingly traces the development of biblical hermeneutics and accompanying 





 century Enlightenment philosophy, culminating in D.F. 
Strauss and Schleiermacher.  From the first chapter, it becomes clear that, for all his 
recognition that there is no going back, Frei’s sympathies are primarily with the 
premodern approach to scripture.  By contrast, he condemns the Enlightenment 
hermeneutical project as having been disastrous for biblical theology.   
 
However, when read in tandem with The Identity of Jesus Christ, it becomes clear 
that Frei has a larger agenda than simply critiquing historical hermeneutics.  For all 
that their roots lie in the past, Frei’s theological opponents are not historical figures, 
but decidedly contemporary ones.  His preface to The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative is 
unambiguous in this respect, when he writes in praise of the contemporary 
philosopher Gilbert Ryle, that 
 Ryle’s work ... is a marvellous antidote to the contorted and to my mind unsuccessful efforts 
 of certain phenomenologists and philosophers of ‘Existence’ and ‘Being’ to tackle a similar 
 dualism.  And therefore it serves to explain better than they do how it is that we can read 
 written discourse with the expectation of doing it reasonably intelligently.
3
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As his preface to Identity confirms, Frei’s aim is to counter Christian existentialist 
theology, first of all by exposing the ‘errors’ of similar – indeed, formative –  
misreadings of scripture in the history of biblical hermeneutics, and then by offering 
the positive suggestion of a “realistic narrative” reading.
  
This project, begun 
‘negatively’ in Eclipse, is developed in positive fashion in Identity.   
 
But before we get to the positive account in Identity, it is Eclipse which offers the 
first definition of Frei’s proposed “realistic narrative hermeneutic”.  The confident 
tone of Eclipse is a long way from the more hesitant evaluations offered by Frei’s 
1950s essays: almost twenty years after his thesis, it seems that Frei has finally 
worked out his own positive theology.  Frei’s Preface to Eclipse cites as “particularly 
influential on my thought”
4
 Erich Auerbach, Karl Barth, and Ryle; tellingly, there is 
no longer any mention of his teacher Niebuhr, whose concept of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
history Frei has now rejected.  It seems that Niebuhr’s influence has been negated by 
Ryle in particular, about whom Frei writes, “Anybody interested in hermeneutics has 
special reason to be grateful to the book [The Concept of Mind] for its 
demystification of the concept of intentional personal action, and the author’s steady 
refusal to divide intelligent activity into separate mental and external components.”  
Frei smoothly appropriates this insight of Ryle’s into the person for discussion of the 
text: as Frei observes, “It is a lesson well applied to the way one views written 
statements and hence also how to read them”.
5
  For our purposes, we note also that 
the direction can just as easily be reversed, so that what Frei says about the text is 
equally applicable to the person, and in particular, the person of Jesus Christ.  
Furthermore, this insight of Ryle’s into the person is applicable not only to 
hermeneutics and to history, but also to the doctrine of revelation, and ultimately, as 
will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, to the knowledge of the content of God. 
 
Frei’s thesis in Eclipse is that the Enlightenment search for meaning ‘behind’ the 
literal sense of the text has resulted in the negating of the story of God in scripture.  
In the introduction, Frei outlines and approves the contrasting hermeneutic of the 
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“literal sense”
6
 as employed by Luther and Calvin.  This ‘literal sense’ hermeneutic, 
for all its simplicity to modern eyes and ignorance of the hard questions posed by 
science, nevertheless was one which was, according to Frei’s criteria, ‘successful’, in 
that it did adequate justice to the biblical narrative.   
 
Frei identifies three features of premodern Reformed hermeneutics which meant that 
the prominence of the narrative was maintained: 
 First, if it seemed clear that a biblical story was to be read literally, it followed automatically 
 that it referred to and described actual historical occurrences...  
 The second element in precritical realistic reading was that if the real historical world 
 described by the several biblical stories is a single world of one temporal sequence, there 
 must in principle be one cumulative story to depict it...  
 In the third place, since the world truly rendered by combining biblical narratives into one 
 was indeed the one and only real world, it must in principle embrace the experience of any 
 present age and reader.
7 
These three principles are highly suggestive when it comes to Frei’s own approach.  
Crucially, all three are concerned with the unity of scripture: firstly, the unity of text 
and referent; secondly, the unity of all biblical events and genres, including Old and 
New Testaments; and thirdly, the unity of historical past and historical present. And 
as noted above, what can be applied to the text of scripture can be applied also to the 
person, an account of whose identity must provide for a similar unity of ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ self, of disparate events and experiences, and of past and present.  These, 
therefore, are the themes which Frei pursues throughout Eclipse and on into Identity.  
Accordingly, they will be used to structure our study of Frei’s hermeneutical 
preferences.   
 
The following discussion shall therefore follow Eclipse in giving a threefold account.  
Firstly, each heading will introduce the precritical hermeneutic of Luther and Calvin, 
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as understood by Frei.  This will be followed by a brief description of the 
Enlightenment rebuttal of the precritical position, and then a detailed consideration 
of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical response to the problems raised.  Thereafter, 
Frei’s climactic appreciation and despair in Eclipse of Schleiermacher’s biblical 
hermeneutics will help us to pinpoint what he found useful therein for his own 
project, and what he discarded as inimical to the narrative genre of the gospels.  
Lastly, having defined Frei’s understanding of his hermeneutical heritage and the 
choices available to him, the final aim will be to describe Frei’s own hermeneutical 
proposal, the realistic narrative hermeneutic, which is the ‘literal sense’ in its modern 
form. 
 
3. Figuration as the Principle of the Unity of Scripture 
3.1 Unity of Text and Referent 
 First, if it seemed clear that a biblical story was to be read literally, it followed automatically 
 that it referred to and described actual historical occurrences...  
In the premodern hermeneutical scheme, Frei describes how Luther and Calvin had 
taken on faith that the biblical narratives referred to real historical people and events.  
However, with the advent of the Enlightenment, for the first time the narratives were 
subjected to the following questions: “Do the stories and whatever concepts may be 
drawn from them describe what we apprehend as the real world? Do they fit a more 
general framework of meaning than that of a single story?”
8
  In effect, the 
Enlightenment hermeneutic of reason apprehended the world of our senses, not 
merely as separate from the ‘mythical’ world of the Bible, but as rationally superior 
to it, and infinitely more trustworthy.  As a result, scientific and historical 
investigation could now be used to judge the veracity of the biblical narratives, and if 
there was a mismatch, then it was the Bible which was obliged to give way. 
 





 in modern biblical hermeneutics.  Now a word, a 
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sentence, or a text was understood as having only one referent; and moreover, the 
relationship between the two was oblique.  In practice, this meant that the first 
question the reader had to ask of the text was one which neither Calvin nor Luther 
had ever considered: whether a Bible story ‘really happened’.  If it were 
demonstrated by historical or scientific investigation that this was indeed the case, 
then no further meaning need be sought: the text was merely descriptive of 
something that happened in the past, and as Lessing’s neat aphorism points out, 
“Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of 
reason".
11
  Hence the discovery of an actual historical referent behind a Bible story 
had the ironic effect of divorcing the text from any spiritual referent.   
 
Meanwhile, the very act of asking the historical question opened up the possibility 
that the biblical narratives, for all they might have been intended to refer literally, 
might nevertheless refer wrongly, led astray by a pre-scientific credulity.  Or there 
was the further possibility that they had never been intended to refer to actual people 
and events at all, but were ‘myths’ (in the sense of instructive fiction) from the very 
start.  In the former case as in the latter, the ‘real’ referent now must be sought 
‘behind’ the narrative, whether that real meaning was ‘actual’ or ‘spiritual’ (it could 
in no way be both).  In other words, even if investigation demonstrated that the text 
did not refer accurately to an actual historical event, the principle of one referent still 
held.  That referent could even be God, provided that God were understood in an 
abstract and not in a concrete, storied sense.  In this way, those committed to the 
Christian faith managed to preserve a modicum of revelatory content for the Bible.  
The price, however, was that the biblical narrative had to recede into the background 
as its ‘true meaning’ became “detachable from the specific story that sets it forth.”
12
   
 
The growth in the eighteenth century of a hermeneutic of universal reason was not 
accepted uncritically by nineteenth century theologians, who were well aware of the 
danger posed to faith of this essentially reductionist scheme.  Schleiermacher’s 
innovative response was to shift the hermeneutical debate away from the issue of text 
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and external referent.  Not that he could “return … to a pre-Kantian stance, for which 
either knowing or understanding would be a merely isomorphic internal reproduction 
of given external data”
13
, i.e., an intellectual understanding simply of the sense of the 
words.  Rather, Schleiermacher’s concern was to make a special case of the 
knowledge of God and so to isolate God from the distorting and/or limiting effects of 
our perception.   
 
As Schleiermacher explained it, our relation to all other objects is one of 
“reciprocity”, which word “expresses our connexion with everything which either 
appeals to our receptivity or is subjected to our activity”.
14
  However, when it comes 
to God, there is no “reciprocity” at all, because we have absolutely no capacity to 
impinge upon God in any way.  Therefore God is absolutely free, and we are 
absolutely dependent.  This means that, while he accepts fully Kant’s point, that 
subject and object are in a mutually affective relationship, Schleiermacher simply 
refuses to categorise God as an object.  His alternative proposal is that knowledge of 
God, far from being ‘filtered’ through our perception, is given to us in immediate 
fashion, to be identified directly with that same “feeling of absolute dependence”. 
 
When it comes to the interpretation of texts, Schleiermacher writes that 
“hermeneutics deals only with the art of understanding, not with the presentation of 
what has been understood.”
15
  The “reciprocity” here is between reader and author, 
as the reader seeks to understand the consciousness behind the creative act.  
However, God cannot be regarded in any way as the ‘author’ of the Bible, for that 
would be to involve God in the dialectical reader-writer relationship, which would 
contradict the principle of God’s absolute freedom and our absolute dependence.  
Therefore, as a special epistemological case, Schleiermacher removes God from the 
biblical narrative, so that scripture now has no revelatory content as such.  Rather, 
the hermeneutical task is now to understand the God-consciousness of the ancient 
writers and speakers of scripture, particularly Jesus himself.  In this way, 
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Schleiermacher sought to make space within religion for historical biblical criticism 
by the simple expedient of allowing it to help uncover the God-consciousness of 
Jesus, but denying it the power either to reveal or obscure the content of God.  But 
the price is a separation between the ‘literal sense’ of the text and God as its 
purported referent. 
 
3.2 Unity of Events, Genres, and Testaments  
 The second element in precritical realistic reading was that if the real historical world 
 described by the several biblical stories is a single world of one temporal sequence, there 
 must in principle be one cumulative story to depict it...  
The issue of the unity of text and referent is further complicated when the focus is 
widened to embrace the Bible as a totality.  Frei’s comment about “one temporal 
sequence” begs the question as to how a modern critical awareness of the disparate 
genres, events, and voices of scripture, can ever allow for their unity under any 
scheme – and this before we even consider the “one cumulative story” of the Bible as 
extending in some way to embrace our time and cultures.   
 
The unity of the Bible can be envisaged in a number of related ways, all of which 
were almost indistinguishable for premodern interpreters.  A temporal sequence is 
one way of unifying disparate stories: a realistic narrative takes place in time and 
over time, adding event to event as an entire story unfolds in an unbroken chain of 
cause and effect.  Of course, in the case of the Bible, ‘cause’ must also be understood 
in a divine, cosmic sense and not simply as a natural historical pattern.  This 
conception also implies a telos: a climax or denouement towards which the narrative 
drive is headed, which is accounted for by the theological category of ‘Providence’.  
A second way of envisaging the unity of scripture is something akin to a collection of 
short stories, all by different authors, but all writing about the same theme.  And a 
third concept of textual unity lies in the singularity of an author, so that even on a 
more qualified understanding of the inspiration of scripture, the claim that scripture 
is the Word of God supplies a kind of authorial unity.  All three grounds of the unity 
of scripture were axiomatic to Luther and Calvin. To them, the entire Bible was a 
realistic narrative, truly depicting a real world and a real God; and what is more, it 
was one narrative, as befits one God. Indeed, it is the thesis of Auerbach’s Mimesis, 
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that the realistic narrative tradition in western literature owes its very existence to the 
fierce monotheism of the Judaic tradition.   
 
However, this ‘single world’ of Hebrew scripture was, with the advent of Jesus 
Christ, given a new interpretative ‘key’ – and a new interpretative problem.  Greene-
McCreight describes the issue for Christian interpreters as follows:  
 The plain sense of scripture in Christian reading thus hinges hermeneutically on the problem 
 of the relation of the two testaments, and theologically on the problem of the relation of the 
 covenant with Abraham and the New Covenant made in the death and resurrection of Jesus 
 Christ.
16
   
Now not only must Jesus Christ be ‘read back’ into the Hebrew scriptures, but so 
must the Hebrew Scriptures be ‘read forward’ into the New Testament – yet without 
violating either their integrity or the simplicity of their relation with their more direct 
referent.  The effect of understanding this “second element” of unity in this way is 
that the “first element” – the unity of text and referent – has become considerably 
more complex.  Clearly, the ‘single referent’ practice of Enlightenment hermeneutics 
cannot hold here; somehow, an Old Testament account must be read to refer not only 
to an actual contemporary event, but also to that event’s fulfilment in Jesus Christ, 
and then yet further, also to our time and world.  At this point, the premodern 
interpreters would invoke the crucial hermeneutical key to the maintenance of the 
unity of the Bible: the practice of reading scripture figuratively.
17
  Auerbach offers 
this useful definition: 
 Figural interpretation establishes a connection between two events or persons, the first of 




This principle of figuration lent itself particularly well to premodern biblical 
interpretation, for the Doctrine of Providence guarantees that any given historical 
event is no mere accident, but points always to the salvation event that was Jesus.   
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However, as John David Dawson points out, the idea that Jesus can be ‘read back’ 
into the Hebrew scriptures is a misleading one.  Dawson stresses that, for Frei, 
 Figural reading is essentially a “reading forward” in anticipation, a reading from figure to 
 fulfilment, rather than a retrospective “reading back” that would apply the self-assured 
 certainty of Christian meaning to otherwise vague and uncertain figures of the Hebrew Bible.  
 Instead, the figural reader aims to subordinate him or herself to the text and to follow the 




This observation is entirely in accordance with the point made in Chapter 2, that Frei 
is arguing for a linear hermeneutic rather than a circular one.  Furthermore, a vital 
connection is made here between such a ‘linear’ reading, and the appropriate attitude 
of theological humility towards the Hebrew Scriptures: a figural reading can avoid 
the imposition of an externally-derived interpretative principle which would destroy 
the historical uniqueness of the promissory events, even while it refers these events 
forward to Christ. As Auerbach explains with respect to Tertullian’s figurative 
reading of Joshua: 
 Thus the naming of Joshua-Jesus is a phenomenon prophecy or prefiguration of the future 
 Saviour; figura is something real and historical which announces something else that is also 
 real and historical.
20
 
So while in one sense, Jesus Christ is a Barthian-style ‘ontological assumption’ in 
every Christian reading of the Hebrew Scriptures, in Frei’s logic of belief, it is 
necessary always to read forward, and not back, from promise to cumulative promise 
and on to fulfilment.  That is the only way not to make an abstraction out of the 
fulfilment – a Christ apart from his story.  It is also the only way to appreciate fully 
the story of how that fulfilment came to be, including all the twists and turns along 
the way.   And thirdly, it is the best way to preserve the unity of the text, as each 
moment of promise builds cumulatively on the one before.  (The alternative is to 
treat them as separate and disconnected witnesses to the fulfilment.)  Therefore, for 
all that such figurative interpretation seems to take imaginative liberties with the text 
which are impossible to justify under later empirical hermeneutics, Frei argues that a 
figurative reading is in fact a natural extension of the realistic reading of the Bible, 
unifying the “accidental truths” of history into one “cumulative” story.  Thus 
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figuration moves beyond the restrictive literalism of the single referent reading to, as 




However, with the advent of the Enlightenment, this figurative scheme of reading 
underwent a reversal.  In terms of the unity of Scripture, the problem with the ‘single 
referent’ Enlightenment hermeneutic is that the “cumulative” narrative of the Bible is 
broken down once again into individual genres, events, and voices.  With the loss of 
God as the referent; with the loss of God as the ‘author’ of scripture; and with the 
loss of the concept of a providentially-ordered world with a single temporal 
sequence, there is now nothing to hold all the fragments together.  As Frei illustrates 
in the course of Eclipse, the Bible seemed to have lost every one of its principles of 
unity. 
 
Schleiermacher once again proposes his hermeneutic of understanding as an 
approach which could ‘solve’ this problem by providing an alternative account of the 
unity of a text.  A true Romantic, he shifts the focus of hermeneutics away from the 
search for a single ‘external’ referent, and turns the spotlight instead on the task of 
understanding the ‘inner’ authorial consciousness.  Without ceasing to refer to an 
objective reality (factual or philosophical), religious meaning retreats into the 
subjective.  This means that for Schleiermacher, the unity of the text can reside only 
in the unbroken unity of the author’s consciousness.  Schleiermacher’s stated aim as 
reader is “to understand the text at first as well as and then even better than its 
author”
22
 – which task Gadamer calls “the whole problem of hermeneutics”.
23
   
 
Yet alongside this affinity, the dialectical otherness of author and reader must still 
stand.  Schleiermacher asserts this ‘unity in duality’ thus: 
 Because understanding necessarily involves a reversal in one’s dealing with a given 
 discourse, one may speak of heterogeneity between them; because it equally necessarily 
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Not for Schleiermacher the ‘static’ syntheses of the Hegelian scheme.  Here, the 
author and the reader remain separate entities, and creation and understanding remain 
separate processes, for the reader’s experience is of an essentially different order – an 
“immediate intellective act”,
25
 as opposed to the pre-linguistic experience of the 
immediate self-consciousness.  Understanding, therefore, can never be complete, but 
is instead a “constant act of approximation”.
26
  This very dynamic construct of 
understanding relies absolutely on the unity of the consciousness of the single author. 
 
Perhaps this hermeneutic of understanding could have worked very well indeed in 
the context of a doctrine of the inspiration of scripture.  However, Schleiermacher’s 
refusal to regard God as an object of knowledge means that he has no such 
doctrine
27
, and he is not shy in dismissing most of the Old Testament as irrelevant to 
faith.  Nevertheless, when it comes to the gospels, the centrality of Jesus to the 
Christian religion, added to the location of revelation in the immediate God-
consciousness, meant that Schleiermacher had to find some way of arriving at an 
understanding of Jesus which was perhaps even better – or at least more intellective 
– than his understanding of himself.  Jesus is not the author of the gospels, but 
Schleiermacher finds in the long self-conscious discourses of John’s Gospel
28
 
enough ‘spoken’ material at least to attempt a reconstruction of his consciousness.  
By comparison, the synoptic gospels, with their rag-tag succession of characters and 
events, do not lend themselves so easily to a hermeneutic of understanding.  
Nevertheless the Gospel of John, which Schleiermacher’s own biblical criticism 
regarded as chronologically earliest
29
, provides enough material for the reader to 
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work with.  And so, for all its limitations, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic of 
understanding does at least preserve a limited revelatory role for the Bible: not God 
as such, but Jesus at least, communicates. 
 
However, Gadamer’s crucial insight is that where Schleiermacher seems to be 
talking about understanding, he is actually taking misunderstanding to be the starting 
point of communication.
30
  As Schleiermacher himself wrote: 
 A more rigorous practice of the art of interpretation ... is based on the assumption that 
 misunderstanding occurs as a matter of course, and so understanding must be willed and 
 sought at every point.
31
 
In this light, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical method is in fact diametrically opposed 
to the ‘literal sense’ of Luther and Calvin, by whom language is assumed to be 
communicative, and directly at that.  Gadamer does appreciate how Schleiermacher 
had shifted the focus of hermeneutics from referent to understanding; however, in the 
process he regrets how “the task of interpretation has been uprooted from the context 
of intelligent consensus” and now has to “overcome complete alienation”.
32
  The 
result is, as Gadamer writes and as Frei himself cites, “Schleiermacher’s problem is 
not historical obscurity, but the obscurity of the Thou”.
33
  For all that their concerns 
are very different, the line of descent from Schleiermacher's hermeneutics of 
understanding to the existentialism of the mid-20
th
 century is not hard to trace.   
 
Although he ultimately dismisses Schleiermacher’s ‘solutions’, Frei nevertheless 
reads him more kindly than does Gadamer.  Frei understands how in 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ are not hopelessly separated: 
there is something in between – a text – and this is something they both share.  
Furthermore, it is possible to widen this commonality to include a world beyond the 
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writer and reader: the discourse, while it remains “the self-expression of individual, 
self-developing spirit”
34
, is simultaneously “an individual focus of a common 
linguistic and cultural stock”.
35
  Schleiermacher named these two aspects of 
discourse the “psychological” (or “technical”)  and interestingly, the “grammatical”:  
 To understand a speech always involves two moments: to understand what is said in the 
 context of the language with its possibilities [grammatical], and to understand it as a fact in 
 the thinking of the speaker [psychological].
36 
Once again, here is an instantiation of what we have called the distinction between 
the grammatical and the ontological.  In essence, Gadamer’s criticism focuses on the 
“psychological” (ontological) aspect of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical procedure.  
However, Frei considers that Gadamer overstates this, arguing against his claim that 
there is a straightforward relation between Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics and his 
theory of ‘feeling’.  By contrast, as Frei reads Schleiermacher, psychological 
intention is of lesser interest to him than grammatical self-expression, given that the 
hermeneutics of understanding must of necessity begin with the objective text.  
Schleiermacher was fully aware that intention behind the work of art, and its ultimate 
grammatical expression, need not entirely coincide, so that the final structure of the 
finished work does not in itself constitute the ontological consciousness of the 
creating subject.  Apart from other objections, that would be far too static an account 
of consciousness for Schleiermacher.  Rather, for him the final structure of the text 
can only be understood as the reader reconstructs its “genesis and development”
37
; 
and that reconstruction can only be ventured insofar as the author and reader share a 
common language.  Should the dialogue proceed to full understanding (an unlikely 
event), this is nevertheless full understanding only of the initial pre-linguistic 
consciousness behind the author’s impulse to create, and not of the authorial Subject 
in itself.  Thus Schleiermacher refuses the Hegelian route of positing an ultimate 
‘union’ of the dialectical opposites: for him, Subject and Subject remain inviolably 
other.  
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Frei’s concern then, contra Gadamer, is to restore grammatical understanding to its 
rightful centrality in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics.  If, like Gadamer, we emphasise 
the psychological aspect over the linguistic, then we do indeed perceive only 
subjectivism.
38
  However, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic is linguistically grounded: 
it exists within in the context of language in general, which aspect provides an 
objective foundation to the hermeneutic as a whole.  Indeed, once an ‘intention’ has 
been linguistically expressed, even the author cannot now psychologically ‘locate’ 
that pre-linguistic intention without at least first ‘reconstructing’ it through the given 
linguistic channels.  As Frei puts it, with his usual attention to the logic of belief, 
“there is no technical understanding without grammatical understanding”
39
, and in 
that order.   
 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic, then, is a general hermeneutic only in a very specific 
sense.  It does not believe in a universal ‘meaning’ which can be abstracted from the 
text, for if the ‘meaning’ is the consciousness of the author, then that ‘meaning’ must 
at least be as heterogeneous as the number of people who have ever written.  
Moreover, the ‘meaning’ of the text is not the author’s consciousness in general, but 
their consciousness only in the specific act of creating that text.  Neither is 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic predicated on a universal system, for such a ‘subject 
matter’ as the individual human spirit can hardly be amenable in every instance to 
the same structured analysis, particularly given the very imprecise fit between 
authorial intention and finished form.  Indeed, Schleiermacher is adamant that there 
are no stateable ‘rules’ which can be followed in every instance of reading: 
 In order to complete the grammatical side of interpretation it would be necessary to have a 
 complete knowledge of the language.  In order to complete the psychological side it would be 
 necessary to have a complete knowledge of the person.  Since in both cases such complete 
 knowledge is impossible, it is necessary to move back and forth between the grammatical 
 and psychological sides, and no rules can stipulate exactly how to do this.
40 
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The very fluidity of the dialectic ultimately renders hermeneutical rules impossible.  
In Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic of understanding, both life and language (and 
“language to Schleiermacher is something like a form of life...”
41
) are a process, 
without beginning or end where they might stand still and be systematised.  Rather, 
Schleiermacher presents his hermeneutics of understanding as a universal method, 
which can be applied to all texts, but which allows room for heterogeneity of 
meaning and form.  Certainly one can question – as Frei did, and Barth before him – 
whether there can be any legitimate universal method that can be applied to poetry as 
to cookbooks, but that is a different question to the one about universal content or 
form.  In short, and whatever his limitations, Schleiermacher had identified 
accurately the problems with the dominant Enlightenment hermeneutic, and in his 
attempts at answering them did suggest to Frei some useful lines of thought. 
 
3.3 Unity of History Past and Historical Present 
 In the third place, since the world truly rendered by combining biblical narratives into one 
 was indeed the one and only real world, it must in principle embrace the experience of any 
 present age and reader. 
As the theologians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries found, the question of 
the meaning of a text becomes particularly urgent when it comes to the applicative 
sense of the Bible.  It may well be historical fact that the Hebrews slaves walked out 
of Egypt; that the Babylonians took the Jews into exile; that a man called Jesus died 
on a cross – but what meaning can such facts have for us in our present historical 
moment?  Indeed, how can any accident of history have a meaning for us, especially 
when that ‘fact’ is the single allowed referent of the text?  And as for those passages 
of scripture which are mythical or allegorical, how is the meaning which is their 
referent to be turned into meaning for us in our very different cultural context? 
 
These questions about the historical and the applicative sense of the Bible – and the 
gap between them – had returned with force in Frei’s own time, particularly in the 
theology of Rudolf Bultmann.
42
  However, Frei notes that there was no such issue for 
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precritical biblical hermeneutics.  Then, as Frei argues in his first chapter and restates 
at the end of Eclipse, “the temporal perspective mattered little”
43
: the overarching 
narrative of Scripture underpinned by a literal figurative reading could with ease be 
extended yet further into our own time and place.  Indeed, figuration is one of the 
premises which makes preaching possible, for it underpins the faith that the historical 
biblical text is also speaking about us in our time, and that we exist within the world 
delineated by the Bible.  As Lindbeck was later to put it, “A scriptural world is … 
able to absorb the universe”.
44
  
   
Luther’s notion of the perspicuity of scripture is therefore no naïve reading, but is 
based on the perceived unity of God’s providentially-ordered world.  That is why 
Luther understands the Bible as sui ipsius interpres
45
, needing no hermeneutic from 
outside its own canon – precisely because there is no world outside its own canon.  
Rather, in his view, as expressed by Gadamer, scripture has “a univocal sense that 
can be derived from the text: the sensus literalis”.
46
  True, Gadamer contends that 
Luther’s reading of scripture is not so hermeneutically neutral as it appears, relying 
as it does on an understanding of scripture as a ‘unity’: a “postulate that is in itself 
based on a dogma”, or on dogmas, as we have seen.  Indeed, in a criticism that is 
very pertinent to Frei, Gadamer argues that “the literary and hermeneutical principle 
of understanding texts in their own terms is … itself unsatisfactory and always in 
need of support from a generally unacknowledged dogmatic guideline”.
47
  
Nevertheless, as Frei understands Luther, he is not so much as denying the existence 
of a hermeneutical lens, as maintaining that any such lens which does exist is 
nevertheless working from within the world encompassed by scripture: in short, from 
‘within faith’.  The ‘neutrality’ of the sensus literalis, or of the realistic narrative 
hermeneutic, at least understands itself as a conditioned neutrality, as opposed to the 
unbounded  ‘neutrality’ of universal reason. 
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As discussed above, the Enlightenment ‘single referent’ hermeneutic effectively 
abolished figurative interpretation.  Now, the contemporary world was no longer 
understood as being encompassed by God’s grand providential narrative; rather, the 
present historical moment was apprehended as entirely separate from the historical 
moments described in scripture.  Indeed, in the aftermath of Hume’s empiricism, 
philosophers struggled to maintain the links of even natural chains of cause-and-
effect: fact was isolated from fact as surely as present was isolated from past.  Then, 
in a further step, the present historical moment was turned on the narratives of the 
past and used to judge their veracity. Under the pressure of such questioning, the 
‘grand narrative’ of God’s providence had little chance of survival: hence the ‘ditch’ 
which had grown between the historical past and the present historical moment, and 
the struggle of theologians ever since to overcome it. 
 
Where Strauss had worried about the historical gap between the writers of scripture 
and the modern reader
48
, Schleiermacher was closer to his Reformed tradition in 
regarding the modern reader as at no significant disadvantage: indeed, 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic, in which “the original and the interpreter – are 
directly ... present to each other”
49
,  is expressly designed to leap the ditch of history.   
Furthermore, his insistence on treating the text as a work of art complete in itself 
avoided Strauss’ exegetical dissection of the whole of scripture into virtually 
unrelated parts; while his location of ‘meaning’ in the consciousness of the author 
means that an individual text has an inherent unity, even if the method falls down 
when it came to the heterogeneity of the Bible.  As a result, Schleiermacher’s 
solution to the hermeneutical problem is not entirely uncongenial to Frei.  However, 
the test of any biblical hermeneutic will be exegesis: and it is here that Frei judges 
that Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic of understanding actually completes with a final 
flourish the ‘eclipse’ of biblical narrative.   
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3.4 Frei in Dialogue with Schleiermacher 
Frei’s problem with Schleiermacher is that the search for Jesus’ ‘inner’ 
consciousness effectively nullifies the importance of the ‘outer’ events of his life 
story.
50
  This tendency did not worry Schleiermacher himself, for if “narrative 
continuity lies in consciousness”
51
, then it absolutely does not lie in the external 
world.  Frei’s insight is that while Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic can account for 
character (just!), it cannot begin to account for incident; nor for interaction with other 
characters; and nor can it account for the social context within which and against 
which the individual is defined.  The immediate practical result is that the true 
content of the biblical narratives “has to be discovered at a level more remote” than 
the interaction of character and incident.  As with a rationalist single-referent 
hermeneutic, so is it also with a hermeneutic of understanding, that “the documents 
mean something other than what they say”.
52
   
 
The process of the eclipsing of the biblical narrative did not, of course, end with 
Schleiermacher.  By Herrmann’s time, the epistemological ‘enemies’ of revelation 
were the Neo-Kantians
53
, who took Kant a step further and argued that there is in fact 
nothing given to thought which is not at the same time the creation of thought.  
Herrmann accepted this as axiomatic, but once again was obliged to isolate the 
knowledge of God and make it a special case.  The result was, in what McCormack 
terms an “existentialized Schleiermacherianism”
54
, Herrmann rejected altogether 
both objective doctrine and the phenomenological world as sources of the knowledge 
of God, and argued instead that such knowledge could only come from the subjective 
encounter:  
 The power of the Gospel can never be effectual in its working, while people are so insincere 
 as to propose “to appropriate by faith” the ideas contained therein. The ideas are always so 
 shaped that their truth is obvious to those alone who in their inward being experience a great 
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 transformation.  The very conception of God as the Almighty Father is true only when it 
 expresses this kind of experience.
55
   
Revelation, therefore, could never be an objective event, even in the diluted 
Schleiermacherian sense of an impression being made on our consciousness.  Now, 
only the inner life of Jesus could reveal anything, because only the subjective has 
independent reality.  The result was even more drastic than Schleiermacher’s semi-
objective account, in which what Jesus said and did could at least be read as an 
outworking of his inner consciousness.  Now, as McCormack puts it, Herrmann 
effectively “drove a wedge between the inner life of Jesus ... and his teaching and 
works”.
56
   This development meant that revelation lost any notion of objective 
content at all, and became merely the subjective, experiential, and non-objectifiable 
encounter with God.  However, where Herrmann saw only the inner life of Jesus as 
revelatory, for the 20
th
 century existentialist theologians, committed to the dialectic, 
the location of revelation was transferred to the inner life of the individual in their 
encounter with God.  Thus, by Frei’s time, this “existentialized 
Schleiermacherianism” had grown into the full-blown existentialist account. 
 
Once again, as Frei sees it, this denial of any concrete content to the knowledge of 
God is the inevitable outcome of a logic of belief which begins with the separation of 
meaning from text.   His own realistic narrative hermeneutic is therefore designed to 
counter this separation, and the inevitable abstraction of God which accompanies it.  
In his linear and cumulative scheme, meaning cannot be read ‘backwards’, as 
situated somewhere behind and ontologically prior to the text, after the discernment 
of which the text can safely be discarded.  Not only would this be an abstraction, but 
it would also be a logical nonsense, for without the text, there would be no meaning 
to discern, and meaning cannot exist on some metaphysical plain, independent of its 
public expression.  Grammatically, we are obliged to say things in a certain order – 
so in strict grammatical logic, being precedes action, ontology precedes 
epistemology, just as the subject precedes the predicate.  But this necessary 
grammatical ordering should not be loaded with too much ontological significance in 
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itself.  Frei’s point is that, while ontology and grammatical logic should be 
distinguished, the ontology and the epistemology should not be, even though 
grammar lines them up in a certain order.  Just as the deus cannot be separated from 
the dixit, so meaning cannot be separated from the text.  This is because the means 
by which we know is essential to the nature of the object of our knowledge, just as 
speaking is essential to the nature of God.   
 
The constantly reinforced thesis of Eclipse is that the meaning of the gospels is 
absolutely inherent in the story, and can neither be extracted, nor translated into non-
storied terms.  Indeed, compared to the richness of the interactions of characters and 
events, a mere restatement of themes is flat in the extreme.  We are therefore drawn 
back to Frei’s ‘figural’ understanding of scripture, in which the text can refer at the 
same time to an actual historical event, a spiritual lesson for those caught up in that 
event, the fulfilment of an earlier prophecy, an event yet to happen, the culture in 
which we live now, a spiritual meaning for us who read the text now, and an 
eschatological promise – and all that and more without any strain on the unity of the 
text.  And this is precisely why Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic is so vital a 
starting point in the logic of belief, for a realistic narrative can bind all these 
elements together with ease, in the way that a myth, or a spiritual biography, or a 
series of propositional statements, simply cannot.  Form criticism despite, a 
figurative scheme can even bind together the four disparate gospel accounts, so that 
without any attempt at synthesis, they can be held in tension: four narratives about 
one person, the cumulative story of Jesus Christ.  The centrality of this notion of 
figuration to Frei’s theological ‘system’ cannot be overstated, and as will be seen in 
the following section, this same principle, which underpin the unity of scripture, 
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4. Figuration as the Principle of the Unity of the Person 
4.1 The Unity of the ‘Outer’ and ‘Inner’ Self 
Where The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative was concerned with issues surrounding the 
unity of scripture, in his ‘follow-up’ book, Frei effectively extends this principle of 
unity to the person of Jesus Christ.  The thesis of the long essay, “Theological 
Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection”, and of its fuller 
statement in The Identity of Jesus Christ, is that as with the biblical text, so with the 
individual person: that there can be no separation of ‘outer’ form and ‘inner’ content.  
Accordingly, Frei posits two possible schemes of identity-description derived in part 
from Gilbert Ryle: that of “intention-action description”
57
, and that of “self-
manifestation”.
58
  The former is more directly opposed to the existentialist account 
than the latter, but both are essential components of the concept of the unity of a self.  
As it happens, “intention-action description” more neatly corresponds with this first 
principle of figuration, the unity of ‘outer’ and ‘inner’, where “self-manifestation” 
will be better considered below, under the second principle. 
 
Where existentialism would locate true identity in the ‘inner’ self, Frei follows Ryle 
in his direct relation of a person’s intentions and actions, so that a person’s identity 
cannot be divorced from its outward, physical expression.  The body is, in fact, the 
“link”
59
 between the individual’s ‘consciousness’ and the public world of contingent 
events.  There is no “ghost” inside the person which can be separated from the dead 
“machine”
 
which is the body.  Quite the contrary: what we do physically and 
externally is entirely constitutive of who we are.  Frei cites Ryle with approval: 
 “To perform intelligently,” says Gilbert Ryle quite correctly, “is to do one thing and not two 
 things”
.  
Hence, each has to be described by reference to the other.  An intention is nothing 
 more than an implicit action; but to say this is not to make intention and action one and the 
 same ... Their unity, we can only repeat, is in the irreversible passage or movement from one 
 to the other, from intention to action.
60 
Again, the issue is one of logic.   While intention and action are in effect a unity, yet 
given that we cannot say everything at once, the question becomes in what logical 
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order we should say them.  Here, Frei insists that the logical order must be intention 
first, and then action.  Of course, for human beings as opposed to God, not every 
intention works its way out as an action.  However, such an unenacted intention 
remains an abstraction, and is of no consequence to a person’s identity: 
 An intention, unless impeded or frustrated, is no intention and has no mental status at all 
 except as a plan to be executed.  The expression “I intend” is rightly and logically followed 
 by a verb, i.e., an action word.
61
 
However, what we can posit is that every action was intended. This means that, in 
answer to the question ‘What is (s)he like?’, we are able to point to a person’s actions 
and thus truly describe him or her, assuming that, in and with their action, we are 
also given their intention: “Enactment does not merely illustrate, but constitutes, 
intention.”
62
  To illustrate: if in answer to the question, ‘What is she like?’, we reply, 
‘She is cruel to animals’, we can assume that any such cruelty was intentional.  
Hence ‘cruelty to animals’ becomes constitutive of her identity.  But what we cannot 
do is extrapolate ‘backwards’ from an action to an intention which was prior to and 
independent of the action, and possibly even different to the action which resulted: 
“In that case,” Frei points out, “the intention or decision to act would account for 
everything, the actual enactment for nothing.”
63
  In other words, ‘cruel to animals’ 
would become a statement of the essence of a person, even if they had never been 
cruel to any animal.  This principle of logical ordering is parallel to the 
hermeneutical principle, that we cannot extrapolate back from a story, to a prior and 
independent ‘meaning’.  Rather, just as the meaning is given inextricably with the 
story, so too the intention is given inextricably with the action.   
 
So when it comes to the identity of Jesus Christ, whenever Jesus was ‘active’, then 
that action must be recognised as a concrete outworking of an inner intention.  
Therefore, under this category of ‘intention-action description’, it is impossible to go 
looking for the inner life of Jesus as located somewhere behind his actions.  Nor do 
Jesus’ words and actions act as some kind of conduit through which we can perceive 
his true inner self, which, having been perceived, means that we can now dispense 
with the outer form.  There is no such passage from action to intention, just as there 
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is no such passage from external text to inner meaning.  Rather, it is better to think of  
a direct relationship, in which Jesus’ identity is constituted by his public actions – 
just as in parallel fashion, the meaning of a realistic narrative is constituted by the 
characters and events it describes.   
 
Thus it is that Frei can locate Jesus’ core intention as always “to enact the good of 
men on their behalf – or their salvation – in perfect obedience to God”.
64
  This is 
because, of all his intentions, obedience is the most ‘objective’.  By that I mean that 
obedience is grammatically transitive, always focussed outwards; therefore it can in 
no wise be conceived as an abstract quality, for in order to qualify as obedience, it 
must be obedience to somebody.  Hence it must be constituted (and not merely 
illustrated) by an external act.  In other words, the intention to be obedient is 
meaningless without the actual act of obedience.  This is true of other intentions 
besides obedience – Frei cites faith and love as examples of ‘transitive’ personal 
qualities, which must have an external referent: faith in something, love for someone.  
Nevertheless, faith and love are both vulnerable to abstraction from their referent, so 
that they become more of a “spiritual characteristic”, where the issue becomes “not 
that to which faith refers but the quality of the person’s faith itself”.
65
  However, it is 
much harder to abstract obedience, either from its referent, or from the action which 
constitutes it.  Therefore, Jesus’ obedience “exists solely as a counterpart to his being 
sent and has God for its indispensable point of reference.  Jesus’ very identity 
involves the will and purpose of the Father who sent him”.
66
   
 
Later, in Chapter 4, we will again consider the relation between Jesus’ identity and  
his obedience to the will of God.  For the time being, however, it is interesting to 
note that the terminology Frei uses to describe the intention (not the quality) of 
obedience echoes which he understanding of the function of the biblical text: 
 The referent of Jesus’ obedience is the will of God and his purpose, which becomes 
 embodied in the climactic events of Jesus’ self-enactment.  The content or meaning of that 
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 obedience is the pattern of merciful, saving activity drawn largely from the picture of the 
 obedient, righteous servant in Deutero-Isaiah.  It is a pattern of exchange.
67 
Once again, the issue is of referent and content.  The enacted intention ‘obedience’, 
like the text, has its ‘referent’ built in to its very form.  The referent of the biblical 
text is God; the referent of Jesus’ enacted intention is God.  Therefore, as God is 
known in and through the stories of scripture, so God is known in and through Jesus’ 
obedience.  Both are revelatory of the content of God.  Moreover, the obedience of 
Jesus cannot be abstracted from the stories of scripture; otherwise it could be 
envisioned as, for example, the obedience of a soldier to a superior officer, or the 
obedience of a small child to its parent.  But if the referent of Jesus’ obedience is 
God, how might we then describe the content of God?  How does the particular 
obedience of Jesus Christ to God manifest itself in practice, and what language can 
we use to describe it?   
 
Frei relates the obedience of Jesus to the content of God, first of all by means of a 
figurative reading of the Old Testament witness, which Jesus invokes to describe his 
mission.
68
  According to this textual witness, the content of this obedience is Jesus’ 
saving activity, which is the same as the saving activity of God.  But even more 
specifically, the content of Jesus’ obedience is manifested in the narrative of the 
passion and crucifixion: 
 It is in the connected narrative sequence of the last events of the Gospel story that we look 
 for the coincidence of Jesus’ obedience to God and his love toward men, which is the content 
 of that obedience.
69 
In other words, just as the content (or ‘meaning’) of scripture must be described in 
storied form, so the content of Jesus’ intention to enact our salvation in obedience to 
God must be described with reference to what Jesus actually does and says.  The key, 
once again, is the figurative concept of unity, and “the most striking instance of that 
unity of [outer] obedience and [inner] love comes precisely in the process of his 
identification in the enactment of his intention”.
70
  Jesus’ “love towards men” is 
therefore no abstract feeling or quality, but can only be conceptualised by means of a 
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redescription of the events of the passion and resurrection. And again, if the referent 
of Jesus’ obedience is God, then we can truly describe the content of God in terms of 
what that obedience shows forth: in other words, the content of God is that self-same 
“love towards men”   That is why it is only when we look at the event of the cross 
that we can say of Jesus, “Here he was most of all himself”
71
; because here the 
content of God is most manifested in him.  In Chapter 4 we will consider the co-
identity of Jesus and God with reference particularly to the resurrection.  However, 
the enacted intention of obedience throughout Jesus’ earthly ministry suggests that 
we need not wait until the resurrection before we can posit this co-identity. 
 
This principle of the “enacted intention” emphasises once more that for Frei, there 
can be no separation between subject and predicate beyond the logical need to 
describe their relation in a certain order.  There can be no actual separation of deus 
and dixit, for it belongs to the being of God to reveal.  There can be no actual 
separation of inner meaning and outer text, for the meaning is constituted by the text. 
There can be no actual separation of inner self and outer actions, for the content of a 
person’s identity is constituted by their enacted intentions.  And finally and above all, 
there can be no actual separation of who Jesus is and what Jesus did, precisely 
because who Jesus is, is entirely constituted by what Jesus did. 
 
4.2 One Person, One Cumulative Story 
In the intention-action account of identity, thus far Jesus comes across as very much 
in control, just as he does in the Gospel of John.  He is the subject who intends and 
acts and “governs his predicates”.
72
  However, a human body exists in a contingent 
world, and as Schleiermacher himself recognised, this means that it is “dependent”, 
subject to all sorts of outside forces.  If the intention-action description works for a 
person’s conscious and elective acts, this is because there is a single subject who is 
holding all these disparate predicates in a unity.  The problem, however, is how to 
maintain that unity when the subject is not acting; when, in fact, the subject is being 
acted upon.  Frei’s intention-action identity description works very well for an 
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account of a powerful Subject God who is entirely free.  However, the question for 
the absolutely dependent human subject is how to unify not only what they do, but 
also what is done to them, in one single identity.  And when that human subject is in 
some way also the revelation of the powerful Subject God, the problem is redoubled. 
 
In order to deal with this second aspect of identity, Frei brings in another descriptive 
category, that of “self-manifestation”.  In “Theological Reflections” Frei prefers the 
term, the “Ascriptive Subject”,
73
 which he defines as a person’s “ongoing, open-
ended persistence in continuity with himself”.
74







 identity which links together what 
would otherwise be entirely separate and even contradictory.  Indeed, such an 
identity has its beginnings long before a person is even born, and persists after their 
death, both in terms of lasting impact on this world, and in terms of life in eternity.  
So once again, Frei’s realistic narrative scheme is employed to hold in unity what a 
person does with what is done to them – or in Schleiermacher’s terms, their 
“freedom” and their “dependence”.  We have already seen how a story can hold 
together diverse events and persons, figuratively linking past, present, and future in a 
way which defies rational explanation.  In the same way, diverse events, 
relationships, memories, intentions, actions, passions, words, feelings, and social, 
historical and familial identities, can be held together and interpreted as meaningful, 
not in any rational scheme of being, but only in the being of a person.  In view of 
such complexity, it is impossible to explain in any abstract sense exactly who a 
person is in their inner being.  Rather, a person can only be described in concrete, 
storied, content-full terms.   
 
                                                 
73
 Frei, “Theological Reflections”, 20. 
74
 Ibid. 22. 
75
 By which Frei means the self which can never reflect on the self as the self is reflecting.  See Frei, 
“Theological Reflections”, 20. 
76
 “The intenderactor knows perfectly well ... that he is anterior to that beginning and subsequent to 
that end (of any intended action).”  Frei, “Theological Reflections”, 21. 
77
 “States and qualities are predicated of it; but it is itself unpredicable of anything else.”  Frei, 
“Theological Reflections”, 20. 
   141 
Frei’s account of identity here is entirely applicable to the person of Jesus Christ.
78
  
Jesus not only acted out his intentions in powerful, godly freedom; he was also very 
much subject to the contingent forces of this world, and from his arrest to his death, 
entirely powerless before them.  Frei, however, is able to interpret this paradoxical 
mixture of power and powerlessness in Jesus as constituent of this same self-
manifested identity: once again, apparent contradictions can be held together by a 
person, where logically they can only fall apart.  Gethsemane, for example – an event 
in the synoptics but not in John – Frei reads as the moment when Jesus surrendered 
what was left of his power to act intentionally, and intentionally resolved not to act: 
resolved, in fact, to be helpless in accordance with his continued intention to enact 
our good in obedience to God.
79
  This power to be powerless – this ability to enact 
our good by not acting – is a tension which is fully evident on the cross: Frei points 
out the irony of the ‘saviour’ who ‘cannot save himself’, commenting upon the 
unwitting aptness of the crowd’s taunt.
80
   
 
In summary, the identity of Jesus (or of any other person) can be described by 
reference to a two-fold scheme of intended actions and self-manifestation.  Or rather, 
not so much a two-fold scheme, as a unity, in which what he did and what was done 
to him are equally inseparable from who he was.  However, it would be true to say 
that the person of Jesus Christ has more ‘baggage’ attached to his identity than 
perhaps anyone else in history, not least because there seems to be more than one 
sphere of existence going on.  In this, Frei’s conception of identity is very similar 
indeed to the Chalcedonian formula.
81
  Early church attempts to define how Jesus’ 
humanity and divinity might co-exist found themselves obliged to state that they co-
existed in his person, and only there.  This personal and storied unity of two such 
rationally contradictory ‘identities’ is of a different order entirely from Donald 
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Baillie’s conception of “paradox”.
82
  Any paradox which exists is logical merely, and 
not ontological, for whatever the grammatical contradictions in the Chalcedonian 
formula, there is no contradiction in the person of Christ.  Moreover, the ontological 
actuality corresponding to Chalcedon’s very minimal grammatical description of 
“fully divine, fully human, two natures in one person, without confusion or change, 
separation or division”, while resisting philosophical conceptualisation, can 
nevertheless be truly described.  Frei concludes, then, that it is only as a storied 
person that Jesus can hold in tension and unity his vast array of names, expectations, 
roles, events, and even his own two natures – and all this without strain or 
contradiction.   
 
However, this is not to say that even this ‘literal reading’ of his identity renders Jesus 
entirely transparent.  As Auerbach pointed out, a world in which God is dialectically 
Other has given rise to a literary genre in which mystery is the rule and the norm.  
The realistic narrative genre of much of the Bible is characterised by 
 the externalization of only so much of the phenomena as is necessary for the purpose of the 
 narrative; the decisive points of the narrative alone are emphasized, what lies between is 
 nonexistent; time and place are undefined and call for interpretation; thoughts and feeling 
 remain unexpressed, are only suggested by the silence and the fragmentary speeches; the 
 whole, permeated with the most unrelieved suspense and directed toward a single goal (and 
 to that extent far more of a unity), remains mysterious and “fraught with background.”
83 
If this is true of the realistic narrative, then it is also true of the person: Frei has 
explained how, because a person’s actions and passions truly render their identity, 
there is no need to go searching behind such available phenomena for their ‘inner’ 
self.   However, this means that there can never be absolute knowledge of any 
person, for although we can describe their intended actions as we see them, we can 
never go behind these actions to every motivation, every fear or desire, every option 
which was considered then rejected.  Similarly, while what happens to a person 
becomes constitutive of their identity, we do not have access to their every reaction 
or emotion.  As in the realistic narrative, so in the person: there are silences.  These 
silences are of vital importance to the genre of the realistic narrative, for they ensure 
that we are presented, not with the smooth “externalised, uniformly illuminated 
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phenomena ... connected together without lacunae in a perpetual foreground”
84
, as 
Auerbach describes Greek classical literature, but with the realistic 
‘multilayeredness’ of a particular event.  In the same way, the silences in a person are 
precisely what make them a unique and “unsubstitutable”
85
 individual, one who 
combines “the simultaneous existence of various layers of consciousness and the 
conflict between them”.
86
  That an “elusive” person can be adequately if indirectly 
described – that they can accurately be identified through a realistic narration of their 
life story – does not mean that we can equate that identity without remainder with 
their ontological actuality.  The mystery of the individual human being can never be 
eliminated, and to an even greater degree, nor can the mystery of the infinite divine.  
This principle is a vital counterbalance to Frei’s search for a concrete ‘content’ to 
God.  God has given the whole of God’s self to us in revelation, but that whole 
includes mystery. 
 
Frei is not saying, therefore, that Jesus has no ‘inner self’ – that he has no private 
thoughts, no unspoken desires.  Far from it.  It is simply that his inner self is not 
accessible to us in its entirety.  His identity, however, is accessible, as long as that 
identity is correctly understood as descriptive rather than explanatory.  Having 
outlawed Schleiermacher’s reconstructive hermeneutic, and having forbidden any 
extrapolation from action to intention, Frei is particularly critical of 19
th
 century 
attempts to do just that: 
 The task of writing a life of Jesus, especially one including as its pivotal point his ‘inner’ life, 
 is difficult if not impossible – whether it is undertaken as a reconstruction from recorded data 
 or by entering by imaginative reiteration into his self-understanding, or both.
87 
But if we cannot describe the inner self of Jesus, we can at least describe his self-
manifestations and intended actions in the world, and thereby can truly describe who 
he is and what he is like.  Identity description, therefore, cannot be isolated from the 
narrative in which Jesus is named, active, and acted upon.   
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5. Theological Grammar and Ontology 
5.1 The Medium is not the Thing 
With the transition from Eclipse to The Identity of Jesus Christ, Frei did something 
remarkable.  By putting Auerbach’s understanding of figuration as the principle of 
unity of the biblical text side by side with Ryle’s conception of the unity of the 
embodied self, Frei was able to transfer his textual realistic narrative hermeneutic 
across to a kind of hermeneutic of human being.  Applying these same hermeneutical 
principles which he developed in his realistic narrative hermeneutic to the person of 
Jesus, this means that the identity of Jesus Christ cannot be read as existing 
somewhere behind and ontologically prior to his intended actions as are narrated in 
the gospels.  Logically, we are of course obliged to speak first of a person whom we 
identify as Jesus of Nazareth, and then of what he said and did.  Nevertheless, it 
would be wrong to see the relation between his identity and his actions as being 
ontologically identical to that grammatical ordering: just because his identity must be 
posited before his actions, that does not mean that his identity existed before his 
actions.  Rather, the ‘public’ events of Jesus’s life, death, and resurrection, as 
narrated in story-form, constitute his identity.  This is the leap, aided by Gilbert Ryle, 
which Frei makes from a textual to a personal hermeneutic, and which becomes the 
central thesis in The Identity of Jesus Christ. 
 
This leap, however, is open to misinterpretation.  Emphatically, what Frei is not 
saying, is that the being of Jesus is constituted by the text: just as Barth rejected “any 
confusion of revelation with the medium in which it veils itself”
88
, so too Frei is 
insistent that the ‘medium’ is not die Sache.
89
  This is the locus of Francesca 
Murphy’s criticism, that Frei has ‘textualised’ Jesus’ identity to such an extent that 
the real existence of the historical Jesus of Nazareth has become an irrelevance: the 
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text has the power to ‘produce’ Jesus simply upon reading.  Kay has made a similar 
error, commenting critically on Frei, that 
 to assign to any creaturely form—including a literary genre—the power to render 
 revelation, or the divine Presence, confuses the Creator and the creature, substituting 
 hermeneutics for the Holy Spirit.
90
  
However, both Murphy and Kay have misread Frei on this point.  It is true that for 
Frei, Jesus’ identity is given in and with its grammatical expression in storied form, 
but he does not load this medium in itself with too much by way of ontological 
significance.  Of course the being who was the historical person Jesus of Nazareth is 
logically prior to any story that was later told or written down about him.  As Frei 
clarifies in a later essay: 
 “Historicity” is finally neither reference to specific events, nor a pattern in specific stories; it 
 is their ingredience in or unity with the logically prior general condition of self as 
 consciousness within a diachronic frame, which stories – indispensable but logically 
 subsequent – then bring to expression.
91 
However, this is a grammatical rather than an ontological point.  The fact is that the 
ontologically prior Jesus is entirely inaccessible to us: what we know of him, we 
know only in and with his story.  Therefore, to posit the subject as prior to its 
predicate is to start with an ontological abstraction, even if that abstraction once had 
a fleshly reality.  Nevertheless, Frei does not reverse the grammatical logic: he has 
emphasised time and time again that the predicate cannot work backwards to 
‘produce’ the subject God, or revelation, or the presence of Jesus Christ, or any 
reality in itself.  Indeed, the story’s ability to render Jesus’ identity is utterly 
dependent on his ontological actuality: the unity of text and referent is maintained 
precisely because the identity of Jesus Christ is entirely consistent with his historical 
actuality then and now.  Remove his historical actuality from the picture, as Murphy 
thinks Frei has done, then all that is left is pure fiction, and no presence at all.  And 
given that Frei spends an entire chapter explaining why Christ-figures in fiction can 
never replicate the unique and unsubstitutable identity of the real person who is Jesus 
Christ
92
, a fictional identity is no revelation and no presence.   
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5.2 Current Debates 
This problem of the relation between ontological and grammatical logic continues to 
be a very live issue in christology and in Trinitarian theology.  The debate goes back 
to Barth’s publication of Church Dogmatics 2:2 on the doctrine of election, and in its 
current form owes much to Jüngel’s proposal that God should be conceptualised as 
“being-in-becoming”.  The issue was revived by the publication of “Grace and 
Being”, Bruce McCormack’s contribution to The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Barth, and the key argument is now over the relation between the incarnate and the 
eternal Son – the Logos ensarkos and the Logos asarkos – in Barth’s doctrine of 
election.   
  
In “Grace and Being”, McCormack writes, “If now Barth wishes to speak of “Jesus 
Christ” as the Subject of election, he must deny to the Logos a mode of state or being 
above and prior to the eternal decision to be incarnate in time”.
93
  In this way 
McCormack distinguishes Barth’s doctrine of election from that of the classic 
reformed theologians, who understood the Son, or Logos, as eternally pre-existing 
the decision to elect.  However, as McCormack points out, this means that “the 
identity of this Logos is, in fact, already established prior to the eternal act of Self-
determination by means of which the Logos became the Logos incarnandus.
94
  And 
if all this were true, then the decision to assume flesh in time could result only in 
something being added to that already complete identity – an addition which has no 
effect upon what he is essentially.”
95
  McCormack’s point is that if God is indeed 
“being in becoming”, or “being in action”
96
, then the eternal Son, or Logos asarkos, 
cannot be posited as ontologically prior to his decision to be the Logos ensarkos.   
McCormack is arguing here along lines which would be recognisable to Frei, that 
there is no ‘essence’ or ‘real God’ behind God’s acts in revelation: God’s intentions 
are given in and with God’s actions, and these intended actions, as predicates, 
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constitute God’s identity as Subject.  He then extends this principle in a subsequent 
essay: 
 … the actualism which had always governed Barth’s talk of the divine act of relating to the 
 human had now been pressed back  into the very being of God. To put the matter as sharply 
 as possible: God is in himself, in eternity, the mode of his Self-revelation in time – God as 
 Jesus Christ in eternity and God as Jesus Christ in time – thus guaranteeing that the 
 immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity will be identical in content.
97
 
The argument of this side of the debate is so far entirely in line with Frei’s thesis, 
that ontology and epistemology cannot be separated in actuality, for all that in strict 
grammatical logic, the former must be posited first.   
 
However, the opposing argument objects that, even with Barth, this ‘actualistic’ 
identity of God’s being and God’s revelation can be pressed too far.  The point is 
summarised with admirable clarity by Edwin Van Driel: 
 … we have thus, on Barth’s side, as the starting point God’s Trinitarian nature, with the 
 Trinitarian processions being natural and necessary …; followed by the decree of election, 
 which is not part of God’s nature, but dependent on the divine will, and contingent, since 
 God could have been God without being the God of election.
98
 
On this side of the argument, the identification of God’s actions with God’s being is 
allowed to an extent.  For example, God is rightly termed ‘Creator’; Jesus is rightly 
termed ‘Son of God’.  What is not allowed is the identification of God’s decision-to-
act with God’s eternal being: God ‘existed’ in eternity before God created time, and 
the eternal Son ‘precedes’ the man Jesus.  The logical problem this raises is that with 
the decision to create and to elect, something was ‘added’ to God’s being.  However, 
the equal and opposite logical problem, which Hunsinger99 and van Driel point out, is 
that if the decision to elect is eternal, then our election (and creation) was necessary 
to God, rather than a freely-willed act of love.  And now the dialectical distinction 
between God and world becomes very shaky indeed.  Therefore, this side of the 
argument maintains that God cannot be eternally Creator, given that God was 
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“ontologically and logically”
100
 ‘existent’ before creation.  Likewise, the Son was 
“ontologically and logically” ‘existent’ before he willed to elect himself to be for us.   
 
In effect, what Hunsinger is pleading for is the retention of mystery when talking 
about the being of God: 
 The primordial form of God’s eternal self-relationship is necessarily inaccessible to us, even 
 though its content assumes a secondary form for our sakes.  Deus pro nobis would not be 
 God if he were not perfectly and primordially Deus extra nos.
101
  
Just as the nineteenth century theologians failed to ‘find’ Jesus by mining the gospels 
for his self-consciousness, so Hunsinger is contending that we will fail to find God 
by digging around in a doctrine of revelation.  For him, therefore, the eternal being of 
God is not locatable behind, but is in fact entirely independent of, our temporal 
perception of God’s revelation, including the incarnation.  That means that 
Hunsinger can “logically and ontologically” separate God’s essential being from his 
being-in-act: in Frei’s terms, God was an “Ascriptive Subject” before God ever 
intentionally acted.  However, in the postliberal anxiety to avoid subjectivism, this 
leads Hunsinger rather oddly to posit a “double structure” of objectivity in the Son, 
perhaps in a Chalcedonian sense.  Hence he can write that “The Son is always hidden 
from us in his first mode of being (asarkos), but manifest to us in his second mode of 
being (ensarkos).”
102
   
 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to do more than give this brief sketch of the 
positions involved, and certainly not its purpose to assess the validity of these two 
interpretations of Barth.  The purpose is rather to ask what Frei can contribute to the 
clarity of the debate.  Faced with these two opposing positions on the logical 
relations between God’s being and God’s actions, what would Frei’s position have 
been?  This assessment is complicated by the fact that, in his absence, Frei has been 
largely claimed by one side of the debate, and blamed by the other: Hunsinger was, 
of course, Frei’s student, while Bruce McCormack has shown a consistent hostility to 
Frei, attributing to him the continued ‘misreading’ of Barth in American postliberal 
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theology.
103
  Nevertheless, it may be that Frei is neither the friend, nor the enemy, 
which the respective proponents suppose.   
 
One suspects that Frei – a theologian looking always to avoid abstraction and to 
ground theology in the concrete content of God – would be dismayed by the 
increasing abtruseness of the debate.  While the proponents insist that, like Barth, 
they are determinedly anti-metaphysical, this debate is effectively speculation about 
the being of God.  In the light of Barth’s ‘actualism’, certainly there is an ontological 
realism underpinning this debate, grounded as it is, particularly by McCormack, in 
revelation.  But this does not remove all charges of abstraction, or even of 
metaphysics.  The ‘being-in-becoming’ model that Jüngel attributes to Barth 
basically asserts that God reveals Godself as a Trinitarian God who reveals 
trinitarianly.  This is content of a sort, but it reads more like grammar than ontology: 
once more, a kind of delimitation of the rules for talking about God, rather than a 
concrete content.  After all, when posited as a starting point for the logic of belief, in 
what sense is ‘Trinity’ less abstract than ‘God’ or ‘Christ’?  Indeed, Jüngel himself 
admits the problem, that when we endeavour to speak of the concreteness of God’s 
being, our thinking “must necessarily become more difficult and ‘abstract’”.
104
   
 
This on-going debate concerning the being and action of God in the incarnation is 
therefore a twenty-first century instantiation of the problem Frei spotted early with 
regards to Barth’s theology.  As we know, Frei was unhappy with Barth’s starting 
point in the being of God, or later, in the being of Christ.  In Frei’s time this had led 
to the abstractions of the existentialist concept of God; and here it has led to a new 
brand of speculation about the being of God, either divorced from (Hunsinger), or 
“pressed back” from (McCormack), God’s revelation in history.  
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In his doctoral study on the doctrine of revelation in Barth, Frei describes how, even 
if ‘the medium is not the thing’, nevertheless “the form is founded in the content”.
105 
 
One might paraphrase these two statements as follows: while the media which God 
has chosen for direct or indirect revelation (the human person Jesus Christ, scripture, 
proclamation) are not to be correlated directly with the being of God, yet the fact that 
God reveals in the form of the threefold Word actually provides us with knowledge 
of the being of God: 
 This Word in its distinction from the Father is nevertheless identically God with him.  In 
 God, therefore, the ontic and the epistemic analogies are one.
106
 
That Jesus is a person means that we can rightly think of God as a person; as 
scripture and proclamation are words, so it is appropriate for us to identify God with 
God’s Word of power.  Thus the form of revelation is based upon or determined by 
the content of what is revealed: the content of God as a ‘person’ grounds God’s 
analogous ‘choice’ of a human being as the form of revelation.  There is therefore a 
thoroughly suitable fit between the ‘medium’ and the ‘thing’, as between an original 
and an image.  For us, this means that if Jesus is available to us in narrative form, 
then we can legitimately posit that God is available to us in narrative form, even if, 
as Francesca Murphy points out, “God is not a story”.  At the same time, if Jesus is 
“elusive”, then we can legitimately read this as a revelation of the ontological and 
epistemological elusiveness of God.  This final point in itself might go some way to 
answering Hunsinger’s plea for the maintenance of mystery. 
 
However, when it comes to the relation between form and content, Hunsinger makes 
an interesting move.  Both sides of the argument define the ‘content’ of God as 
Trinitarian, accepting Jüngel’s attribution of non-metaphysical ‘concreteness’ to this 
content in revelation.  As expressed by Colin Gunton: 
 The order of being grounds the order of knowing, so that what God does in time is 
 shown to be a function of what he is in eternity.  The outcome is that historical revelation  and 
 eternal being correspond to one another.
107
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This statement in itself is not particularly controversial: it is a principle accepted by 
both sides of the debate.  However, what Hunsinger then does is separate out the 
‘form’ and the ‘content’ of God – or, if you will, the ontic and the epistemic, or the 
deus and the dixit.  Thus he posits a “primordial form” of God, which may or may 
not be Trinitarian an sich, despite God’s self-revelation as Trinitarian.  This is 
because, in revelation, it is the content of God which is revealed as Trinitarian, and 
not the form; and furthermore, this “secondary” Trinitarian content is not to be 
equated with an unknown and unknowable “primordial” form.  This is a curious 
return to the kind of dualism which Frei had all combated in his own time. 
 
This relates to Frei’s further point, that the intention must be seen as being given in 
and with the act, for especially in the case of God, intention cannot exist in 
abstraction.  This is very close to McCormack’s position, except that Frei also insists 
that we cannot “press back” from an act to an intention, eternal or otherwise.  This 
assertion is slightly counter-intuitive.  It must always seem like we are working 
‘backwards’ from the act to the intention, but we are in fact refusing to do this, 
because we are refusing all abstractions.  In actuality, we are working in a kind of 
simultaneity: the intention is given in and with the action.  And in terms of strict 
grammatical logic, we are in fact always working ‘forwards’, from the subject to the 
predicate, from the intention to the action.   
 
Thus initially, McCormack’s logic works well.  He begins with the concrete action of 
election, and Frei would approve of his refusal to separate this from the eternal 
intention of God.  Indeed, Frei would also approve of McCormack’s insistence that 
this intended action is actually constitutive of the person that is God.  I would 
suggest that for this reason, McCormack’s ontological logic is closer to Frei’s 
position than is Hunsinger’s.   
 
However, once again we must state, that ontological logic is not the same as 
grammatical logic.  For what McCormack does now, is try to reverse the 
grammatical logic by “pressing back” the predicate into the subject.  While in the 
logic of ontology and epistemology, God can be described as eternally electing, the 
logic of grammar insists that one cannot work backwards from predicate to subject, 
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for that would be to suggest that the predicate, “has elected”, would have been 
essential to God, even if God had never elected.  Once again, as with Barth’s deus 
dixit, McCormack never actually abstracts God’s essential intention to elect from 
God’s action of election.  Indeed, he predicates the former on the latter.  But this is 
precisely the problem with his “pressing back” formulation.  The grammar is the 
wrong way round; the predicate controls the subject, and so we have the logical 
conclusion of a free-floating, abstract, and essentially-electing God.  This 
‘essentialism’ is precisely what is so objectionable to the other side of the debate. 
 
This confusion of grammatical and ontological logic is perhaps even more prominent 
on the other side of the debate.  Indeed, van Dreil finds himself caught in these same 
vexing logical knots which Frei had so carefully unravelled.  Like McCormack, he 
too wrestles with the same notion of reading ‘forwards’ from being to act, or 
‘backwards’ from act to being, for which concepts van Driel uses the terms 
“downstream” and “upstream”.  However, the difference is that van Driel mistakes 
the vexed question of grammatical order to be even more profoundly ontological 
than does McCormack.  Van Driel proposes that a better interpretation of Barth 
would be to understand Jesus Christ not as “a subject, but [as] an act and 
determination of divine willing … as the being of Jesus Christ.”  In other words, 
when Barth writes, “Jesus Christ is … God in his movement towards man”
108
 van 
Driel suggests that “it is not the subject of the sentence with whom Barth identities 
Jesus Christ, but the verb, the action.”
109
  Thus, for his preferred “upstream” option, 
working from ‘act’ to ‘being’, van Driel formulates the question as follows: “if 
Christ himself is the electing God, what does this tell us about the divine being and 
identity?”
110
  However, where McCormack refused to separate subject and predicate, 
as Frei himself counselled, the intended effect of this move for van Driel is precisely 
to separate the predicate “Jesus Christ” from the subject “God”.  In this way, Jesus 
Christ (as the logos ensarkos) is not of the essence of the Godhead; and so the 
freedom of the pre-existent subject is affirmed. 
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It is not my purpose to quibble with this interpretation of Barth.  However, my 
suggestion as to what Frei might say to this debate, is that he would propose an 
untangling of this profound confusion of ontology and grammatical logic.  Once 
again, Frei insists that one cannot read an abstract subject ‘behind’ or “upstream” 
from the one presented to us in action.  Grammatically, then, the order must be 
“downstream”, for given that we cannot say everything at once, then the correct 
logical order is first the eternal being of God, and then God’s actions – first subject, 
then predicate.   
 
Given that we cannot speak about everything at once, we are grammatically obliged 
to separate God’s being and God’s acts in this way, and to speak about them in that 
order.  However, once again it is important to make the point, that logical is not the 
same as ontological.  A pleasing linguistic parallel is not an argument: logic and 
ontology travel along separate tracks, for all that these tracks might run side by side 
for a time.  Much of the current debate has become entangled in this very confusion 
which Frei was at such pains to avoid: van Driel, for example, throughout his paper, 
refers always to “logically and ontologically” to the point that one suspects the two 
have become indistinguishable for him.  McCormack is clearer on the point: 
 Jüngel certainly does grant a logical priority to Trinity over election – but only a logical 
 priority.  Talk of an ‘ontological priority’ of Trinity over election must inevitably result in an 
 abstract, wholly metaphysical conception of the triune being of God which stands behind the 
 event in which God chooses to be God ‘for us’ in Jesus Christ.
111
 
McCormack’s position does therefore appear to me to be more congenial to Frei than 
that of his opponents, although in Frei’s view, it still would err in the direction of 
abstraction from the story of Jesus Christ, not to mention the dubiousness of the 
“pressing back” schema.  If we accept van Driel’s suggestion, that Jesus is the 
predicative content of God (and there is some value to this formulation), then once 
again, it has to be with the stress that ontology and epistemology – the deus and the 
dixit – cannot be separated.  We cannot work ‘back’ from Jesus to God.  We cannot 
posit the subject God apart from the predicate Jesus.  And we cannot conceptualise 
the intention to send the Son apart from the action of sending of the Son.  In 
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ontological terms, as McCormack recognises, the ‘intending being’ and the ‘acting 
being’ are given as one.  Indeed, ontology and epistemology, ‘intending being’ and 
intended action, are so simultaneous, that van Driel’s consignment of God to subject 
and Jesus to predicate becomes redundant.  For if Jüngel is correct, that God is best 
understood as “being in becoming”, then outside of the category of strict 
grammatical logic, there is no “downstream” and “upstream”, no before or after, no 




In summary, then, Frei offers to this debate a concept of the vital ‘fit’ between 
grammatical ordering and ontological form and content, alongside an insistence on 
the vital distinction between the respective logics of grammar and ontology.  Indeed, 
given the tendency towards abstruse metaphysical speculation, which is inevitable 
whenever God’s being begins to be considered in abstraction from God’s acts, Frei’s 
advice on this matter might well have been to sidestep the always speculative 
category of ‘ontology’ altogether.  At the same time, it is also perhaps advisable to 
categorising revelation under ‘epistemology’, as if the knowledge of God given in 
the predicate can ever be separated from the being of God given in the subject.  In 
the event, Frei’s alternative category of ‘identity’ proved itself to be far more useful 
to him: more useful because it is more concrete, unifying personal being and 
intended actions – or referent and text – in one non-separable scheme.  Indeed, the 
category of ‘identity’ should perhaps be understood as encompassing both ontology 
and epistemology, so that grammatically it becomes harder to separate them, thus 
minimising the temptation also to conceptualise them as separate. 
 
Up to this point, then, we have been thinking in the categories of epistemology, 
ontology, and grammatical logic.  The proposal is now, in the light of the above, to 
adjust these categories, and replace both ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’ with 
‘identity’.  In the best tradition of Frei, and of Barth before him, this is an ad hoc 
decision, based on the suggestion that ‘identity’ might ultimately turn out to be a 
more useful category when thinking about the logic of belief and the content of God.  
Chapters 4 and 5 shall be the test of that proposal. 
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Chapter 4  The Logic of Belief and the Content of God: 




One aim of these last two chapters is at last to place Frei in direct dialogue with some 
of his most immediate theological opponents, that is, the Christian existentialist 
theologians belonging to the Neo-Orthodox movement.  Having clarified (a) Frei’s 
understanding of the unity of subject and predicate in revelation; (b) the basis in 
figuration of the identity of a person as well as the unity of the biblical text; and (c) 
the linear and cumulative logic of the realistic narrative hermeneutic it is now 
possible to proceed to Frei’s own anti-existentialist account of the concrete content 
of God which is the identity of Jesus Christ.  That this can be attempted is predicated 
on the following assumptions, already examined in this thesis but here restated for 
clarity’s sake. 
 
Firstly, there is the logical and grammatical point, that if Jesus Christ is the “concrete 
content”, or the inseparable predicate, of God, then knowledge of the concrete 
content of Jesus is at least indirectly equivalent to knowledge of the content of God.  
Once again, it is important not to place too much ontological weight upon a 
grammatical formulation.  However, if the grammatical formulation is appropriate to 
the ontological reality – if the form is indeed founded in the content – then the first 
part of Frei’s hypothesis, that “Christian faith involves a unique affirmation about 
Jesus Christ … that he is the presence of God”
1
 can at least be tested.  It is important 
to reemphasise that ‘identity’ is being employed here as a more useful, less loaded 
term than ‘ontology’.  As such, given that ‘identity’ as a category carries less weight 
than ‘ontology’, the grammatical formulation may well be able to support it. 
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Secondly, as a category, ‘identity’ sidesteps speculation and offers a much more 
concrete account of the content of Jesus Christ which encompasses both ontology 
and epistemology.  This is because the category is capable of uniting intention and 
action, and moreover, of uniting each separate intended action, as well as 
‘unintended’ passions, in one person.  The hermeneutic which deals most adequately 
with this interactive account of identity is the realistic narrative hermeneutic, which 
credits story with the ability to render, in a linear form appropriate to the 
chronological order of history, a person’s “cumulative” identity.  In this chapter, we 
will see how Frei applies this hermeneutic directly, through gospel exegesis, to the 
identity of Jesus Christ.  In the process, we will also see how he applies this 
hermeneutic indirectly to the identity, or concrete content, of God. 
 
Thirdly, this chapter will continue the emphasis on grammatical logic, examining 
Frei’s contention that the identity of Jesus Christ, as read according to a realistic 
narrative hermeneutic and as revealed most fully in the resurrection, is the only true 
starting point in the linear logic of belief.  We have already seen how alternative 
starting points, such as Schleiermacher’s “feeling of absolute dependence”, or 
Barth’s deus dixit, lead to a divine abstraction.  Now, however, some alternative 
hermeneutical accounts of the identity of Jesus Christ will be considered, with their 
exegesis of the resurrection examined as the ‘test’ of their adequacy.  In particular, 
the equal-but-opposite accounts of the existentialist-style theology of Paul Tillich, 
and the ‘historical’ theology of N. T. Wright, will be examined as examples of two 
approaches which take the identity of Jesus as serious and central, but which fail 
according to Frei’s criteria to ground the logic of belief. 
 
1.2. The Identity of Jesus Christ 
In his 1957 essay on “The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr”, Frei’s concern for a 
christology which has actual ‘content’ is contrasted to the existentialist approach of 
Bultmann in particular, in whose theology, Frei remarks critically, “the object is lost 
sight of”.
2
  Frei’s criticism of Bultmann and his fellow existentialists is a subtle one
3
: 
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that Jesus Christ has no real ‘existence’ outside of our subjective apprehension of 
him.  This means that “other than this ‘encounter’ we can assert nothing clearly about 
Jesus Christ”
4
 and have no means of attaining concrete knowledge of who he was 
and what he was like.  In effect, the existentialist theologians have taken to a kind of 
logical extreme the Barthian understanding of revelation as an ‘event’ with no 
continuity in history: Jesus of Nazareth in his own time was indeed the revelation of 
God, but that event has not ‘lingered’ in any way, for that would be to make 
revelation into a human possession.  In other words, beyond a “completely formal, 
positivistic claim that Jesus Christ did once exist in human particularity”
5
 – the 
necessary basis of our claim that this is indeed Jesus Christ whom we have met – our 
encounter with him in our existential moment bears no relation to who he was in the 
past, nor indeed to the narrative rendition of him in the gospel.  While the existential 
encounter with Jesus Christ in our historical present seems to solve the faith/history 
question, offering us an immediate knowledge of God which is not bound to explain 
how a two thousand year old event can impact upon us now, Frei concludes that this 
is a knowledge with “no noetic content”,
6
 scarcely to be called knowledge at all. 
 
As we have seen, from Frei’s perspective, the effect of this “eclipse of biblical 
narrative” is twofold: not only are believers left struggling to find in scripture any 
positive knowledge of God, but to compound matters, given that biblical criticism 
has dismissed most of the stories about him as myths, they are also frustrated in their 
search for any positive knowledge even of the historical Jesus.  Nevertheless, if Jesus 
of Nazareth could still be regarded as revelatory at least in his own time, then he 
might yet be able to furnish us with some kind of content to God.  However, if the 
historical Jesus is indeed revelatory of God, then revelation is therefore an ‘external’ 
act of God in history.  And given the existentialist split between the external 
“machine” and the inner “ghost”, it is thereby a virtual impossibility that the 
objective, historical Jesus should reveal anything of the Subject of that act.  At the 
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root of Bultmann’s account of revelation
7
, Frei detects a “sheer epistemological 
agnosticism with regard to Jesus of Nazareth.”
8
  Whatever Jesus was or is, he is not 
the self-revelation of God. 
 
So Frei then, in his attempt to provide an account of the concrete content of God, is 
contending with a two-sided hermeneutical problem.  As discussed in Chapter 3, on 
the one side there is the divorce between ‘outer’ text and ‘inner’ meaning;  while on 
the other side there is the existentialist divorce between the ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ 
person.  Take the two sides together, and the concept of objective revelation has been 
utterly destroyed.  Not only is scripture incapable of carrying the weight of the Word 
of God; and not only is Jesus Christ himself almost completely elusive; but any 
Word which God might have spoken, being now ‘external’ to God’s own being, can 
in effect reveal nothing about God anyway.  Therefore, even if we could discover the 
inner God-consciousness or personality of Jesus Christ, this would not give any 
content to our knowledge of God, because for the existentialist theologian, revelation 
by definition has no content.   
 
Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic, then, has set itself a formidable task.  As 
discussed previously, it is intended first of all to reunite text and meaning in the 
gospel narratives at the level of the story.  This may or may not result in the 
reclamation of scripture as the Word of God, but it certainly will allow the narrative 
of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus to be taken seriously as a direct conveyor 
of meaning: for if there is revelation there, then that revelation will be located first 
and foremost in the identity of Jesus Christ.  Secondly, the realistic narrative 
hermeneutic is intended to reunite a person’s ‘inner’ self with their outward 
manifestation, or their ‘intentions’ with their ‘actions’.  This is entirely applicable to 
every individual
9
, but in the case of Jesus Christ something is being said, particularly 
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in the light of his resurrection.  This will be examined shortly.  But if the realistic 
narrative hermeneutic can achieve all this, then we will have a concrete and objective 
portrayal of the identity of Jesus Christ, inner and outer, and possibly even divine 
and human, all unified in a single personal identity.  That was the thesis of Chapter 3.   
 
Following on from this, the task in this chapter is to consider how the realistic 
narrative hermeneutic creates the conditions for ‘reuniting’ God with God’s own 
revelation.  For God too can be considered as a ‘person’, given that God’s self-
revelation in chronological history has given us permission to render God’s identity 
in linear narrative form.  There is no suggestion that this will be a full or complete 
rendering – this is not possible even at the level of an average human life – but it will 
be an accurate and an adequate rendering.  If God is self-identical with God’s own 
revelation, and if through exegesis Jesus can be identified as God’s own revelation, 
then finally we will have the content of God.  This content is identical with the story 
of Jesus Christ: what Jesus did, God also did; what Jesus underwent God also 
underwent; and therefore, what can be predicated of Jesus’ identity can also be 
predicated of God.
10
  Frei cites with approval the maxim of the realistic novelist 
Henry James: “‘What is character but the determination of incident?  What is 
incident but the illustration of character?’”
11
  In other words, who God is in Christ 
determines what God does; what God does in Christ illustrates – and indeed, 
constitutes – who God is.  It is, as we have seen before, “a pattern of exchange”.
12
  
As a result, if it survives exegetical testing, Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic 
offers the real prospect of supplying the content of our knowledge of God. 
 
                                                 
10
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2. Continuity and Contingency: Frei and Schleiermacher on Identity 
2.1 Frei’s Gospel Exegesis 
In the previous chapter we discussed Frei’s two-fold account of identity: that of the 
intention-action scheme, and that of self-manifestation description.  Now it is time to 
follow Strauss’ axiom, that “the critical examination of the life of Jesus is the test of 
the dogma of the person of Christ”
13
, and apply these directly through exegesis to the 
identity of Jesus Christ. 
 
In “Theological Reflections”, Frei describes how there are several “stages” leading 
up to Jesus’ full identification.  The first stage concerns the stories from before his 
birth up until his baptism.  Here, “the person of Jesus is identified wholly in terms of 
the identity of a community”.  Far from being an individual, he is “Israel under the 
representative form of an infant king figure”.  Indeed, rather than having an identity 
of his own, at this stage the people of Israel “lend their identity to, they bestow it 
upon him”.
14
  At this ‘pre-active’ stage of his life, Jesus does not yet intentionally 
act, but simply bears the hopes and titles ascribed to him by others. 
 
This all changes when Jesus’ ministry begins.  Now he appears for the first time as 
an individual man.  As an active and historical agent, he performs numerous intended 
actions, all of which help us to describe what he was like: he was obedient to God, he 
loved the poor and the outcast, he despised hypocrisy, he was a powerful healer.  
“Nevertheless,” claims Frei, “he retains something of the symbolic or representative 
quality that he had in the first part of the accounts”
15
, particularly as a representative 
and inaugurator of the Kingdom of God.  This representative quality is particularly 
evident in the various titles applied to him and claimed by him: Son of Man, Son of 
God, Christ, etc, climaxing in Peter’s insight at the Transfiguration, that “You are the 
Messiah, the Son of the living God”.  However, Frei claims that these titles and 
ascriptions, while certainly ‘clues’ as to the identity of Jesus Christ, are not yet 
individuated.  This is because they pre-date the life of Jesus of Nazareth.  In a sense, 
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they are being tried on him for size; and when the passion sequence gets underway, it 
begins to look as if these titles do not fit him so well after all.  Indeed, as ‘The King 
of the Jews’ is nailed to the cross above the broken and humiliated man, Frei 
observes how “there is an increasing tendency to use the titles ... with an ironic and 
pathetic twist”.
16
   
 
The necessity of maintaining both accounts of identity simultaneously becomes stark 
in the exegesis of the third stage of Jesus’ identification: the arrest and crucifixion.  
In his active ministry up until his arrest, Jesus is what he does – a classic intention-
action scheme of identity.  Indeed, with the Gospel of John in particular, Jesus’ 
“abiding initiative” is extended into even his crucifixion and death, “to the point of 
the elimination of Jesus’ passive, helpless suffering”.
17
  There is no Gethsemane in 
John’s gospel.   
 
Nevertheless, a human body exists in a contingent world, and this means that it is 
subject to all sorts of outside forces.  Frei regards this “co-existence” of power and 
powerlessness as non-contradictory, admitting that there is an extent to which Jesus 
powerfully chose to be powerless.  But crucially – and what Schleiermacher 
absolutely could not allow – Frei’s concept of identity can also account for the 
transition between the former and the latter state of being:  
 The Gospel writers show us a picture of the actual transition from power to helplessness, a 
 transition held together through the experience of the one undergoing it.
18
 
Jesus not only ‘is what he does’, but also ‘is what he undergoes’, and in the realistic 
narrative hermeneutic, the two are held together without strain in the one storied 
person.  Thus Jesus’ “genuine”
19
 and not merely ‘willed’ helplessness upon the cross 
in no way compromises his identity as saviour, as it would in Schleiermacher’s 
scheme.  Gethsemane is therefore the transition point, where the narrative gives us 
“access to the storied Jesus’ intention at a crucial point”
20
; and the crucifixion 
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becomes the climax of this particular intention-action scheme, locating as it does “the 
identity of an individual at the point at which his inward life, coming to outward 
expression, is linked with or meshes into the train of public circumstances”.
21
  With 
the accounts of the crucifixion, therefore, we have all the information we need to 
describe what Jesus was like, and in particular to point to obedience as his most 
defining characteristic. 
 
However, in Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic, while the narrative of the 
crucifixion sequence reveals clearly what Jesus was like, it still leaves much 
ambiguity concerning who Jesus is.  Jesus may be ‘the crucified one’, but it is not 
clear that this is anything more than a tragedy, the cruel death of a good and godly 
man.  The evidence we noted earlier in the gospel of his claims to divinity is now 
thrown into utter confusion by the increasing powerlessness of Jesus in the events 
which culminate in his helpless and pathetic death.  As we shall see, this ambiguity 
as to Jesus’ identity is only resolved, in Frei’s scheme, in the resurrection.  
 
2.2 Schleiermacher’s Gospel Exegesis 
Where Frei’s understanding of the storied person could hold together with ease such 
seeming contradictions, the ‘disconnect’ between who Jesus is and what was done to 
him was deeply troubling to Schleiermacher.  On one level Schleiermacher was 
deeply committed to “the positivity of historical revelation”.
22
  This commitment 
meant that Jesus could not be abstracted to a consciousness apart from his physical 
presence.  However, the immediate effect of Schleiermacher’s locating of revelation 
in the inner, unbroken consciousness of Jesus is that the interaction of character and 
incident recedes in importance: what Jesus does, and what is done to him, is of little 
consequence.  In the hermeneutic of understanding, the locked eyes of the author and 
interpreter, of the Redeemer and the Christian, cannot ‘look around’ at external 
events, and so external events can have had no role in the shaping of the identity of 
Jesus Christ. 
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Schleiermacher himself put his own hermeneutic to the exegetical test in a series of 
lectures published as The Life of Jesus.  According to his principle of the unity of the 
authorial consciousness, Schleiermacher states in Lecture 62 that “we are concerned 
that the picture of Christ that we have formed should be continuous and remain the 
same to the last moment”.
23  
As Frei points out, if “the crucial continuity of the story 
... lies in the inner being of Jesus”
24
, then his death, if actual, would be a fatal 
interruption of that being, i.e., a fatal breaking of Jesus’ self-consciousness which 
could not then recover even in a ‘spiritual’ resurrection. The effect of this would be 
to render the task of understanding entirely futile.  It is therefore vital to 
Schleiermacher’s scheme that the ‘resurrected’ Jesus maintains the same unbroken 
consciousness: that he is “the same as he had been before”.
25   
 
As Frei reads Schleiermacher, the logical consequence of this hermeneutical stance is 
that Jesus’ death could not have been a real death: it can only have been a Scheintod, 
a ‘seeming-death’, for “no genuine death had taken place”.
26
  Nevertheless, this 
assumption, in which Frei is not alone, is to do Schleiermacher an injustice.  First of 
all, he contends that the physical reality of Jesus’ death is impossible to prove one 
way or the other by reference to the gospel texts.  Schleiermacher equates physical 
death with the decay of the body, one succeeding the other immediately.  However, 
there is little evidence that such decay did take place in Jesus’ body – he cites Peter’s 
speech in Acts where Peter references Psalm 16 –  “Thou wilt not ... let thy Holy One 
see corruption”
27
 – as proof that Jesus’ body did not decompose.  Therefore, if his 
body did not decompose, then he did not actually die.  However, even-handedly, 
Schleiermacher also points to the separation of the blood and water coming out of 
Jesus’ side as an indication that decomposition had indeed begun.  The point cannot 
be resolved. 
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Fortunately for Schleiermacher, the point does not have to be resolved.  The subtlety 
of his christological position is that is does not rely on the real or otherwise death of 
Jesus.  The point is that Jesus’ role as Redeemer can in no way be dependent on any 
contingent event.  To take this even further, given that Jesus, as human, must have 
been limited by language and historical accident, then there is no reason at all for 
considering him to be unique – that is, unless his “absolute ideality” resided, not in 
what was externally expressed, but in his inner being: 
 ... in the sense that that inner being may always transcend its manifestation, and what is 
 manifested be only an ever more perfect presentation of it.
28 
The crucifixion, then, as an accident of history, truly does not matter to 
Schleiermacher.  It has no bearing on the inner being of Jesus, and is neither a nor 
the saving event.  That is not to say that the crucifixion did not happen, and nor is it 
to assert that Christ did not really die.  These are simply inconsequential historical 
details.  As the editor glosses it neatly in his notes to The Life of Jesus, “What is 




Similarly, for Schleiermacher, the post-resurrection Jesus must be the same in body 
and in spirit as he had been pre-crucifixion.  There can be no positing of a ‘spiritual 
body’, or a body which has been ‘transformed’ in any way: it must be a human body, 
a fully human body, which ate and drank and visibly bore its wounds.  
Schleiermacher finds much support for this position in the gospel
30
, although he has 
more trouble dealing with a Jesus who can pass through walls and appear and vanish 
suddenly.  However, these latter events, he concludes, can be interpreted perfectly 
naturally.  The important point is that Jesus “does not want anyone to think of his 
resurrection state as differing from his state he was before.
31
   
 
Schleiermacher, then, is insistent on the “wholly natural corporeity of his 
[resurrected] state”.
32
  Once again, this is not to be thought of as a denial of his actual 
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death.  Indeed, as Schleiermacher himself points out, if Jesus had merely suffered 
terrible tortures and a near-death experience before being revived, we could hardly 
account for his apparent health and vigour only a few days later.  So on balance, 
although he refuses to commit himself too definitely, it seems that Schleiermacher 
ultimately comes down on the side of an actual death at the crucifixion, and a ‘real’ 
(i.e., historically factual
33
) resurrection.  Thus far he holds an orthodox position.  
However, given that the God-consciousness of Jesus must be unbroken, it might be a 
reasonable statement of his position to say that it was only Jesus’ body which died: 
his ‘consciousness’ did not die, although it did “reach zero”
34
 – although whether this 
can be fully conceptualised is questionable.   
 
For Schleiermacher, then, the very foundation and principle of Jesus’ unity with God 
is entirely dependent on his God-consciousness being unbroken.  For this reason, he 
rejects the cry of desolation as indicating some kind of separation between Jesus’ 
self-consciousness and his consciousness of God: 
 I can think of no moment when the relationship between God and Christ could have changed.  
 It must always have been the same.
35 
Furthermore, it is not only Jesus’ identity which is compromised by the disruption of 
his death and resurrection, but God’s identity is compromised too.  To imagine the 
abandonment of Jesus by God is to deny that God is powerful and loving, and to 
deny also that Jesus is the Redeemer, for his very redeeming efficacy is by virtue of 
“the constant potency of His God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of 
God in Him”.
36
  Thus the idea of abandonment is both a logical nonsense and an utter 
offence to Schleiermacher, given that the understanding of Jesus’ unbroken God-
consciousness is for us the whole of redemption.   
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In Frei’s view, the exegetical test confirms that Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic of 
understanding simply is not adequate to the task of reading the realistic narratives of 
the gospel.  Just as the art of understanding is context-free, applicable to all texts in 
all situations, so has the consciousness of Jesus been divorced from all context, with 
the result that that the events of his life do not in any respect constitute who he is.  
This means that his role as Redeemer is in no way related to his death, Scheintod or 
otherwise – and this despite every insistence of the gospel to the contrary.  It took 
Strauss to perceive that at the heart of Schleiermacher’s reading of the gospel lies a 
theological and methodological dilemma: “Schleiermacher,” he writes, “is a 
supernatualist in Christology but in criticism and exegesis a rationalist.”
37
   The 
painful hermeneutical contortions outlined above are the result.  However, Frei’s 
insight was that, when the hermeneutic of understanding is applied to realistic 
narratives, “fearful and wonderful things begin to happen to those texts”
38
, and the 
shape of the narrative is entirely distorted: 
 It never occurred to him that there is something unfitting, indeed ludicrous, about rendering 
 the story of Jesus in a way that makes such a thundering anticlimax possible.
39 
In its inability to reconcile its universal methodological principle with the demands 
of the particular narrative, it is Frei’s judgement Schleiermacher’s hermeneutic of 
understanding has failed the ad hoc exegetical test. 
 
2.3 Comparison 
Nevertheless, Schleiermacher’s account was not without its uses for Frei.  Like 
Schleiermacher, Frei also insists on a vital continuity between the earthly Jesus of 
Nazareth and the resurrected Jesus.  However, in his case this becomes a continuity 
of identity rather than of consciousness.  For Frei, Jesus’ inner God-consciousness 
simply is not accessible through a reading of the gospels: 
The task of writing a life of Jesus, especially one including as its pivotal point his ‘inner’ life, 
is difficult if not impossible – whether it is undertaken as a reconstruction from recorded data 
or by entering by imaginative reiteration into his self-understanding, or both.
40 
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But although Jesus’ inner consciousness is not accessible, his narrative identity is 
accessible to us.  Furthermore, Frei is in full agreement with Schleiermacher on at 
least one other core principle: that Jesus Christ is unique.  Precisely on this basis, 
Frei refutes any suggestion that the gospel accounts should be read as myth: for 
myths, Frei writes, “are stories in which character and action are not irreducibly 
themselves”: 
The point is to be made, then, that if one identifies the savior figure with a fully human 
being, the story cannot be retold by substituting somebody else as its hero who is then made 
to be fully identical with that original person.  No matter who the savior may be, if he is a 
person, once the identification is made he is that person and no one else.
 41
 
Equally, for Schleiermacher, Jesus is clearly irreducible to any other figure in history 
or fiction.  In addition, and for all Strauss’ sarcasm, Schleiermacher is insistent that 
the ‘Jesus of History’ and ‘the Christ of Faith’ (Strauss’ terms, not Schleiermacher’s) 
are not separable, but are continuous, so that the impression Jesus makes on believers 
in the present is much the same as the impression he made on his disciples in the 
past.  It could be Schleiermacher himself and not Frei who wrote: 
 The identity of the crucified Jesus and that of the risen Lord are one and the same in the 
 accounts.
42 
While Frei interprets the idea of continuity rather differently, he is nevertheless side 
by side with Schleiermacher in asserting that “to think of him dead is the equivalent 
of not thinking of him at all”.
43
   
 
The main difference between the two accounts of the crucifixion and resurrection, is 
that where Schleiermacher sees the ‘continuity’ of identity in ‘organic’ terms, i.e., 
the body of Jesus was the same natural body post-resurrection as it was in pre-
crucifixion, Frei sees “the story of the connection between his death and 
resurrection” as “not an organic but a dramatic transition”.
44
  To an extent then, and 
for all his realism, Frei too avoids the question of the corporeality or otherwise of the 
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risen Jesus.  The narratives say that this was a bodily resurrection, and are adamant 
that this body, although transformed, is continuous with his pre-resurrection body, 
right down to the wounds in his hands and feet.  And that is as far as Frei takes the 
matter.  This is precisely the kind of avoidance of the ‘real’ historical referent which 
so irritates such otherwise different theologians as Francesca Murphy and N. T. 
Wright.  However, Frei’s refusal to discuss the nature of the resurrection in any kind 
of scientific or historical terms should not be interpreted as a denial of its actuality.  
It is simply an admission, that beyond the narrative lies only speculation.  Once 
again, to ask the historical question, ‘Did this really happen?’, or the scientific 
question, ‘How is this to be explained?’, is to make a category error.  In the context 
of the gospel narratives, the resurrection makes sense as a dramatic climax to the 
story of Jesus, eliciting first a start of shock, and then a recognition of its utter 
aptness.  Beyond this narrative fitness Frei saw no need to go.   
 
3. The Historical Jesus and the Existentialist Christ 
3.1 Introduction 
Who Jesus is: “It is this ambiguity,” Frei writes, “that is resolved in the resurrection 
account”.
45
  Exactly at the moment when Jesus is dead, in that moment of complete 
powerlessness when he has in effect no more ability to intend or act – that is the 
climactic event of the narrative, and therefore the moment when his fullest identity is 
revealed.  The question then becomes how to read this revelatory event, so that what 
we have finally is a positive account of the concrete content of God? 
 
In the mid 20
th
 century, there were two principle theological options for the treatment 
of the resurrection which Frei was obliged to answer, both of which survive in 
slightly altered forms into the 21
st
 century theological scene. The most prominent 
when Frei was writing was of course the Neo-Orthodox existentialist-style 
interpretation.  This was the position already examined at length in discussion of H. 
Richard Niebuhr, but which by the time of Frei’s mature theological writing was 
typified by Paul Tillich – the very same who had first recognised what Niebuhr 
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himself was doing.  However, before proceeding to Tillich, the intention is first of all 
to examine the other main theological option, that of historical biblical theology.  By 
this means, consideration will be given to the main criticisms which have been 
directed at Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic.  In addition, this treatment should 
also demonstrate something of the tightrope which Frei was walking between 
objective historical realism and subjective historical experience.  In the course of this 
treatment, the reasons for his own choices should become clearer, as will the issue of 
the continuing influence of Frei’s voice in current theological debate. 
 
3.2 The Historical Jesus: N.T. Wright and the Historicity of the Resurrection 
Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic is particularly vulnerable to criticism from New 
Testament scholars and historians.  With his claim for the gospel being “history-
like”, and his insistence on an objective realism based on the concrete narrative of 
Jesus, Frei’s main target was Christian existentialism.  However, in the process, he 
also raised questions of history which many think he never adequately answered.  
The example mentioned above, of his avoidance of the historicity or otherwise of the 
bodily resurrection, is one such criticism.  Meanwhile, Frei’s refusal of the question 
of ‘fact’, coupled with his concept of the unity of the biblical narratives, and his 
insistence on reading the disparate, even fragmented gospel narratives as one 
“cumulative” story, differentiate his concerns sharply from those of biblical scholars 
and from more historically-minded theologians.  Not only does he avoid answering 
directly the question of historical fact, but he is often interpreted and appropriated – 
or misinterpreted and misappropriated – as arguing for a purely literary approach to 
the gospel.  This is the assumption of Francesca Murphy, for example.  Historically-
inclined theologians are less than impressed.  Here, for example, is Francis Watson 
in critical mode: 
Hans Frei seems to me to stray too close to this position in his emphasis on “the story as 
story” and on “the storied Jesus,” about whose being prior to his literary embodiment we are 
not to inquire (Frei, Identity of Jesus Christ, pp.102, 115).  Frei tends to assimilate the Gospel 
to the genre of the modern realistic novel, which is “the special vehicle for setting forth 
unsubstitutable identity in the interplay of character and action” (p.82).  It does not occur to 
Frei that a range of relations to the real can coexist within a single narrative (also in a 
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realistic novel) and that judgements about these relations may be integral to the act of 
reading.
46 
This criticism, however, is not entirely fair.  The point as to the ‘realistic novel’ 
genre has already been addressed in Chapter 3: as pointed out there, Frei is not so 
simplistic as to apply a modern genre to an early text, but is rather rooting the entire 
western tradition of realistic narrative in the model of the Bible.   
 
What is more, Frei freely admits that when it comes to the passion-crucifixion 
sequence in particular, the question as to historical fact must be asked: 
 This one thing historians and novelists have in common: they deal with specific actions and 
 specific human identities.  If a novel-like account is about a person who is assumed to have 
 lived, the question of factuality is virtually bound to arise.
47
 
Indeed, the more “unsubstitutable” Jesus’ identity becomes throughout his ministry, 
the more specific and “history-like” are the events related: compare the historical 
detail of the week of his arrest, to the vague context of the Sermon on the Mount, for 
example.  Further, Frei admits that to believe in the bodily resurrection is to take an 
‘historical risk’: should proof ever emerge that Jesus’ bones are still in a grave, then 
his faith would cease.
48
  Therefore, as Mike Higton concludes, “right at the heart of 
[Frei’s] theology (and Jesus’ resurrection is at that heart), there is a serious 
correlation between the description of Jesus in the gospel and general theories of 
historicity and factuality – not a wholesale appropriation of those theories but a 




Frei therefore does not so much ignore the question of history as keep it firmly in its 
place.  “I am well aware of ...,” he writes: 
... but not terribly distressed by, the fact that my refusal to speak speculatively or 
evidentially about the resurrection of Christ, while nevertheless affirming it as an 
indispensable Christian claim, may involve me in some difficult logical tangles.  Even so, I 
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believe this is a better way than the contrary path (taken, for example, by Wolfhart 
Pannenberg) and a religiously significant way at that.
50 
By his own admission, then, Frei sidesteps the question of history, and never 
attempts a systematic exploration of it.  Nevertheless, this is not a lacuna in his 
thought, but a carefully worked-out decision simply not to go there.  This is not only 
because he judges the scientific historical question to be a “category error”
51
 when it 
comes to the realistic narratives of the gospels, but also because it separates Jesus’ 
identity into two components: the Jesus of history is distinguished at source from the 
Christ of faith, so that it is then a huge theological struggle to reunite them.  Hence 
Frei’s preferred literary approach shelves these questions, and necessarily so.  They 
may be important to other theological considerations, but they are of no importance 
at all to the identity of Jesus Christ beyond a logically basic affirmation that he 
existed.  To become tied up in historical questions of factuality is simply to divert 
attention away from the only source of knowledge which is available to us: either 
Jesus’ identity is constituted by what he did and what was done to him as narrated in 
the gospel, or he has no identity for us at all. 
 
To an extent, the work of historians, and even of biblical critics, need not trouble us 
here.  Their interest is almost purely in historical investigation of the Bible as source-
text, and therefore they are working with a very different set of categories.  Critical 
historical study, as Barth pointed out, is necessary to ground and limit theology, but 
it is not concerned in itself with making theological statements.  Of much greater 
interest here are those theologians (as opposed to ‘pure’ historians) who contend that 
historical study does not merely provide theology with its necessary negative 
condition – the empty tomb as a negative condition for claims to the bodily 
resurrection, for example – but who insist that a theology of the resurrection can and 
should be based positively on critical historical study.  In Frei’s time perhaps the  
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main proponent was Wolfhart Pannenberg.
52
  Now in the 21
st
 century, this is a 
position much associated with the theologian N.T. Wright. 
 
N.T. Wright at first glance appears to represent the opposite end of the spectrum to 
the existentialist approach.  However, Wright is no ‘mere’ historian: he is very clear 
in his opposition to the “quest of the historical Jesus” as it has been carried out 
according to a hermeneutic of “post-Enlightenment scepticism”.
53
  In particular, 
Wright has set himself to combating the most recent manifestation of the “quest” in 
the historically rational approach of the Jesus Seminar.
54
  Working very much from 
an apologetic ‘faith perspective’ (for all his claims to historical neutrality), and with 
a tendency to take the biblical narratives at face value as historical sources, Wright 
insists on the actuality-in-history of the events of the resurrection, and hence on their 
(at least theoretical) demonstrability. 
 
Very close to the beginning of The Resurrection of the Son of God, Wright sets out 
his project, which is to reclaim the historical study of Jesus from “the Procrustean 
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bed of a reductionist worldview”.
55
  In so doing, his intention is to redeem history as 
a theological discipline. Shortly afterwards, he outlines his parallel project: to 
redeem also theology as an historical discipline.  At this point he discusses Frei at 
some length, setting out his main objections to Frei’s ‘theological’ approach to 
history.  Where “reductionist” historians insist that historical study of the 
resurrection couldn’t be done, Wright claims that Frei’s theological approach says 
that it shouldn’t be done.
56
  His comment below is highly insightful: 
If I have understood Frei, he was arguing that we should not try to investigate the 
resurrection historically because the resurrection is itself the ground of a Christian 
epistemology.  Everything that Christians know, they know because of the resurrection and 
for no other reason.  There can therefore be no starting-point, no neutral ground on which one 
might stand, from which one might observe the resurrection itself.  Even to try to find one 
constitutes a kind of epistemological blasphemy.  You must not try to shoot arrows at this 
target, because the only appropriate place from which to shoot at anything is where the target 
itself is standing.
57 
Thus far Wright has read Frei absolutely correctly: the citation above chimes exactly 
with Frei’s reading of Auerbach and the “tyrannical” text of the Bible.  Furthermore, 
as we shall see by the end of this chapter, Frei does indeed consider the resurrection 
to be the starting point in the logic of belief for all talk about and knowledge of God.  
However, Wright refuses to concede to Frei that the question, What happened at the 
resurrection?, is either unanswerable or “a kind of epistemological blasphemy”, 
adding that “we cannot decide … in advance”
58
 whether the resurrection does indeed 
constitute the starting point for our knowledge of God.  To an extent, Frei would 
agree: the question as to the revelatory quality of the resurrection cannot be decided 
in advance.  But where Wright insists that it cannot be decided in advance of 
historical investigation, Frei contends that it cannot be decided in advance of a 
realistic narrative exegesis of the gospel texts.  In other words, where Frei freely 
admits that he is testing a “basic conviction” which has been derived from the texts 
via the community, Wright is less than willing to concede this.  Instead, he holds out 
for the ‘neutrality’ of the historical investigative process which, using a range of 
biblical and non-biblical sources, can speculate as to the likelihood of the 
resurrection as the “‘best explanation’ for the historical data”.
59
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We have already considered Frei’s critique of such supposedly ‘neutral’ standpoints.  
However, Wright’s critique of Frei in turn merits some attention.  His main point of 
contention is that Frei, in purportedly rejecting historical investigation, has outlawed 
the apologetic function of theology to such an extent, that there is now no shared 
language between faith and the ‘rational’ world outside.  This makes it absolutely 
impossible to demonstrate any historically-factual basis to Christianity: 
Frei’s proposal, in the last analysis, is always in danger of describing a closed 
epistemological circle, a fideism from within which everything can be seen clearly but which 
remains necessarily opaque to those outside.  Even if it is true that a fully Christian 
epistemology would want to begin all its knowing with Jesus, confessed as the crucified and 
risen Messiah, that does not mean that there is no access to Jesus and his death and 
resurrection in the public world.  If Frei were right, how could we know that the resurrection 
was the only valid epistemological starting-point?  If the answer is, because only that will 
work, how do we respond to those who say that other starting-points work just as well?
60
   
To isolate two points here: in the first case, as pointed out in Chapter 2, Frei is very 
clear in his opposition to the hermeneutical circle, and so opposes the ‘faith 
hermeneutic’ as a starting point for theology.  By contrast, and far from being a 
“closed epistemological circle”, Frei insists that the narrative identity of Jesus Christ 
as the crucified and risen saviour is entirely accessible to believers and non-believers 
alike.  In addition, there is something profoundly ‘concrete’ about his understanding 
of the biblical texts, which alone provide us with an objective access to Jesus’ 
identity, and hence to the content of God.  Thus Frei has made it quite clear that there 
is indeed access to Jesus in the public world, and this, moreover, by a means which is 
far more accessible to the non-believer than either historical research or someone 
else’s existential encounter.  Once again, Frei insists that faith is no precondition to a 
right understanding of the texts, nor even to knowledge of the content of God – 
though how that text-based knowledge then becomes a living faith is something on 
which Frei refuses to speculate.  But then, Wright has the same problem of 
explaining how historical knowledge might make the transition to a faith 
commitment. 
 
Secondly, Frei “knows” that the resurrection is “the only valid epistemological 
starting-point” precisely because “only that will work” when tested by an ad hoc 
exegesis.  In other words, Frei has read the narratives, and arrived at the conclusion 
that that is precisely what the narratives are saying.  In turn, that conclusion can only 
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be tested by reading the gospel narratives.  If the hermeneutic is “closed” anywhere, 
then it is closed here.  However, this is not the enclosure of a hermeneutical circle, 
for the conclusion that the resurrection is “the only valid epistemological starting 
point” becomes a new hypothesis to be tested with each subsequent linear reading.  
Rather, the “closed” nature of the realistic narrative hermeneutic is in fact the fixed 
text of the gospel and their fixed narrative form, for Jesus has no other narrative than 
this.  There is therefore no need to respond to those who claim that their starting 
points work “just as well”, for any alternative starting point is clearly derived from 
somewhere other than the biblical narrative, and they are therefore working on an 
entirely different logic of belief.  They are free to do so, and their logic of belief 
might take them some interesting places, but the fact remains that they are starting 
from something other than the Christian story.  It follows then, as Frei demonstrated 
in Eclipse, that if they extend this logic of belief to the knowledge of the content of 
God, then the God they will derive will be abstract and content-less.  This is 
inevitable precisely because they will have divorced God from God’s revelation in 
Jesus Christ, whose concrete identity is known to us through scripture alone.   
 
Once again, by refusing to speak either speculatively or evidentially – in effect, by 
“laughing”
61
 at the historical question – Frei has shown that he much prefers his own 
“logical tangles” to the logical bind of the historical approach.  Indeed, when Wright 
describes his own hermeneutical method, he reveals himself as curiously 19
th
 century 
in his approach, insisting on the neutrality of the historical method despite his own 
obvious faith-hermeneutic, while at the same time working as hard as did 
Schleiermacher to protect Jesus from the method’s reductive tendencies.  At the same 
time, his apologetic appeal to a generalised rationality of human experience is 
combined with a 20
th
 century existentialist-style stress on the absence of God.  
Witness, for example, his description of St Paul’s thought processes: 
Ed Sanders, in his well-known reading of Paul, argues that Paul did not start off with a 
problem and then discover that Jesus was the solution; he discovered Jesus, found him to be 
God’s solution, and then figured out that there must have been some kind of problem.  This 
can be shown to be, not exactly mistaken, but misleading. There was an earlier stage 
involved as well: Paul’s thought moved from his Jewish perception of ‘the plight’ to the 
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solution offered in Christ and thence to a fresh analysis of the problem.  The ‘problem’ he 
eventually described was a rethought version of the ‘problem’ he had before he began.
62 
In other words, where Barth and Frei contend that there is no knowledge even of our 
lack of God outside of God’s revelation, the realist historian Wright is adopting 
assumptions and a method absolutely typical of Christian existentialism.  As we shall 
see, particularly in the discussion in Chapter 5 on the theology of Bultmann, the 
transcendent ‘absence’ of God, and our awareness of that absence, is central to 
existentialist theology.  Sure enough, the human “plight” for Wright is our awareness 
of the absence of God, to which Jesus appears only as a secondary “solution”. 
Thus Wright’s historical approach is predicated on a number of existentialist 
assumptions, including the “plight” of the human being, an absolute dialectic, and a 
hermeneutical circle.  Even more pertinently, he assumes along with both liberal and 
existential theology, that historical human experience has to be the starting point in 
the logic of belief, to which God then appears further down the line as revelation and 
answer.  It may well be that Frei’s preferred ‘literary’ approach to revelation has its 
weaknesses.  However, these pitfalls of the historical approach to theology bear out 
the wisdom of his dogged avoidance of the historical question. 
 
3.3 The Existentialist Christ: Paul Tillich on the Resurrection 
For all the almost accidental overlap, N.T. Wright’s historical approach is designed 
to occupy the opposite end of the spectrum to the existentialist reading of the 
resurrection.  One gets the impression that the criticisms of biblical historians were 
never much more than a nuisance to Frei; however, as one of the foremost 
proponents of Christian existentialism, Paul Tillich represents Frei’s serious 
theological ‘opposition’.  Indeed, Frei spends some time in The Identity of Jesus 
Christ explaining and countering the “strangely moving interpretation”
63
 of Jesus as 
the symbol of our alienation from our true selves.  Frei’s contention throughout is 
that the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of a theological starting point will become evident 
in exegesis, most specifically of the crucifixion/resurrection sequence.  As such 
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Tillich’s account of the resurrection in his Systematic Theology
64
 makes for an 
instructive contrast.   
 
Firstly, therefore, we must establish Tillich’s own starting point in the logic of belief.  
As a Christian existentialist, he is by definition a dialectic theologian, and therefore, 
at least to some extent, a disciple of Barth.  However, Tillich’s existentialist 
understanding of the dialectic took him in a direction which illustrates neatly Frei’s 
unease with the ‘faith hermeneutic’ as propounded by Barth.  Once again, Frei 
thoroughly approved of the ad hoc nature of Barth’s theological method, with its key 
exegetical emphasis.  However, he was deeply worried by the door which Barth had 
opened to the kind of theological existentialism which was espoused by Tillich.   
 
In addition to his dialectical prolegomena, Tillich had a particular view of the task of 
theology.  His project in his Systematic Theology is to define all doctrine according 
to the “ultimate concern” of theology, which he understands as “the abstract 
translation of the great commandment” to love God and neighbour.  He then defines 
further the content of this “ultimate concern”: 
The question now arises: What is the content of our ultimate concern? ... the answer, 
obviously cannot be a special object, not even God, for the first criterion of theology must 
remain formal and general. ... Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or 
non-being.  Only those statements are theological which deal with their object in so far as it 
can become a matter of being or non-being for us.  This is the second formal criterion of 
theology.
65 
Tillich’s system begins, then, with our “ultimate concern”, so that it is the human 
situation which creates the theological imperative.  He then proceeds from that 
starting point to extract the “content” of our ultimate concern.  Given his starting 
point, his logic of belief dictates that such content cannot lie outside us, but equally, 
given the absolute dialectic, neither can God be found inside us, in our 
consciousness.  Therefore our ultimate concern “cannot be … God”, but must in fact 
be ourselves: whatever it is that “determines our being or non-being”.  That means 
that, right from the start of Tillich’s system, there is no way of arriving at any content 
to the concept of God.  Not even Jesus can provide this: as Frei explains, the 
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existentialist understanding of the redemptive work of Jesus is not so much that he is 
the incarnate God, but rather that he is “our embodiment or representative”.
66
  The 
only content we can know is ourselves: and this is something Tillich not only admits, 
but actually upholds as the principle task of theology. 
 
In contrast to N.T. Wright, Tillich cannot be labelled a liberal theologian along the 
lines of the 19
th
 century Schleiermacherians.  Tillich and Frei are entirely in 
agreement as to the redundancy of earnest attempts to construct ‘Lives of Jesus’ from 
biblical and historical evidence, Tillich observing that the historical Jesus “not only 
did not appear but receded farther and farther with every new step”.
67
  Moreover, 
Tillich’s diagnosis of the problem, as a confusion between the “factual side of 
events” and “the receiving side”
68
, is a long way from the ‘eclipse’ of the narrative 
that Frei perceives.  As Tillich explains in a long paragraph, the gospel miracles 
should be read as attempts to express the significance of the man Jesus of Nazareth in 
symbolic, mythical terms: 
We have distinguished between historical, legendary, and mythical elements in the biblical 
records.  For the purpose of showing the universality of Jesus as the Christ within his 
individuality, this distinction provides three ways of looking at the biblical materials. The 
first is that of historical reports which were chosen according to their value in answering the 
questions of human existence generally and of the early congregations especially.  This 
produces what has been called the “anecdotal” character of the Gospel stories.  The second 
way emphasises the universal quality of particular stories through a more or less legendary 
form.  The third way expresses the universal meaning of the whole event of Jesus of 
Nazareth in symbols and myths.  The three ways often overlap, but the third way is decisive 
for christological thought ... In order to describe the universal significance of Jesus as the 
Christ on the basis of the biblical literature, one must hold to the symbols and use the 
historical and legendary stories only in a corroborative sense.
69 
Tillich’s “ultimate concern”, we remind ourselves, is the “abstract translation” of the 
Great Commandment, in order to extract what it has to say to us about our Being.  In 
that light, the resurrection itself becomes symbolic of our “ultimate concern”.  
Tillich’s exegetical project is therefore to decode this symbol by extracting the true 
meaning behind the representative form: and in doing so, he discovers that the ‘true 
meaning’ of the resurrection is “the conquest of existence”.
70
  Quite avowedly, and 
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for all his self-differentiation from liberal theology, Tillich is still working within a 
liberal hermeneutic of searching for the meaning ‘behind’ the story.  For Tillich as 
for Schleiermacher, the Bible stands ever in need of “translation”: what it cannot do 
is simply mean what it says. 
 
So how does Tillich interpret the resurrection?  In dialectical fashion, he ties it to the 
event of the cross, and like Frei, conceives of the two as absolutely 
“interdependent”
71
: if the cross symbolises “the subjection to existence”, then the 
resurrection symbolises “the conquest of existence”.
72
   The cross is “part of a myth”, 
but should also be understood as “a symbol based on a fact”, for Tillich also 
acknowledges it as an actual historical event.  While Frei does not refer directly to 
Tillich, the following description of the existentialist position is entirely applicable to 
him: 
 His [Jesus’] death is unique precisely and paradoxically because he, unlike others, 
 surrendered all claims to uniqueness by his act of dying, and so became one with all of us ... 
 Jesus ... is truly “the man for others,” the one to whom all things happen and who takes all 
 upon himself in such a way that he becomes the true pattern for all humanity...
73 
For Tillich, then, the crucifixion of Jesus is therefore yet another tragedy “in the long 
history of the tragedy of man”.
74
  However, with a forward reference to the victory of 
the resurrection, it is also “the Cross of the one who has conquered the death of 
existential estrangement”.
75
   Therefore it is more than just a tragic event, although it 
is also a tragic event.  The hint of a figurative reading here is indicative of the 
richness of Tillich’s symbolic hermeneutic: given that, for the existentialist 
theologian, revelation occurs in history, history is no mere brute fact, but is pregnant 
with meaning.    
 
In his exegesis, Tillich notes the parallelism by which the “objective” Cross is raised 
to “universal symbolic significance”
76
, while simultaneously, the “universal 




 Tillich, Systematic Theology II, 176. 
73
 Frei, Identity, 89–90. 
74
 Ibid. 177. 
75
 Ibid. 176. 
76
 Ibid. 177. 
   180 
symbolic significance” of the resurrection is reported in determinedly objective terms 
– “Touch my hands and my feet”.  However, he extrapolates from this 
interdependence that, just as Jesus himself was both an historical person and the one 
in whom “the typical human situation finds its most concentrated symbolical 
expression”
77
, so too must the cross and the resurrection “be both reality and 
symbol”.  Thus Tillich regards both the cross and the resurrection as real historical 
events: “In both cases,” he writes, “something happened within existence,”
78
 for if 
the resurrection is not in some way an actual historical event, then that is the 
equivalent of nothing happening at all.  Tillich does admit that whatever happened in 
the crucifixion and the resurrection, the two events were not of the same order: one is 
clearly an historical event, while the other a mystery.  Nevertheless, the dialectical 
parallels and paradoxes are such that they quite clearly belong together as event and 
symbol both.  One could even argue that they are held together as event and symbol 
by the storied identity of Jesus Christ, himself event and symbol.
79
  There is therefore 
none of Schleiermacher’s “thundering anticlimax” to Tillich’s account.  On the 
contrary: Frei comments of the existentialist Jesus that “his end is altogether of a 
piece with the rest of the story”
80
, for the story of the archetypal, alienated human, 
the wandering stranger, is fittingly concluded by an empty tomb. 
 
Tillich, then, insists upon the historical actuality of the resurrection.  However, the 
exegetical test demonstrates that he defines that actuality very differently to how the 
gospels define it.  He claims that the symbol of resurrection was one readily available 
to Hellenic and Judaic culture, and so was adopted by the followers of Jesus so to 
objectify their belief that Jesus was the Messiah.  Believing this, they also actually 
made him the Messiah, for “the Christ is not the Christ without the church”.
81
  
Nevertheless, Tillich maintains the uniqueness of Jesus, locating it in the early 
church's conception of Christ: their account of the resurrection, he claims, 
transcended the myths available to the early church, in that no other resurrection 
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account combined event and symbol in quite the same way.  He argues therefore, that 
the event of the resurrection should not be understood as the actual raising of the 
physical body of Jesus, even if it could be proved historically that that is what 
actually happened.  Neither – perhaps surprisingly – should it be understood as the 
raising even of a spirit: 
 Certainly, it is not the death of an individual man, no matter how important.  Therefore, the 
 revival of an individual man or his reappearance as a spirit cannot be the event of 
 Resurrection.
82 
For Tillich, a spiritual resurrection would still be an event ‘out there’, which would 
render it irrelevant to us, even if that is exactly what happened.  As Tillich pointed 
out in his introduction to his Systematic Theology, the instance we try to describe the 
resurrection, it loses “its character as object”.  What is more, our attempt at 
description then turns on us in judgement, making an object of us “whenever we try 
to make it our object”.
83
  In other words, even an objective resurrection has no 
objective reality, for that would be to make its revelation a ‘possession’ and not an 
‘event’.  Better by far to think of the resurrection as an event then in the experience 
of the early disciples, and as an event now in the experience of the believer.   
 
Tillich concludes that, as a subjective event, the resurrection should be understood 
theologically as a concrete expression in symbolic form of an abstract principle, 
which is the experience of the victory of Jesus over non-being.  Tillich therefore 
reads the resurrection as the defining existential event in the lives of Jesus’ followers, 
in which they found that they were no longer estranged from God.  This experience – 
“of being grasped by the power of the New Being” 
84
 – is actual enough for Tillich 
(perhaps disingenuously) to term it a “fact”.   
 
The power of the existentialist account is the great imaginative appeal of the symbol, 
and the space it opens up for our active participation in the creation of its meaning.  
Frei describes the existentialist Jesus thus: 
 After having faded from the imagination of sensitive men during the eighteenth and 
 nineteenth centuries, Jesus has reappeared to the inner eye of the imagination in the 
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 twentieth.  His reappearance to contemporary imagination, however, is neither in the 
 orthodox garb of the miraculous Savior raised from the dead nor in the form of the great 
 moral example of heroic action.  Instead, as he is frequently depicted in the imagination of 
 present-day writers of fiction, Jesus is the archetypal man, or the pattern for authentic 
 humanity.  He is the stranger – as we all are – in this harsh and hostile universe.
85 
This is, as Frei admits, a “strangely moving interpretation”.  Without naming Tillich 
directly, he gives an appreciative analysis of existentialist-style Christ-figures in 
modern literature.
86
  However, he ultimately rejects these Christ-figures, for they are 
unable to cope with “the unique coherence in Jesus of two elements: unsubstitutable 
individuality and universal saving scope”.
87
  Therefore, Frei’s principle objection to 
the existentialist scheme is not that it has devalued the gospel narrative, nor that it 
has downplayed the literal sense – although it may have done both of these things – 
but primarily that it has turned Jesus the person into Jesus the symbol.  The very 
point of a symbol is that, while it does have concrete actuality, it does not have its 
own meaning, but means only as it refers to something beyond or behind.  So when it 
comes to Jesus’ resurrection, Frei describes how for the existentialist “His 
resurrection is the symbol of our ascending (or descending) to another level of our 
being, so that his presence is diffused into and made to represent all mankind seeking 
to grasp its own basic longing and true hidden spirit”.
88
  The meaning is not in the 
symbol itself, and nor is it in the story.  The meaning is in us.   
 
Ultimately, Frei judges that the existentialist theological system has, once again, 
begun in the wrong place.  Such is the power of its appeal, that the wrongness of its 
starting point perhaps only becomes evident at the other end of the logic of belief, 
where we find that the existentialist Jesus, rather oddly, has no identity of his own: 
 In this view, he cannot, after the fashion of orthodox belief that emphasises his literal 
 resurrection and ascension, own his own presence, or possess a life of his own, for to do so 
 would mean that he is at a different level from our own true being, as if he were on another 
 planet, gazing vacantly at nothing.  Owning his own presence there would preclude sharing it 
 with us.
89 
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If Jesus is indeed the archetypal wandering stranger, the one who has risen in order 
to “diffuse his mysterious presence into the imagination and consciousness of human 
beings”,
90
 then he has no actuality, no ‘outwardness’, to call his own – not even the 
more limited actuality of a resurrected spirit, let alone the concrete actuality of a 
resurrected body.  The result is a loss of his ability to intend and to act, and a loss too 
of his name (the stranger has no name), his socially-constructed identity, and 
ultimately of the Subject which might hold all these predicates together.  Of course, 
in Tillich’s scheme, the loss of the Self (in order to find the Self) is rather the point: 
for the existentialist theologian, Jesus’ uniqueness paradoxically lies in his 
surrendering of his uniqueness.  Ultimately, however, Jesus’ unique identity is made 
into a symbol of our less-than-unique human condition, and so in the event, his 
‘meaning’ is entirely constituted by us.  After all, symbols have meaning only as 
meaning is given to them.   
 
From his starting point of “being or non-being for us”, Tillich proceeds in the logic 
of belief to the claim that “the event on which Christianity is based has two sides: the 
fact which is called “Jesus of Nazareth” and the reception of this fact by those who 
received him as the Christ”.
91
  In effect, Jesus of Nazareth would nothing more than 
the ‘Jesus of History’, with no extension in time or significance, apart from as he is 
received by his followers.  This allows Tillich to claim that Christ and the church are 
also dialectically “interdependent”
92
, just like the resurrection and the cross.  This 
interdependence applies equally to the presence of Christ now as to the biblical 
witness, for Christ is not Christ except as he is received by his church and continues 
to be so.  Tillich’s own logic of belief leads him directly to this point, where God’s 
self-revelation has become dependent upon its reception-history in humanity.  So 
when seeking the identity of Jesus, in history or in faith, who then becomes the 
object of theology?  It can only be the followers of Jesus, then as now, who received 
him and receive him and give him his meaning.  The content of God is an 
irrelevance. 
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4. Current Approaches to the Identity of Jesus Christ 
4.1 The Revival of Reception-History 
For all that Tillich wrote his Systematic Theology in the 1960s, his focus on reception 
history continues to influence the current debate about the identity of Jesus Christ, 
most particularly at the point where systematic theology meets with biblical 
criticism.  This has recently been evidenced in the 2008 collection of essays, Seeking 
the Identity of Jesus.
93
  The intention of this collaborative project was to bridge the 
gap between historical biblical studies on the one hand, and systematic theology on 
the other.  The resulting essays illustrate clearly why this is such a fraught task, and 
illustrate also the prescience of Frei, both in his anticipation of some of the issues, 
and his plain avoidance of others.   
 
It becomes clear that Frei is seen as something of a father-figure for this line of 
theological inquiry.  William Placher, for example, gives due homage in statements 
such as, “I propose that the four canonical Gospel ... are history-like witnesses to 




  However, as Frei well understood, each 
generation of theologians has its own theological task, and a formidable one has been 
set christology by the Jesus Seminar.  In the face of the Jesus Seminar’s historical 
deconstruction of the gospel accounts, the location of the identity of Jesus Christ has 
been shifted: this volume of essays concedes that the narratives are too historically 
unreliable to constitute Jesus’ identity as such, but contends that they are 
significantly more reliable as a record of his reception history.  Therefore Placher can 
cite with approval Robert M. Fowler, that “the key to understanding the ending of 
Mark is not to understand the women or men in the story, but to understand what is 
happening in the women or men reading the story”.
95
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While this interpretation of the gospel is not new in itself, the new element here is 
that Jesus’ reception history actually constitutes his identity.  The happy result is, that 
while there may be much contradiction between the gospel narratives and the 
historical actuality, there is now no such contradiction between the Jesus of history 
and the Christ of faith.  Hence, coming from a biblical studies perspective, Dale C. 
Allison can state, that “the temptation narrative, which recounts events which 
probably never happened, nonetheless rightly catches Jesus in several respects”.
96
  
Like Placher, Allison’s point is that the church’s later commentary on Jesus is a 
historically reliable source of theological content.  Meanwhile, Francis Watson is 
even more explicitly indebted to Tillich, stating his thesis as follows: 
The theologically significant Jesus (the Christ of faith) is the Jesus whose reception by his 
first followers is definitively articulated in the fourfold Gospel narrative. This thesis attempts 
to bridge the chasm of presumed incommensurability between historical Jesus research and a 
theology that regards the fourfold Gospel narrative as a given.  It is the concept of 
“reception” that can reconnect the two...
97 
Indeed, Watson cites Tillich with approval, that “without this reception the Christ 
would not have been the Christ, namely, the manifestation of the New Being in time 
and space”.
98
  Thus, while Watson insists that “the Jesus of faith comprehends the 
historical Jesus but is not to be reduced to him”
99
, he has in effect reduced not only 
the Jesus of faith but also the historical Jesus to a subjective existential experience, 
so that the concept of Christus extra nos has all but ceased to be relevant.  The result 
is that the quest of the historical Jesus has been transformed into the quest of the 
historical community.  In this way, Tillich’s understanding of reception history as 
constitutive of Jesus’ identity has been found to be very useful to this collaborative 
project.   
 
4.2 William Placher on “How the Gospels Mean” 
However, this new attempt to find a rapprochement between theology and historical 
biblical criticism has its problems, many of which were anticipated by Frei.  These 
                                                 
96
 Dale C. Allison, Jr, “The Historian’s Jesus and the Church”, in Seeking the Identity of Jesus: A 
Pilgrimage, ed. Beverly Roberts Gaventa & Richard B. Hays, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008), 79–95, 82. 
97
 Watson, “Veritas Christi”, 105. 
98
  Tillich, Systematic Theology 2, 114.  Cited in Watson, “Veritas Christi”, 105. 
99
 Watson, “Veritas Christi”, 106. 
   186 
problems can usefully be illustrated by Placher’s approach.  Placher himself was a 
pupil and loyal admirer of Frei, and a co-editor along with George Hunsinger of the 
posthumous collection of Frei’s essays, Theology and Narrative.  Indeed, he claims 
in “How the Gospels Mean”, that “I am in this whole essay following the 
conclusions, albeit inadequately, of my teacher Hans Frei”.
100
  However, in this 
essay, and in The Triune God, he betrays an increasingly ambivalent relationship 
with his old mentor.  On the one hand, in the light of modern biblical scholarship he 
cannot now read the gospel as simple and direct accounts of actual ‘real world’ 
happenings.  On the other hand, he wishes to avoid the option which he understands 
Frei to have taken, of treating the gospel purely as literature.   
 
Placher is therefore anxious to assert the historical trustworthiness of these accounts 
in the face of what he sees as the reductive historicism of the Jesus Seminar: 
Yet the Jesus Seminar insists that lacking any trustworthy particularism, we cannot possibly 
have a trustworthy generality.
101 
Placher accepts the lack of “any trustworthy particularism”, but insists that we do 
have a “trustworthy generality”, which is Jesus’ reception history.  In support of this 
contention, he points out that people usually remember general characteristics more 
accurately than specific incidents.  Indeed, the implication is that these first witnesses 
actually might have ‘made up’ some of these stories about Jesus, which, while not 
factually true in themselves, nevertheless truly illustrate Jesus’ character: 
An emphasis on general characteristics does not dodge the question of truth.  A character 
portrait of Adolf Hitler that made him out to be a nice guy would be false – even if every 
report within it of kindness to dogs and small children were true.  So too the Gospels, if they 
did not convey the person Jesus was, would be false.  Many of their episodes we can take to 
be illustrative anecdotes; nevertheless, some stories narrate an event so central to the picture 
of Jesus they present that, in Hans Frei’s words, it “allows and even forces us to ask the 
question, ‘Did this actually take place?’”  He could have healed one person rather than 
another, spoken one parable rather than another, and still have been the same person.  But 
not, for instance, if he had lived to a ripe old age rather than dying on a cross.
102
 
My suggestion is that Placher has read Frei wrongly here.  Frei’s riposte would or 
should have been, that Jesus could not have healed one person rather than another, 
precisely because he did not heal one person rather than another: the question is a 
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redundant one, suggesting in the intended-action scheme that somehow Jesus could 
have done other than he did, and therefore have been other than he was.  As Barth 
himself puts it, “Where the actuality exists, there is also the corresponding 
possibility".
103
  Besides, there is a certain offensiveness in the implication, that the 
unique people with whom Jesus interacted were themselves somehow 
“interchangeable”, their active and affective role in the formation of Jesus’ identity 
being reduced to a static “illustration”.  This is not a rich account of human character 
and interaction. 
 
However, Frei is partly to blame for Placher’s misreading.  Frei’s almost exclusive 
focus on the “connected narrative sequence”
104
 of the passion and resurrection makes 
it impossible to downplay its significance for the identity of Jesus Christ.  After all, it 
is at this point in the narrative that Jesus is “most of all himself”, so that this 
sequence “does not merely illustrate or represent his identity.  Rather, it constitutes 
what he is”.
105
  But equally, this narrow focus makes it very possible to do as Placher 
did, and downplay the earlier, more disconnected events in Jesus’ story.  This 
downplaying is further encouraged by Frei’s observation, that the question about 
what a person is like seeks to discover “a typical state or action of a person that 
would properly and genuinely constitute or characterize him”.
106
  Here Frei is trying 
to account for his second category of identity description, that of self-manifestation.  
His idea is that a person’s identity persists even through seemingly ‘out of character’ 
moments, in that we can only attribute ‘out of character’ if we already have a 
conception of more typical behaviour.  Placher, however, has read this caveat as 
permission to abstract Jesus’ defining qualities from the more illustrative events, and 
then apply them as a hermeneutical lens to judge the meaningfulness of the less 
illustrative incidents.  As we have seen, Frei will not allow any such hermeneutical 
circle.   
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Exploiting this ‘loophole’ in Frei’s thought, Placher is able to conclude that a 
generalised ‘idea’ of a personality is of greater import than any particular intended 
action.  In The Triune God, he even cites Frei to support this point: 
 In the instance of Jesus, it may well be that certain of his sayings or specific, isolated 
 episodes recounted from his brief ministry, which are quite enigmatic in character and tell 
 little about him, such as his condemning a fig tree because it would not yield fruit out of 
 season (Mark 11:12–14), are much more nearly reliable historical reports than those in 
 which his over-all personal intention is more clearly depicted.
107
 
Placher adds to this citation, “This is not a reason to try to base our understanding of 
him on a collection of such enigmatic stories.”
108
  Therefore, when seeking the 
identity of Jesus, he suggests that we might be better to regard the gospel narratives 
as Barth did – at least, according to David Kelsey: 
... as a source of anecdotes about what Jesus said or did which one would tell to show ‘what 
he was like’.  The anecdotes that fall together into a given group are interchangeable.  Barth 
is not interested in them for themselves but for the patterns that recur in a number of them.  
The incidents the anecdotes recite serve to illustrate Jesus’ personhood, not to constitute it.
109 
Frei, however, would have been happy neither with this notion of 
“interchangeability”, nor with these worryingly generalised “patterns” of story, for 
the implication is that none of these events are in themselves constitutive of Jesus’ 
identity.
110
  This is yet another example of working in the wrong direction, “pressing 
back” from action to intention, so that the predicate becomes of the essence of the 
subject, regardless of whether it is ever “illustrated” in action.  Therefore, to say that 
an incident “illustrates”, but does not constitute, Jesus’ identity, is to prioritise the 
attribute over the story, in logical order as well as in theological importance.  In the 
process much of Jesus’ uniqueness is lost: for others are ‘loving’ or ‘obedient’ 
besides Jesus, but no one else shares his unsubstitutable story.   
 
Indeed, Kelsey’s concept of “illustration” can only be achieved by a flattening of the 
complexity of all that goes into the making of an identity.  Placher’s analogy of his 
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“curmudgeonly” grandfather, about whom he could not recall a specifically 
illustrative incident, is particularly unhelpful in this respect.  The quality of 
“curmudgeonliness” as perceived by the grandchild is a reductio ad absurdum of the 
vast array of intended actions, contingent events, and ascriptive titles which go into 
the making of an identity, as held together by the unique subject-self.  I have no 
doubt that Placher’s grandfather was a considerably more complex character than 
one, or even a multitude of adjectives can convey, and so to proceed from that 
abstraction to the selective telling of, or even making up of, illustrative stories, 
constitutes a kind of abuse of his identity.  The point of a realistic narrative is that it 
retains the ability to convey a complex identity, precisely because it precedes any 
adjectival definition, and remains always open to a number of interpretations.  An 
elusive, complex, and unique identity is truly conveyed, but never trapped, in its own 
narrative.   
 
As it happens, in context, all Frei is saying about the fig tree incident is that simple 
description of what Jesus said and did should not be confused with “intimate 
knowledge”
111
 of his inner life.  Not knowing exactly why Jesus was motivated to 
condemn the fig tree is not the same as judging the incident as incidental to his 
identity.  At this point, we remind ourselves of Frei’s model of a linear, cumulative 
hermeneutic, in which layer after layer of identity is built up from his starting point: 
the fig tree incident is one of the many layers which contribute to the rendering of an 
individual, complex, and elusive identity.  In similar fashion, even Hitler’s kindness 
to children should be admitted alongside all our other knowledge of him, as equally 
constitutive of who he was, in all his individual human unsubstitutability.  Frei’s 
realistic narrative hermeneutic, with its linear and cumulative logic of belief, is able 
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5. The Resurrection and the Content of God 
 
Frei’s realistic narrative reading of the gospel is predicated on the hope that it will 
enable him to describe truly, though not without residue, the identity of Jesus Christ.  
The principles of this hermeneutic, as has been illustrated above, are particularly 
tested in the crucifixion-resurrection sequence, given that it is here that Jesus’ 
identity is revealed as unique, not merely in terms of the uniqueness of all human 
beings, but in a Chalcedonian sense, as uniquely human and divine.  It is precisely at 
this point in the logic of belief that non-narrative hermeneutics break down, because 
once again, only a story can hold together two such logical contradictions.  And 
therefore, it is at this point that the adequacy of the realistic narrative hermeneutic for 
rendering the content of God will finally be tested.  If Frei’s realistic narrative 
hermeneutic actually works in exegetical practice to prove his hypothesis, then the 
crucifixion/resurrection sequence should reveal who Jesus of Nazareth is in his full 
identity; and moreover, it should reveal also that this identity is co-identical with the 
identity, or content, of God. 
 
For Frei, Jesus’ death is no Scheintod, nor yet a symbolic event, but a “real, complete 
disruption”
112
 of the ascriptive subject that is Jesus of Nazareth.  If, while he hung on 
the cross, he might yet have managed to call down avenging angels, with his death 
there is no ‘self’ left to intend or to do anything.  He truly cannot save himself, and 
so the utterly powerless redeemer “himself ... stands in need of redemption”.
113
  This 
is the miracle and revelation of the resurrection, where at last the activity is none of 
Jesus’, but all of God’s.  Frei sees this ‘takeover’ as beginning earlier in the passion 
sequence, where “the action of God … began to supersede Jesus’ initiative beginning 
with the arrest”.  But now, in the resurrection, and beyond all ambiguity, God is 
“climactically the agent”.
114
  This is the moment when the intention-action and self-
manifestation schemes for describing identity now come together to reveal 
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something astonishing.  According to a realistic narrative reading of the gospel, 
while it is God who intends and acts in the resurrection, it is Jesus who is manifested: 
 It is he [Jesus] who is present and none other when God is active.  Jesus alone is manifested, 
 and he is manifested as none other than God’s presence, which is singularly he himself.
115
   
In other words, God’s action results in Jesus’ full presence and identity.  The subject 
and the predicate have come together in Jesus Christ in such a way that they cannot 
be separated without the same kind of destructive violence that is required to split a 
person in two.  As such, and despite the necessary grammatical sequencing, there can 
be no separation of identity between God and Jesus.  At the resurrection, the identity 
of God the acting subject has been “pressed forward” into Jesus the predicate.   
 
In other words, here is revelation.  Here at last is the content of God, and it is 
revealed to be Jesus Christ in all his unsubstitutable identity.  What is more, if Jesus 
is manifested as none other than “God’s presence, which is singularly he himself”
116
, 
then God can no longer be understood as a distant abstraction, but can be spoken 
about in essence as a concrete human person: for so God has revealed Godself to be.  
The question about who Jesus is, is therefore answered: the unique identity of Jesus 
is revealed as God, while at the same time, in true figurative fashion, “he remains 
himself”
117
, the “crucified human savior”.  Both identities are held together, without 
strain, by the unsubstitutable narrative and the unsubstitutable person whose identity 
it constitutes.  
 
Therefore, to focus on the resurrection as the full revelation of the identity of Jesus 
Christ is not to ignore the earlier gospel revelations as to Jesus’ divine-human 
identity.  These ‘clues’, as they accumulate, provide more and more compelling 
evidence that Jesus of Nazareth is indeed the Christ.  Again, this is why the 
hermeneutic demands a linear, cumulative reading, for “the direction of the process 
of identification is unilinear – from no singularity to the fullest singular identity”.
118
   
Thus the ‘evidence’ that Jesus is God’s revelation amounts cumulatively, but clarity 
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will only come at the final denouement, when Jesus ceases to be defined by these 
‘clues’, but instead turns round and defines them in their turn.   
 
At this point, Frei detects a circularity of sorts, “though with a difference”:  
 At the end of the story, as at its beginning, there is full identity between Jesus and Israel.  But 
 whereas at the beginning it was the community that served to identify him, the reverse is now 
 the case.  He, Jesus, provides the community, as well as God’s Kingdom and the stylized 
 savior figure, with his identity.
119
 
This is not a hermeneutical circularity, where the whole is understood in light of the 
parts, and the parts in light of the whole.  We do not now understand Jesus in the 
light of the messianic prophecies, and the messianic prophecies in the light of Jesus.  
This is because the idea of the ‘Messiah’, whatever it meant before, now absolutely 
cannot be abstracted from the person who is Jesus.  Rather, the ascriptive title 
‘Messiah’, which was earlier applied tentatively and ambiguously, has now been 
given the fullest concrete content by Jesus and in Jesus.  In other words, he does not 
so much fulfil the prophecy of the Messiah as tell the prophecy what it means.  In 
this way, the subject Jesus is shown to share God’s power to “govern(s) his own 
predicates”, so that “the predicates are what they are” simply and only “because they 
are his”.
120
  The implication for theological grammar is that we should not say that 
the Messiah is Jesus, but that Jesus is the Messiah.  The theological grammar works 
from subject to predicate; the logic of belief remains linear; and in the resurrection, it 




As early as Der Römerbrief, Barth’s epistemology was grounded in the belief that 
“the Resurrection is the revelation: the disclosing of Jesus as the Christ, the 
appearing of God, and the apprehending of God in Jesus...”
121
  For Frei as for Barth, 
the resurrection defines revelation: it is the Aha-Erlebnis, the climactic moment of 
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sudden insight, when what was hidden is now revealed.  While it is true that there are 
clues as to Jesus’ divine identity throughout the gospel narratives, it is only at this 
climax that God and Jesus are revealed to be the same subject.  Hunsinger may be 
correct that Frei did not give enough attention to the two natures of Christ
122
, and 
Frei does indeed gloss over the stories of the incarnation, categorising them as 
generalised myths rather than specific history-like narratives.
123
  However, Frei’s 
project is not to conceptualise the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth, nor yet to sketch a 
doctrine of the two natures: the story holds them together quite well without any 
abstract explanatory additions.  Much more modestly, Frei is working merely on the 
exegetical starting point for any theological project, in the hope that the right starting 
point in the logic of belief will enable theologians to talk about the content of God 




Furthermore, the principle needed to be restated, that God’s being cannot be 
separated from God’s actions, even though the grammar works in one way only, and 
is not reversible.  Perhaps this can be seen as Frei’s version of the twin Chalcedon 
principle, of the humanity and divinity of Christ co-existing in one person “without 
confusion or division”.  In the figurative scheme, Jesus is both his own unique 
subject, and also one subject with God.  Similarly, the identity of God as acting 
subject includes the identity of Jesus Christ, while yet, in the grammatical logic of 
belief, Jesus as revelation remains the (inseparable) predicate of God.  Indeed, so 
bound up is the identity of Jesus with the resurrection that to “conceive of him as 
dead is the equivalent of not conceiving of him at all”.
125
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However, at this point we need to slow down a little.  While Frei’s exegetical 
discovery does provide us with a concrete content of God in place of the 
metaphysical abstractions of more philosophical or experiential systems, and in place 
also of the silence of the historical method on the topic, this does not mean that we 
now ‘have’ God in any sense.  Where the dialectical theologians turned to the 
concept of the momentary revelation-event as a means of resisting human 
‘possession’ of the knowledge of God, Frei instead locates his own resistance in the 
principles of identity-description.  The very fact that God reveals as a person means 
that even in revelation, God is “elusive” and unintuitable.  Hence the principle of 
God’s epistemological availability in Jesus Christ is the same principle which so 
strongly resists the ‘possession’ of that knowledge.  Thus, as McCormack also 
insists, God “cannot be read directly off the face of Jesus”
126
, precisely because no 
person, least of all God, can be known fully, even in their story.  This is the whole 
principle of the unending revelatory richness of a realistic narrative.    
 
In his account of the resurrection as the climactic revelation of the full divine-human 
identity of Jesus Christ, we therefore have Frei’s hermeneutically-based doctrine of 
revelation, which alone can provide the concrete starting point for any subsequent 
theologising.  So in a sense, Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic should be 
understood, not so much as theology, but as a kind of ‘pre-theology’.  It is interesting 
how often readings of Frei’s project begin with this very misapprehension, that he 
was being far more ambitious than he ever claimed to be: Kay, for example, who 
reads Frei as trying to explain the presence of Jesus Christ
127
 where his only aim was 
to describe its negative pre-condition; or Murphy, who accuses Frei of imbuing the 
narratives with the power to produce God.   Frei’s ambitions for his realistic narrative 
hermeneutic do not extend so far.  But nevertheless, he is being ambitious enough.  
His exegetical reading of the identity of Jesus Christ has provided him with a veiled 
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but concrete content of God, which is the first step in the logic of belief.  On the 
basis of the resurrection, we know now that the God of the gospel narratives is a God 
who is one subject with Jesus Christ, without whom nothing but abstractions can be 
predicated of God.  He has demonstrated that the content of God is to be found in the 
identity of Jesus Christ.  Now to the real theology. 
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Chapter 5  The (Self-) Presence of Jesus Christ 
1. Introduction 
 
According to his “basic conviction”, Frei’s goal all along in The Identity of Jesus 
Christ has been to demonstrate that knowing the identity of Jesus Christ “is identical 
with having him present or being in his presence”.  As we have seen, this means that 
the correct order for thinking about Jesus’ presence is to start with his identity; and 
so it is issues of identity which have taken up the bulk of Frei’s christological study.  
However, now that the identity of Jesus Christ has been established as the revelation 
of God, most finally and climactically in the resurrection, Frei is in a position to test 
out the latter part of his hypothesis.  Hence the final chapter of Identity can at last 
proceed from this starting point in gospel exegesis, to an account of Jesus’ presence 
now.  The chapter is short, but it repays close attention, for it is here that the truth or 
otherwise of Frei’s “basic conviction” is finally decided.  It is also here that the value 
of starting one’s logic of belief with the resurrection finally becomes apparent, as the 
content-full God we meet here bestows a similar concrete identity on all accounts of 
God’s presence and acts. 
 
This chapter will therefore continue the focus on the grammatical logic of theological 
statements, beginning with a consideration of Frei’s rather awkward, ‘negative’ 
formulation of the identity and presence of Jesus Christ, as he who cannot be thought 
of as not present.  Once again, the relation between theological grammar and 
ontological actuality will be considered.  Given that one of the key aims of Identity 
has been to counter existentialist theology, Rudolf Bultmann’s alternative account of 
the presence of Christ will represent Frei’s theological ‘opposition’: the focus here 
will be on Bultmann’s separation of the presence of Jesus Christ from his historical 
or narrative identity, and the problems this raises for theological language and the 
content of God.  As an answer to the existentialist position, Frei’s doctrine of 
analogy will be considered as a means of predicating concrete, if indirect, content to 
God.  Indeed, this ‘indirectness’ will then be discussed as central to the whole idea of 
the presence and the person of God, as we consider how Frei balances knowledge of 
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the concrete content of God with the dialectical rejection of human possession of that 
knowledge, even in revelation. 
 
Next, this chapter will turn to the mode of the presence of God, which is 
encompassed within the theological grammar of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.  The 
intention is to demonstrate how Frei’s starting point in the resurrection should be 
read as yielding a fully Trinitarian content to God.  The unifying role of the Holy 
Spirit in the church and in history forms the latter part of this chapter and this thesis.  
Then at the last, Frei’s cumulative logic of belief will be shown to be pointing always 
towards the cumulation of all history in the eschaton, where the presence of Jesus 
Christ will once again be direct, and the content of God fully rendered.  
 
2. Grammatical Logic and Ontological Proofs 
2.1 The Grammatical Necessity of Jesus’ Presence 
In direct opposition to the existentialist starting point in the presence of Christ to us, 
Frei insists that the logic of belief, which cannot say everything at once, must begin 
with Jesus’ identity.  This is precisely because Jesus’ identity, defined grammatically 
as he who cannot not live, necessarily includes his presence:  
 In the case of this singular individual, manifestation of his identity involves his actual living 
 presence.  Who he was and what he was, did, and underwent are all inseparable to the 
 [gospel] authors from the fact that he was or is.
1
 
Indeed, so precisely does the grammar of the resurrection render his identity, that if 
we “conceive of him as not living”, then we have misread the gospels and 
“misunderstand who he is”.
2
  This means that the narrative identity of Jesus Christ is 
not merely “continuous” into our present, but that that very continuity is in itself 
“constituent”
3
 of his identity.  There is therefore “a kind of logic in a Christian’s faith 
that forces him to say that disbelief in the resurrection of Jesus is rationally 
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impossible”.
4
  So relentless is the grammatical logic of the gospel narratives, that, as 
Paul DeHart explains, for Frei,  
 the proper way to deny the resurrection is not to say that Jesus Christ was not raised (since 
 the story of his raising is part of how we know who ‘Jesus Christ’ is), but rather to say that 




Not that grammatical logic is in any way the same as ontology: simply stating that 
Jesus is ‘he who cannot be conceived of as not living’ is not somehow to conjure up 
his presence.  Nevertheless, while the ‘being’ of Jesus Christ is in no way ‘produced’ 
by the grammar, yet the grammatical form is founded in the content of his identity.
6
   
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, this description of the presence of Jesus Christ has 
obvious parallels with the Anselmian ‘proof’ of God – and this despite Frei’s own 
awareness that “It may be dubious wisdom to make Luke or John speak like a late 
eleventh-century theologian”.
7
  The problem, however, even with Anselm’s proof, is 
that even if God is indeed that than which nothing greater can be conceived, then it 
follows that God therefore necessarily has a ‘real’ existence only if one is a 
thorough-going metaphysical realist.  This the existentialist theologians most 
certainly were not.  Hence James Kay’s objection to Frei, that “Frei’s christological 
deployment of Anselm’s argument assumes with Anselm that we can move from an 
existent in our thought to that same existent in reality”.
8
  In other words, Kay reads 
Frei as saying, that because we can conceive of the presence of Jesus Christ, it 
follows necessarily that he truly is present.
 
 However, neither Frei, nor Barth, nor 
even Anselm, ever attempts to make the move in this direction, from “thought” to 
“reality”.  Rather, the “move” (and it is God’s move) is made from God’s reality to 
our thought: the actuality determines the possibility as the subject determines the 
predicate.  This strong actualism in Barth’s case, and hermeneutical realism in Frei’s, 
is their counter to the pro nobis assessment of the reality of God.   
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Once again, the crucial issue for Frei is the logic of belief.  Just because Frei has 
rejected the ‘backwards’ theological move from presence to identity, that does not 
mean he can make the ‘forwards’ move with any greater ease.  Hence Kay’s deep 
scepticism that, “by starting with the identity of Jesus Christ one can then move, 
logically and coherently, to claims for his presence”.
9
  Actually, Frei does not even 
get that far.  His minimal account does not claim that Jesus is demonstrably present – 
only that the Jesus whose identity is narrated in the gospel stories cannot not be 
present.  For Frei the resurrection is merely (merely!) the “necessary local basis”
10
 of 
any talk of Jesus’ presence now.  But nevertheless, this ‘leap’ from narrative identity 
to real presence is hard to account for.  This difficulty is at the root of Murphy’s 
scathing criticism: 
 Narrative theology fails to renounce foundationalism because it thinks of Christ as an 
 identity rather than as an existent.  Sidetracked by its anti-apologetic focus on the unique 
 identity of Christ (as opposed to his historical and ontological particularity), narrative 
 theology backtracks into the epistemic act of identifying its sources.
11 
However, to think of Jesus as an “identity rather than as an existent” would be once 
again to work in the wrong order.  The “existent” Jesus Christ, then as now, logically 
precedes his narrative identity.  However, the “existent” Jesus Christ, then as now, is 
not ontologically anterior to his narrative identity, for that would be to separate 
subject and predicate and hence posit an abstraction: a Jesus Christ who was 
somehow other than the “historically and ontologically particular” Jesus of the 
gospels.  Indeed, it is precisely to preserve this particularity that Frei refuses to 
abstract the some free-floating ontology from Jesus’ storied identity.  Therefore, 
Frei’s reiterated point is that ontology and epistemology – subject and predicate, if 
you will, or being and action, or deus and dixit, or however one wishes to put it – 
simply cannot be separated in this way.  We are what we say and do.  God is what 
God says and does. 
 
In comparison to Murphy, Kay’s objection to Frei’s move from identity to presence 
is not so much metaphysical as pragmatic:   
 Here where we were promised such a payoff on ‘presence’, if only we would join Frei in 
 taking his arduous trek of first establishing the ‘identity’ of Jesus Christ, we must confess to 
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 disappointment.  At the end of the road, we find only a version of Anselm’s ontological proof 
 for the existence of God, transposed by Frei onto Jesus Christ.
12
  
Kay, a preacher and teacher of homiletics, had expected more of Frei here.  He had 
looked for an explanation of the presence of Jesus Christ, one which could perhaps 
have a pastoral applicability.  But in the event, all he got was a mere basis for 
theologising.  One can understand Kay’s frustration in travelling such a long way 
with Frei, to find himself only just arriving at the starting line.  However, Frei’s 
‘inside faith’ perspective precludes the explanatory schemes so beloved of the 
existential theologians.  As he wrote himself, for all that “the affirmation of Jesus’ 
resurrection is … overwhelmingly affective (“existential”)”, he could see no reason 
“for trying to validate either the meaning or the truth claim concerning Jesus’ 
resurrection by an elaborate description of its existential appropriation”.
13
  Frei is 
simply not interested in apologetics: his concern is merely to describe the concrete 
content of God, and in so doing, to establish the correct order for the logic of belief.  
His hope for his grammatical ‘proof’ is merely that it might provide the logical basis 
for conceptualising Jesus’ existential presence. 
 
2.2 The Ontological Non-Necessity of Jesus’ Presence 
Grammatically, then, Jesus is necessarily present for Frei.  Ontologically, however, 
there is no necessity for him to be present at all, and certainly not as the result of a 
grammatical formulation.  Rather, the use which Frei makes of his christological 
‘proof’ parallels Barth’s usage of Anselm’s.
14
  For Barth, the proof was simply a 
prolegomena, a grammatical starting point for theology, and not the theological point 
in itself.  Rather, it only when we know God in such a way that “the denial of his 
Existence becomes impossible”
15
, that we can escape the self-referential nature of all 
human thinking and begin to think about God at all.  This is what Alan Torrance 
describes as “Barth’s commitment to the distinction between theology and ontology 
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and his refutation of any universal (pan) ontology which subsumes both God and 
humanity within the domains of its principles”.
16
  Or, as Barth himself puts it more 
succinctly, “all thinking about God has to begin with thinking to God”.
17
  Frei 
maintains this same distinction between theology (as doctrinal grammar) and 
ontology.  All he claims for his christological ‘proof’ is that it provides the basis – 
and nothing more – for thinking about Jesus’ presence, and hence the presence also 
of God.  This is because, for Frei, all thinking about the presence of Jesus Christ to 
us, has to begin with a thinking to him, to who Jesus was and what he was like. 
 
Hence Frei’s stress on this minimal starting point for theology, predicated upon the 
resurrection, that Jesus is the one who cannot be conceived of as not present.  To 
start at the other end of the logic of belief – to begin with the existential presence of 
Christ to us, or with the search for that presence – makes it impossible to work 
‘backwards’ to his identity.  In Frei’s view, the result of such a scheme is that even 
the starting point loses reality, so that what we have is not so much the presence of 
Christ, but something more akin to an absence: 
 What we come across at the end of that quest is not his own self-focused presence, but a 
 diffused presence that seems strangely elusive and haunting as well as difficult to describe: It 
 is that of ourselves, individually or  collectively, seeking to grasp identity from the fear of 
 nonidentity, presence in the midst of the fact and conviction of fleetingness.
18 
In other words, while Jesus may indeed be present to us, this presence is not 
identifiable as Jesus if it is posited prior to the establishment of his identity.  Indeed, 
the more absolute forms of existentialism can suggest that his presence is logically 
independent of his identity.   Thus we have, for example, Bultmann’s account of the 
resurrection being true ‘for us’ in the kerygma, while at the same time denying it 
historical factuality.   
 
Like Schleiermacher, Bultmann accords a very minimal significance to the historical 
events surrounding Jesus of Nazareth, although for a very different reason.  
Bultmann’s demythologising programme necessarily asserts that we can know 
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almost nothing about Jesus Christ other than that he lived and died.  This is not to 
underplay how vital this life and death is to Bultmann’s theology: Jesus is “the One 
who is the crisis, the turning point, of the age”,
19
 and there is no substituting his 
uniqueness.  In this, Bultmann neatly illustrates Frei’s observation regarding 
Niebuhr, that existentialism is always seeking to negotiate between “a present 
internal impact and a stubborn historical fact”.
20
  However, for the existentialist 
theologian, it is the “present impact” which is “our first certainty”.
21
  Therefore, for 
Bultmann, the ‘presence of Christ’ refers first and foremost to the “kerygmatic 
eschatological salvation event”.
22
  Therefore he disagreed strongly with attempts to 
harmonise the ‘historical’ account of the identity of Jesus in the gospels with the 
Christ who is present to us today in the faith encounter: “the word of God is Word of 
God only as it happens here and now”.
23
   
 
In this conception of revelation, Bultmann is indebted to Barth’s distinctive model, 
which was designed to preserve the character of revelation as ‘event’: 
 In the resurrection, the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of the flesh.  But it 
 touches it as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it.  And, precisely because it 
 does not touch it, it touches it as its frontier, as the new world.
24
 
This concept of “intersection”, which “is no more extended onto the known plane 
than is the unknown plane of which it proclaims the existence”
25
, is designed to 
forestall any understanding of revelation as immanent: rather, revelation is the one-
dimensional point, the moment without extension in time or space, so that in itself it 
has no content.  In other words, what we have once again is a grammatical “frontier” 
for theology, and nothing more.  However, what existentialist theology does, is 
transpose revelation from being the indispensable but contentless ground of 
theology, to being the content of theology itself.  Moreover, where Barth locates 
revelation primarily in the past-tense event of Jesus Christ – God has spoken – the 
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existentialist understanding of this moment of intersection is determinedly present.   
This means that the theologian is obliged to speak of Jesus Christ only in terms of 
what he is doing in the present historical moment, to us and in us.  Bultmann 
therefore locates revelation in the “repeatedly present”
26
 kerygmatic event: Jesus is 
“the Crucified and Risen One, (who) encounters us in the word of proclamation, and 
nowhere else”.
27
  Hence Bultmann can preach in his 1938 Advent sermon, that “A 
miracle is in fact in every deed … and every event where the Spirit and the mind of 
Christ hold sway.  And where does Christ hold sway?  Wherever the Word of the 
Gospel is preached and heard in faith.”
28
   
 
In this scheme, the gospel narratives can have little significance to one who has 
separated out in such a wholesale fashion the Jesus of history and the theologically 
(or existentially) significant Jesus.  Bultmann is scathing in his critique of a 
contemporary publication, Jesus Christus der Herr by Emanuel Hirsch
29
, which he 
reads as representative of the outdated liberal tradition of Wilhelm Herrmann.  
According to Bultmann, Hirsch’s ‘error’ was to insist that Jesus Christ was an 
objective historical figure, who nevertheless becomes “contemporary” for us as we 
reconstruct his personality through psychological analysis of the gospel texts.
30
  
Bultmann’s ripost is telling: 
 But does this mean ‘contemporary’ as Kierkegaard meant it?  Does it mean contemporaneous 
 in the present time?  No, it is merely timelessness ... Jesus so regarded never confronts us as 
 ‘Thou’.  A Thou who demands something of us with a concrete claim upon our conscience 
 can only be a Thou confronting us in today’s concrete present.  In relation to a Thou in the 
 past, the most that is possible is the perception of a moral demand that is timeless ... The 
 historical Jesus does not make any direct demand on us...  
31 
Ironically, for all Hirsch’s attention to the details of gospel history, Bultmann regards 
his portrayal of Jesus as an “abstraction”, given that the Jesus of history is now so 
distant from us that “all the features are heightened to the absolute and thus lose their 
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individual character.  What finally results,” Bultmann writes damningly, “is a wholly 
formal ideal which has been coloured by a kind of aesthetic contemplation.”
32
   
 
What we have now is a confusion of vocabulary – and of conceptuality.  Frei has 
accused the existentialist account itself of ‘abstraction’, for divorcing Jesus’ presence 
from his gospel identity.  Bultmann, however, does not regard his account of Jesus’ 
presence as abstract in the slightest.  Indeed, his very project is to counter all such 
abstraction, whether this is the abstraction of Jesus’ personality that he detected in 
Hirsch, or the abstraction of the Christ of Faith from the Jesus of History.  As David 
Fergusson explains: 
 Against Schleiermacher et al., Bultmann can maintain that it is unnecessary to discern the 
 inner consciousness of Jesus or to compile his biography.  Against the Hegelian left, he can 
 prevent a complete dissociation of faith from history by maintaining that a commitment to 
 Jesus is governed by belief in the cross as the historical source of our salvation.
33
 
Bultmann is therefore as concerned as Frei to avoid metaphysical speculation, and so 
refuses to let go entirely the historical account, locating the eschatological turning 
point of all history and of our own individual salvation in the concrete historical 
event that was the cross.  Indeed, he wishes to maintain an account of the cross both 
as an historically-past existential event for Jesus, and as an historically-present 
existential event for us.  As Fergusson clarifies elsewhere: 
 To the historian this [the cross] is simply another world occurrence with an historical 
 explanation.  Yet  for the believer it becomes God’s eschatological action as it is 
 acknowledged in personal faith.
34
 
As Frei has observed, this is yet another example of the historically-past occurrence 
being the “necessary local basis” of the historically-present revelation event.  The 
‘concrete’ matters to Bultmann just as much as it does to Frei.  However, where Frei 
locates the ‘concrete’ in the historical narrative, Bultmann locates the ‘concrete’ in 
the present existential moment, which is also fully historical.  For Bultmann, it is the 
narrative which is the abstraction. 
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Frei agrees with Bultmann, that the ‘liberal’ account of the presence of Jesus Christ 
is indeed a weak one.  However, Bultmann’s ‘solution’ is less than satisfactory.  
Where Schleiermacher did at least assert a vital continuity between Jesus then and 
Jesus now, Frei’s insight is that Bultmann has effectively divorced the presence of 
Jesus from his historical and storied identity.   
 Other than this ‘encounter’ we can assert nothing clearly about Jesus Christ: all that a 
 ‘contemporaneous decision’ needs is the completely formal, positivistic claim that Jesus 
 Christ did once exist in human particularity.
35
   
Moreover, when we try to label the existential encounter ‘Jesus Christ’, or to explain 
in what manner he can be said to be present; then in the absence of content to this 
event of revelation we are reduced to describing its effect on us.  In this way Niebuhr 
can write how “I am being believed in, therefore I believe”
36
: a statement perhaps of 
profound faith, but one which proffers no knowledge of who or what it is, that is 
doing the believing.  Moreover, for all that it tries to say something about God, 
grammatically, the subject of the sentence remains “I”.  Hence Frei’s perception that 
to begin with Christ’s presence to us is in fact to begin with us, so that revelation 
provides us with no knowledge whatsoever of God’s content, but merely increases 
out knowledge of ourselves.  The result is what Frei calls “sheer epistemological 
agnosticism with regard to Jesus of Nazareth”
37
, as his identity, along with his 
presence, is “diffused” throughout the multitude of identities of those to whom he is 
present.  In addition, given Frei’s point that the identity of God cannot be described 
apart from the identity of the resurrected Jesus of Nazareth, (for without the 
resurrection not only is Jesus not Jesus, but God is not God), the result is an even 
more profound epistemological agnosticism when it comes to the content of God.  
Unsurprisingly, then, Bultmann writes about the “invisibility of God”, which 
“excludes every myth which tries to make God and His action visible”.
38
  Such 
‘myths’ include Jesus.  
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3. Speaking about the Content of God 
3.1 The Unknowable God 
This concept of Jesus, and therefore of God, as essentially unknowable and 
unknown
39
 even in self-revelation, is not a problem for the existentialist theologian.  
Quite the contrary: this unknowability is the point.  Where Schleiermacher could 
speak of the immanence of God in the universal God-consciousness, the existentialist 
theologian can speak only of the absence of God.  Niebuhr, for example, locates 
God’s revelation in the human need for God: our God-consciousness, such as it is, is 
the consciousness of not having God.  In other words, even when God reveals, that 
revelation is of God’s absence; and so what we know in revelation is not God, but 
ourselves as apart from God.  This is not to say that Niebuhr, any more than 
Bultmann, understands God to be a mere psychological phenomenon, having 
existence only as God is experienced.  On the contrary, as Bultmann qualifies: 
 From the statement that to speak of God is to speak of myself, it by no means follows that 
 God is not outside the believer.
40
   
Nor does Bultmann equate experience with emotion, observing caustically that “faith 
which is born of such an emotion is ultimately a faith in myself.”
41
  Existentialist 
theology insists throughout upon the reality of God.  It is simply that this reality 
cannot be approached from the human end of the absolute dialectic, for God’s 
revelation-to-us is not to be equated with God’s self-revelation.  A wedge has been 
inserted between the deus and the dixit, so that in God’s essence, God remains 
unknowable. 
 
However, Bultmann does have an epistemological dimension to his theology, and it 
is precisely this: that “de-mythologising is the radical application of the doctrine of 
justification by faith to the sphere of knowledge and thought”.
42
  The dialectic 
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between humanity and the ‘wholly other’ God ensures that revelation, like faith, is 
always a gift and never a possession.  As such, it “destroys every longing for 
security”
43
 and ensures that we can never reason our way to God, any more than we 
can work our way to salvation.  The moment we accept that – the moment we realise 
our absolute profanity – is the moment, paradoxically, of faith.  Indeed, it is the 
ultimate insight of faith, to know that God is utterly unknowable.  For Bultmann, this 
unknowability is the content of God. 
 
So God-in-Godself is unknown and unknowable for the existentialist theologians.  
Nevertheless, they are able to talk confidently about the moment of revelation as the 
presence of Jesus Christ to us.  Indeed, it is precisely the presence of Christ which 
confronts us paradoxically with the absence of God, as dramatised so 
paradigmatically on the Cross.  Thus it is the presence of Christ which constitutes the 
revelatory starting point for the whole existentialist theological system.   
 
However, the existentialist theologians have difficulty in maintaining what Frei calls 
the “identity of God with himself when he is God for us”.
44
  In other words, they 
struggle to hold together the separate, “fleeting” moments of revelation in which 
Christ confronts us.  This is because their lack of an account of the identity of Jesus 
Christ with himself means that his identity then becomes “diffused” across these 
countless moments of intersection, each containing not the fullness of the self-
revealing God, but only a minute fraction of who Jesus was and is.  Hence Frei’s 
awareness of the ‘tragedy’ of the existentialist logic of belief – a tragedy which is 
detectable even in Bultmann’s own description: 
 In these ‘experiences’ we are always being questioned, being put to the test.  We cannot 
 possess them; we ‘have’ them only in action. But in that act, the more genuinely we grasp the 
 experiences, the more uncertain and doubtful of ourselves do we become.
45 
Bultmann is at pains to stress that the loss of self is precisely what leads us to 
dependence upon the grace of God.  But even so, there is a link between the lack of a 
concrete identity for Jesus Christ, and the loss of our own identity.  The fleeting 
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moments of God’s revelation fragment our knowledge not merely of God, but also of 
ourselves: as Jesus’ identity is diffused into his presence-to-us, so too our identity, 
which images his, struggles to maintain its self-focus.  Hence in the existentialist 
scheme, our “fear of nonidentity” is a very real fear indeed, for the unity of all our 
separate moments of existence relies utterly on the unity which Christ gives to us, not 
to mention the unity which, in the figurative scheme, he gives also to time.  It is 
Frei’s insight that these fleeting moments of revelation can be held together only in 
the person of Jesus Christ, whose identity as the one who cannot be thought of as not 
living unites past and present, history and faith.  That is why it is only once this 
identity has been established, that talk about his presence can begin.  And it is only 
as this presence is abiding (though not immanent, and not possessed), that the unity 
of our own fleeting existential experiences in one self-focussed and continuous self 
can be established and maintained.  
 
In summary then, to begin the logic of belief with Jesus’ presence to us, is to begin 
with us, in all our tragic contingency and separation from God.  Then it is to suggest 
that Jesus' own identity is akin to ours, and equally tragic: that he too suffers from 
the same contingency and dialectical separation from God that characterise the 
human condition.  Thus, while Niebuhr, Bultmann, and Tillich would all agree that 
Jesus is the revelation of God, their real problem is that Jesus himself is unfindable.  
He is the stranger, and not the friend; he is a fleeting encounter rather than an abiding 
presence; and so his existential self, if known at all, is known only to himself, and is 
hidden from us.  And given the coincidence that Frei has established between the 
identity of Jesus Christ and the content of God, this means that there is no way for us 
to speak concretely about God: the storied God of the Bible is once again reduced to 
an abstraction.   
 
3.2 The Personhood of God 
Frei’s contention is that a realistic narrative reading of the resurrection accounts 
indicates that God has made Godself known in Jesus Christ.  Therefore, in direct 
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opposition to the existentialist position, Frei insists that in Jesus Christ, the content of 
God has “descriptive availability”
46
: 
 The concept of identity will involve … an affirmation that the singular and true identity of a 
 person is mysteriously and yet significantly manifest and therefore accessible, rather than 
 being a remote and ineffable, unknown quantity.
47
 
However, dialectical theology raises an objection at this point.  For Schleiermacher, 
Barth, and the Neo-Orthodox alike, dialectical theology starts with the insistence, 
that any epistemological venture must first of all ringfence God’s absolute 
subjecthood.  The difficulty then becomes how to talk about God in such a way that 
the dialectic is maintained, when the most logical response to God’s sovereign 
governance of God’s own predicates is silence.  To some extend, this worry explains 
Schleiermacher’s preferred focus on our consciousness of God, rather than on God in 
Godself.  It also explains Bultmann’s stress on the absence and unknowability of 
God even in the moment of revelation.  Barth answers this problem with an account 
of a God who is sovereign subject, but who yet in gracious revelation has opened up 
“the impossible possibility” that “the unknown can as such become an object of 
knowledge”.
48
  This means that the “descriptive availability” of God in Frei’s 
account of revelation is an option for Barth, but is no option at all for Bultmann or 
Schleiermacher.  
 
The task facing Frei’s theological grammar is therefore how to balance the principle 
of the “descriptive availability”
 
of the content of God, with the dialectical axiom, that 
God is sovereign and free.  In the light of that freedom, revelation cannot be pinned 
down in human language; yet the accounts of the resurrection clearly show, that to 
speak of Jesus is to speak of God, as God’s inseparable predicate.  Indeed, to allocate 
God and Jesus to these grammatical categories is almost an irrelevance: in the 
resurrection, something more akin to a shared subjecthood is being posited, as Jesus 
is manifested as the ‘self’ of God.  Even with the caveat of not loading too much 
ontological weight onto a grammatical formulation, this should still mean that what 
is predicable of the identity of Jesus is predicable also of the content of God. 
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Accordingly, given that in the resurrection, God is manifested in the actual, bodily, 
presence of Jesus, this means for Frei that we now have divine permission to 
predicate personhood to God.  Moreover, having revealed thus, it is now unthinkable 
that God could have done so in any other medium; which means in turn that it is 
unthinkable not to think of God as eternally personal.  As Barth puts it, the bodily 
resurrection is “not only His reality for us – certainly that – but at the same time His 
own, inner, proper reality, behind which and above which there is no other.”
49
  Frei 
notes that, where christocentric theologians such as Schleiermacher were happy to 
attribute the actuality of the “incarnate Reconciliation” to “the free grace of God”
50
, 
Barth is almost a lone voice in insisting that not only the actuality, but also the 
possibility and the need for redemption can be explained “solely from the event 
itself”.
51
  Frei describes Barth on the incarnation, in terms that could just as easily be 
applied to his own account of the resurrection: 
 The ground of the actuality of the incarnation, of its ontological possibility, and of our being 
 able to think about it, are one and the same.
52 
For Frei, as for Barth, nothing can be stated, and nothing can be known about God, 
outside of what God has revealed in the historical and narrative actuality of Jesus 
Christ. 
 
For Frei, then, the ‘personhood’ of God is a relatively straightforward proposition.  
However, for the existentialist theologian, the issue is considerably more complex.  
Dialectical theology insists that any epistemological venture must as a starting point 
ringfence the absolute subjecthood of God.  As an acting ‘subject’, this means that 
God must rightfully be called a ‘person’, as opposed to some mere metaphysical 
entity, for if revelation is “the ‘I-Thou encounter’ par excellence”
53
, then as Buber 
argues, only a person can be known as ‘Thou’.  However, although revelation is the 
meeting of ‘persons’, this is no meeting of equals – God as Absolute Subject has a 
freedom and power which we dependent subjects can never have.  Nevertheless, 
existentialist theology can posit a kind of analogia entis between the two subjects.  
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Not that we can say that God is ontologically a ‘person’ as such – for existentialist 
theologians, that would be to posit an illegitimately-derived and speculative content 
to God.  But nevertheless, God is a ‘person’ to us, when confronted in faith.  Thus 
revelation comes to us not as any abstract or historically distant event, but concretely, 
specifically, and immediately, in the meeting of a Person with a person.  Indeed, the 
event of revelation to us is precisely that which, at epistemologically-speaking, 
makes God a ‘person’. 
 
For Bultmann, it follows from our experience of God as personal that we are 
permitted to use the analogy of a ‘person’ to describe God: 
 When we speak of God as acting, we mean that we are confronted with God, addressed, 
 asked, judged, or  blessed by God.  Therefore to speak in this manner is not to speak in 
 symbols or images, but to speak analogically.  For when we speak in this manner of God as 
 acting, we conceive God’s action as an analogue to the actions taking place between men. ... 
 it is in this analogical sense that we call Him Father.  We are not only justified in speaking 
 thus, but we must do so, since we are now not speaking of an idea about God, but of God 
 Himself.
54 
This concept of analogy has the advantage of outlawing metaphysical or speculative 
statements, and of grounding theology in the actual subject-to-subject encounter: 
“God is a personal being acting on persons”.
55
  However, such analogical speech also 
has its limits.  One of them – of which Bultmann and Niebuhr are highly aware – is 
the danger of anthropomorphism: we may think we are talking about God, when 
once again we are talking about ourselves “in a loud voice”.
56
  However, and more 
importantly for our purposes, at the core of Bultmann’s concept of analogy is a deep 
sense of the failure of human language to talk about God.  As Bultmann understands 
it in the citation above, the description of God as ‘Father’ is valid only if one 
understands first of all that God is not ‘Father’; it is valid only if one understands 
first of all that the predicate essentially fails to describe God.  The problem for 
Christian existentialism is that the wedge that it has driven between epistemology 
and ontology, between God’s revelation-to-us and God an sich, means that we 
cannot hold our experience of God as a ‘person’ to be ontologically true.  Indeed, the 
insistence on the unknowability of God means that, while affirming that God is truly 
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a person when confronted in faith, Bultmann must simultaneously deny that our 
experience truly refers.  As a means of speaking about God, analogy has failed 
Bultmann. 
 
The implications of this failure of analogy are yet wider.  The problem, for Bultmann 
as for Tillich, is that Jesus himself is on the wrong side of the dialectic, in his own 
way as alienated from God as we are.  Indeed, the fact that Jesus is a person means 
quite simply that he is not God; that there is no co-incidence between his being and 
God’s.  God’s revelation he certainly was and is, but in the existentialist scheme, 
revelation can reveal to us truths only about our own selves: under no revelatory 
circumstances can we ever “speak of what God is in Himself”, but can only ever 
speak “of what He is doing to us and with us.”
57
  So for all Bultmann’s consideration 
of analogy, Frei is right when he says that analogy is simply not an option for 
existentialist theologians.
58
  It does not help them in any way to talk about God. 
 
Frei therefore detects a great abstract hole at the heart of existentialist dialectical 
theology, which is the lack of content to God.  Moreover, as explained in Chapter 2, 
he traces this lacuna back to Barth’s early theology, and its starting point in the 
doctrine of revelation, posited without the essential content of the identity of the 
historical Jesus of Nazareth.  Mike Higton identifies the issue as follows: 
 Barth had somehow managed, Frei thought, to make this incarnational assertion without 
 paying detailed attention to Jesus Christ’s actual historical humanity … if we follow this 
 effectively monophysite approach we make the catching up of Christ’s history into God an 
 abstract marker, intelligible without reference to the content that is caught up, which could in 
 principle have been placed beside any historical content whatsoever.
59
 
The lack of content in Barth’s ontological starting point was compounded, or perhaps 
confirmed, by the dialectic’s denial of the human ability to speak of God.  For Barth 
himself this was not an insuperable problem, for even in the midst of the fierce 
dialectic of Der Römerbrief, he had a positive as well as a negative account of God’s 
interaction with humanity: “The ‘Yes’ of God illuminates the place where His ‘No’ 
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is complete and radical as the divine negation”.
60
  However, for his fellow dialectical 
theologians, the Christian existentialists, the “No” of God sounded a whole lot louder 
than the “Yes”, so that God’s own self effectively cancels out even that analogical 
language which God’s self-revelation has permitted. 
 
Of course, Frei forgives Barth this early abstraction, in that he reads him as later 
‘turning to analogy’, and thus demonstrating how it is possible, despite the dialectic, 
to speak truly of the content of God.  Whether or not Frei has misread Barth on this 
supposed ‘turn’
61
, it remains true that Barth can talk positively about God where 
Bultmann cannot.  This is because, even if the early Barth was wrong to begin with a 
contentless positing of the deus dixit, he at least held the deus and the dixit together, 
refusing to separate the subject from the predicate.  In addition, Barth presents a 
concept of a God who has revealed to us in Jesus Christ; and given that this is so, “in 
the predicate and object of the concept of revelation we must have … the subject 
itself.  Revelation and revealing must be equal to the revealer”.
62
  Therefore, as Frei 
observes, “there must be a correspondence in predicable qualities between him and 
his creatures”
63
: not on the basis of any analogia entis (the dialectic is still absolute), 
but on the basis of an analogy established by grace to faith – the analogia fidei.
64
   
 
Perhaps, though, the main differences between the Barthian dialectic, the 
existentialist dialectic, and Frei’s own version, can be summed up as follows.  Barth 
starts with the contentless but logical and grammatical point: that we can speak about 
God only because of God’s revelation.  Bultmann recognises rightly the contentless 
nature of this doctrine of revelation, but illegitimately transfers what for Barth is 
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mere grammatical prolegomena across into the realm of epistemology.  Hence 
Bultmann insists that we cannot talk about God despite God’s revelation.  Frei, 
however, counsels that the doctrine of revelation be recognised for the contentless 
grammatical statement it is.  As such, it has a logical function in theology, but does 
not in itself provide any content to God.  Rather, it is only in exegesis that this 
grammatical “frontier” – that God reveals – becomes a true predicate of God.  In 
other words, once again we have simultaneity rather than priority: while logically our 
prolegomena is deus dixit, in actuality we derive this starting point – this hypothesis 
– from exegesis.   For if Jesus Christ is indeed the content of God, then there can be 
no valid talk about God apart from that content; and nor can there be any leaping 
over that narrative starting point to a more general prolegomena. 
 
3.3 Frei’s Doctrine of Analogy 
By speaking first about the identity of Jesus Christ, Frei is able to predicate 
personhood to God, where ultimately, Bultmann and Niebuhr can only insist on 
God’s unknowability.  However, that is not to say that Frei envisages any kind of 
absolute knowledge of God in revelation.  Perhaps surprisingly, Frei himself has an 
understanding, although predicated quite differently from the existentialist one, of 
the essential unknowability of God.  Where starting at the ‘wrong’ end of the logic of 
belief renders a God who is unknowable, even starting at the ‘right’ end does not 
mean that the knowledge of God will fall complete into our grasping hands.   
 
For Frei, the dialectic still holds: there is no human way of ‘producing’ Jesus through 
reading, preaching, or faith.  This was the error of the New Hermeneutic, which 
picked up on Bultmann’s location of the resurrection in the ‘kerygma’, stating that 
“in the proclamation of the resurrection the historical Jesus himself has come to 
us”.
65
  This led to their conviction that human language has an inherent revelatory 
capacity, which means that revelation ‘happens’ whenever the ‘myths’ of the Bible  
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are ‘translated’ into contemporary conceptuality and idiom.  In Fuchs’ words: 
 God’s revelation consists simply in God’s letting men state God’s own problems in their 
 language, in grace and judgement.
66 
By contrast, Frei refuses to allow to even his preferred ‘realistic narrative’ 
hermeneutic this power of ‘producing’ the experience or knowledge of God.  AS he 
explains in emphatic italics, “Reenactment can no more make him present than the 
passage of time can bear him way.”
67
  In a later essay, Frei takes pains to correct this 
misreading of his earlier work.  Here he distances himself from any association with 
New Criticism, a movement in literary criticism which held that the literary meaning 
of a text need not concern itself with the concept of an external truth, so that a text 
can be totally self-referential.
68
  Frei perceives that, while New Criticism suspends 
the question as to whether truth is generally accessible, it assumes nevertheless that 
meaning is a general class, accessible “to all reasonable people who know how to 
relate genus, species, and individual case properly”.
69
  In the case of the gospels, this 
would mean that God was generally available to anyone who knew how to read – 
clearly an unacceptable premise in the light of Frei’s rejection of system and of 
general revelation.  The medium is not the thing. 
 
On the contrary, Frei contends that, even as the gospels reveal the identity of Jesus 
Christ, they simultaneously conceal it.  Frei’s “intention-action” scheme is balanced 
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by his “self-manifestation” category, in which there is a stable and continuous ‘self’ 
which unites all the moment-by-moment intended-acts: 
 Self-manifestation description ... tries to point to the continuity of a person’s identity 
 throughout the transitions brought about by his acts and life’s events.
70 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this core ‘self’, which ensures the continuity of identity, 
has three specific qualities: it possesses “persistence, elusiveness, and ultimacy”.
71
  
The first category of “persistence” refers to the continuity of a Self in time, “from 
action to action” and throughout all changes and even contradictions in identity.  
This “persistence” of Jesus’ identity as the revelation of God provides the 
counterweight to the intersecting and fleeting ‘moment’ of revelation in the 
dialectical scheme, while also encompassing the changes to the person of Jesus 
brought about by the resurrection.   The third category of “ultimate” stresses another 
point we have made, that we cannot abstract Jesus’ qualities and actions from the 
Jesus who possesses or performs them: he is, and they are, unsubstitutable. 
 
However, the interest when it comes to the personhood of God is in the second 
category.  Frei insists that the core and continuous self which is truly manifested in 
our intended actions is nevertheless “elusive”, not merely to other people, but also to 
the actual self which is being manifested.  As he points out, “one’s own acts now 
cannot become objects of knowledge to oneself until they have receded into the 
past”.
72
  To do otherwise would be somehow to step outside of oneself when no such 
detached viewpoint is available.  This is true even of God, in the sense that the 
concept of God stepping outside of Godself is nonsensical – although it would be 
unwise to stretch the analogy further than this.  And as for humans, who are not all-
in-all, it is simply an impossibility.  This means that the very persistent and ultimate 
resurrected identity which guarantees Jesus’ presence to us, guarantees also that his 
abiding presence can never be known directly by us, precisely because it is a present 
happening.  For Frei, then, beyond the fleetingness of the dialectical moment, our 
attempts to make a possession of God are frustrated by the fact that even an abiding 
presence is a presence, and not a past event. 
                                                 
70
 Frei, Identity, 165. 
71
 Ibid. 138. 
72
 Ibid. 138–9. 
   217 
As a present event, the self is therefore never fully available to the knowing subject, 
but can only be described “indirectly, i.e., in and through its manifestation”.
73
  It 
must be emphasised that, although indirect, it is nevertheless truly the self which is 
manifested: God’s revelation is complete, even if we do not thereby know God 
completely.  Accordingly, Frei rejects utterly the concept of “the self seen in 
alienation from its manifestation”, but counsels rather that we should think of “a 
complex of indirect identity between the self and its manifestation”.
74
  It is true that 
Jesus is identified by what he does and undergoes; it is true likewise that God is 
identified by what God does and undergoes in Jesus Christ.  However, we must 
remember once again that the ‘medium’ is not the ‘thing’.  As was established in 
Chapter 3, just because the identity of Jesus Christ is revealed through the medium of 
a story, that does not mean that Jesus has no reality apart from the story.  Likewise, 
even though God reveals in the ‘medium’ of a human person, so that we may 
fittingly and accurately speak of God as a ‘person’, this does not mean that God is, in 
a simple sense, a human person.  Thus Frei cautions: 
 The believer must abide by the New Testament’s complex rather than simple identification of 
 God and Jesus – an identification that can only be narrated…
75
 
This complexity of identity means for us that, although the identity of the God’s self 
with God’s manifestation is true, it is simultaneously indirect and is most fitly 
described analogically. 
 
Although the medium of revelation is certainly not God an sich, nevertheless, as we 
have established, the form is founded in the content.  One might paraphrase these 
two observations of Frei’s as follows: while the medium which God chose for 
revelation – person and Word – is not to be correlated directly with the being of God, 
yet in choosing to reveal in the form of person and of Word, God has provided us 
with true knowledge of God’s content.  That Jesus is a person means that we can 
rightly, if analogically, think of God as a person.  At the same time, if Jesus’ self is 
“elusive”, then we can legitimately read his elusiveness as a revelation of the 
epistemological elusiveness of God.  We can read Jesus as revelatory of God because 
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the content of God as a ‘person’ grounds God’s ‘choice’ of Jesus of Nazareth as the 
form of revelation.  Once again, this is no “pressing back” of the personhood of Jesus 
into the being of God, but is rather a ‘working forward’, from the personal God to the 
inseparable predicate.  As Nicolas Wolterstorff puts it, “God speaks by way of a 
human being only if God is that human being – Jesus Christ”.
76
  Therefore, while the 
medium is not the thing, yet the medium is governed by the thing as the predicate is 
governed by the subject; and this to the point that God’s identity is so utterly 
inseparable from Jesus of Nazareth, that it can be predicated in no other way.   
 
This self-chosen availability of God to us, in human and narrative form, is at the base 
of Frei’s doctrine of analogy.  A doctrine of analogy does not do away with the 
dialectic: indeed, the dialectical separation of God and world is at the core of any 
understanding of analogy, for any more immanent account of revelation renders God 
directly available, and so does away with the need for analogy at all: 
 Analogy … takes place wholly within and on the basis of dialectic.  It has no independent 
 position of its own.
77
  
 At this point, let us concede to Bruce McCormack, that Frei may well have taken too 
readily on board von Balthasar’s thesis, that Barth had turned from dialectic to 
analogy.
78
  Be that as it may, and whatever the implications for Barth scholarship, 
Frei himself embraces analogy, not just because he thought Barth did, but because of 
his own understanding, that it takes a doctrine of analogy to turn the dialectic’s vital 
grammatical negation into a positive description of the content of God.  As he 
himself explained, it is only with such a doctrine in place that “knowledge and object 
correspond to one another positively, even though God in his revelation is only the 
indirect object of reflection”.
79
  Frei is fully aware that the dialectic remains logically 
prior to all positive analogical statement; but in actuality, the dialectic has no 
ontological reality that can be separated from analogy.  In other words, the 
understanding that we cannot speak directly of the being of God is given to us in and 
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with the God-given ability for human language analogically to describe God’s 
identity in Jesus Christ.  After all, if we could speak directly of God, then we would 
have no need of Jesus, or indeed, of any revelation.  Hence Frei’s entire project: the 
establishment of the starting point for all subsequent talk about God in the identity of 
Jesus Christ.   
 
In sum, Frei’s depiction of the identity of God in Jesus Christ renders an account of 
God in which God has simultaneously revealed and hidden Godself.  Where Barth 
had his concept of the veiling and unveiling of God in Christ, once again Frei 
grounds this insight in the gospel narratives, in which the identity of Jesus Christ is 
truly revealed through his intended actions, while at the same time the subject-self 
which binds them all together is not directly available to us.  Indeed, as long as the 
self is a present reality, that self will escape our grasp.  The hermeneutical spotlight 
can certainly be turned upon the past event of the cross and resurrection, and in doing 
so, can truly identify Jesus as the Crucified and Risen One: this is the sense in which 
Frei insists that the identity of Jesus is available to believer and nonbeliever alike.  
Nevertheless, the sense in which these past revelatory events are not simply fleeting 
dialectical moments in history, but abiding, eternal, present events, is beyond the 
scope of objective description.  Therefore, the assumption of the existentialist 
theologians is itself wrongheaded, that even though God an sich is epistemologically 
unavailable, they can at least describe the present encounter with God: such a 
description would be for us to step outside of our own “elusive” selves.  Rather, even 
if we can truly describe the existential encounter with God, we can still only ever 
describe it as a past event – which, in Bultmann’s own terms, is an abstraction.   
 
This is the series of tensions by means of which Frei seeks to do justice both to the 
revelation of God to creation, and to the essential dialectical separation between the 
two.  The alternative to a doctrine of analogy is the annihilation, not of God’s 
absolute subjectivity, but of ours, for of the two ‘persons’ meeting here in the 
moment of revelation, the attribute of ‘reality’ rightly belongs to God.  Bultmann 
admits this, but dismisses it as illegitimately “transcendent” talk.
80
  Instead, he 
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predicates any analogical talk about the personhood of God on our own personhood, 
rather than on Jesus’.  However, as Frei points out, the grammatical logic of belief 
must work in the other direction: it is God who defines God’s own predicates, and in 
the process also defines ours:   
 If the concept of ‘personhood’ describes God as well as man, it is man who stands in need of 
 analogical explanation, and not God – who is in himself fully the content of person: he is this 
 particular person, the particular act of being and self-originating purposive event who is 
 Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  As this person, this concrete identity of being and meaning, he 
 is the Creator of all contingent being and value and meaning.  We cannot go behind the 
 Triune God for a notion of being, meaning, or value.  For he is, as this person, pure act, pure 
 aseity ... His personhood is therefore defined by and in himself – and not in the first place 
 either in  positive relation to or distinction from (negative relation to) the creature.
81 
Once again, Frei has demonstrated how the error of existentialism is to start at the 
wrong end of the linear logic of belief.  That Jesus could redefine all human 
predicates is because he and God are one subject, as the resurrection reveals.  It is 
therefore God who defines humanity, and not humanity that defines God. 
 
4. The Mode of the Presence of God 
4.1 The Holy Spirit  
 To say that Jesus Christ cannot not be, that who he is constrains the imagination to 
 acknowledge him as present, that in him identity and presence are given together completely 
 as one – to say all these things is not yet to say anything specifically about his presence.
82
 
In the epilogue of his christological study, Frei’s task is precisely to say something 
“specific” about the presence of Jesus Christ.  If he fails to do so, then he has not 
demonstrated that his logic of belief actually works.  It is one thing to illustrate how 
beginning with presence cannot lead to identity; but the proof of his alternative 
hypothesis will be whether beginning with identity can lead to presence.  Moreover, 
this ‘presence’ cannot stop at a grammatically negative formulation, but must be 
describable in terms every bit as concrete and positive as those which describe Jesus’ 
identity.  In short, the question becomes, not simply who is present (Frei has 
established that); nor on what basis can we speak of his presence (Frei has  
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established that also); but in what manner he can be said to be present now.  And 
even at this point in Frei’s logic of belief, this is no straightforward undertaking: 
 Although Christian believers assert [Jesus’] self-presence now as a literal fact, they do not 
 know how to imagine or conceive it...; all they can say is that it must have a spatial and 
 temporal basis without it being subject to these confinements in such a way as to be 
 trammeled in its freedom.
83 
The question Frei identifies concerns how we humans, limited by time and space to 
analogy, are to speak of his presence when Jesus is not available to the senses?  For 
all that claims for Jesus’ presence are predicated upon his most concrete narrative 
identity; and for all that his identity description as the Living One necessarily 
includes his presence; nevertheless, the indirect and elusive nature of Jesus’ presence 
in our historical moment seems illegitimately discontinuous with his direct historical 
presence to his disciples.  And if we mean something entirely different when we 
speak about the presence of Christ, compared to what we mean when we speak about 
the presence of a friend, then it may be that our grammar has betrayed us, and the 
nonbelievers are correct when they point out in bewilderment that there is nothing 
there.   
 
It is at this point in his christological proposal that Frei brings in the Holy Spirit: a 
late and very brief consideration which could potentially lead to accusations of 
binitarianism.  However, in the brevity of his treatment, Frei is at least in good 
company.  In Church Dogmatics IV, Barth writes about the brevity of the creedal 
formulations on the Holy Spirit, and the paucity of doctrines pertaining to the Spirit, 
as illustrations not simply of theological difficulty, but perhaps also of necessary 
silence: 
 Even the New Testament, although time and again it places the Holy Spirit between the event 
 of Christ on the one hand and the Christian community and the Christian faith on the other, 
 does not really tell us anything about the How, the mode of His working ... All that is said of 
 it is an attestation and confirmation of the fact that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Jesus Christ 
 ... Beyond the description and assertion of this fact there did not emerge any doctrine of the 
 Holy Spirit and His work even in the secondary and later theology of the Church. All that 
 could be done was to refer forward to this special work of God from Christology and the 
 doctrine of justification (or sanctification or calling), and to refer backward to it from the 
 doctrine of the Church and of faith (or love or hope).
84 
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In other words, beyond a simple Trinitarian affirmation, the church traditionally has 
had very little to say about the Spirit in ontological terms.  Rather, it has been 
obliged to refer first and foremost to the acts of the Spirit: to what the Spirit actually 
does in the world and in the church.  Frei’s central and oft-repeated point is that we 
cannot separate God from God’s works, for God constitutes God’s own identity in 
and by God’s works.  In one respect then, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit may be the 
one which is most amenable to Frei’s descriptive treatment.  If we are looking for the 
concrete content of God the Holy Spirit, then we must look at the acts of the Spirit in 
time, including our time: God with us, as Barth puts it, “is not a state but an event”.
85
   
 
Nevertheless, as has been established, the resurrection remains our logical starting 
point for any theological enterprise.  For Barth, the ability to talk about “God with 
us” in Church Dogmatics IV is rooted firmly in the concrete history of Jesus Christ: 
 We must realise that the Christian message does not at its heart express a concept or an idea, 
 nor does it recount an anonymous history to be taken as truth and reality only in concepts and 
 ideas.  This means that all the concepts and ideas used in this report (God, man, world, 
 eternity, time, even salvation, grace, transgression, atonement and many others) can derive 
 their significance only from the bearer of this name and from His history, and not the reverse 
 ... They cannot say what has to be said with some meaning of their own or in some context of 
 their own abstracted from this name.  They can serve only to describe this name – the name 
 of Jesus Christ.
86
 
In similar fashion, Frei grounds his talk of the Holy Spirit in the concrete gospel 
account of the identity of Jesus Christ – a hermeneutical realism, if you will, rather 
than a strictly historical one.  Indeed, the very concreteness of that narrative identity 
sets the pattern for all our talk about God, including God the Spirit, so that anything 
less than concrete is less than real. 
 
Therefore, when Frei states that “to speak of the identity of Jesus, in which he is 
affirmed by the believer to be present, is also to speak of the presence of God”
87
, we 
read ‘God’ wrongly if we think of God in terms only of God the Father.  In the first 
place, this would be to posit an illegitimate separation between the Father and the 
Son, who, it will be recalled, have been revealed in the resurrection as sharing one 
                                                 
85
 Barth, CD IV/1, 6. 
86
 Barth, CD IV/1, 16–17. 
87
 Frei, Identity, 186. 
   223 
subject.  Rather, it is important to realise that the “complex unity” of God and Jesus 
of Nazareth, in which “we can no longer think of God except as we think of Jesus at 
the same time, nor of Jesus except by reference to God”
88
, is also a complex 
grammatical unity of an historically past event and the eternally present event of the 
presence of God now.  This complex grammatical unity is made slightly simpler in 
the lexicon of the Christian believer by means of the term, the ‘Holy Spirit’.   
 
Importantly, this is not to say that Frei has reduced the Spirit to a mere grammatical 
function.  Rather, it is to say that the complex unity between God and Jesus Christ, as 
evidenced by the tangles of grammar and logic which Frei has so patiently 
unravelled, is a unity which is effected by the Holy Spirit.  According to Barth, the 
Spirit is situated logically and grammatically as the one who affirms the unity of the 
other two ‘modes of being’ of God: “God’s self-attestation makes what He does the 
Word which is spoken to this man and received and accepted by him.  The Holy 
Spirit is God in this His self-attestation.”
89
  Or to put it another way, the Holy Spirit 
is the principle of the unity of deus and dixit, and so is revealed in that unity.  In 
Frei’s similarly anti-speculative stance, there is likewise no gap between who God is 
and what God does, so that when God reveals to us in our present existential 
moment, the Spirit is the principle of the unity of that event of revelation with the 
revealing subject.  If indeed, as we have found, we cannot insert a wedge between 
ontological subject and epistemological predicate, it is because they are held together 
by the Spirit. 
 
The Spirit as the principle of unity can be extended yet further, to underlie the whole 
scheme of figuration outlined in Chapter 3.  The Spirit can be identified with the 
‘inspired’ gospel story, which narrates without strain the unity of divine and human 
in Jesus Christ.  Likewise, the Spirit can be identified with the unity of divine and 
human in Jesus’ concrete personal self.  As such, the Holy Spirit is also revealed to 
be, analogously, a ‘person’.  And finally, when it comes to the issue of the presence 
of Jesus Christ, Frei’s gospel exegesis reveals the central role of the concept of the 
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Holy Spirit.  While Jesus was still directly present to his disciples, the Spirit was yet 
a shadowy concept, mysteriously unifying God with this man Jesus of Nazareth, 
most particularly at his conception and baptism.  However, as the gospel narratives 
begin to move through Jesus’ death and resurrection, and into the Book of Acts, so 
“this indirectness both of Christ’s presence and of our grasp of it as a mysterious, 
self-focused presence is expressed in the stress … on the fact that Jesus had to 
withdraw from men before the Spirit would be bestowed on the community of 
believers”.
90
  In other words, Frei is equating the two: the indirectness of Christ’s 
presence to us is the concrete content of the Holy Spirit.   
 
This is how the Christian is able to achieve the remarkable grammatical feat of 
asserting the self-focussed presence of Jesus Christ, which must necessarily have a 
“spatial and temporal” basis if it is to be continuous with his direct presence to his 
disciples, while yet insisting that that same body is not confined by space and time 
“in such a way as to be trammeled in its freedom”.  This is also what allows the 
Christian to access a grammar and doctrine of analogy in order to express the self-
presence of Christ to us: 
 His presence has ... a spatial and temporal basis.  He must be conceived of in analogy to the 
 only manner in which we know presence: Presence means something like physical proximity 
 and verbal communication; and it also involves self-presence, without which there cannot be 
 presence to others.  It is only insofar as he is self-focused that he can be present now.
91 
In contrast to the ‘liberal’ account of the impact of Jesus’ personality or God-
consciousness; and in contrast also to his dissipated presence in the existentialist 
scheme, which relies on our fragile reality in space and time to anchor his; Frei’s 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the indirect presence of Christ locates his indirectness 
precisely in his presence.  The ever-present subject-self of the triune God has given 
Godself to us in revelation.  Yet once again, God’s presence is necessarily indirect: 
for we remember first of all, that a person is always elusive; and remember secondly, 
that one cannot objectify presence until – instantaneously – it has become the past. 
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4.2 The Spirit in Our Time 
We have established, then, that the narrative identity of Jesus Christ, as the one who 
cannot be thought of as not living, extends the gospel narratives into our present 
historical and existential moment.  This unity of past and present is the work of the 
Holy Spirit, whose identity is the indirect presence of Christ to us.  Anchored by the 
actuality of the gospel resurrection accounts, the acts of God now are likewise 
narratable.  Such a narration is a fraught exercise: the experience of God in this 
present moment is precisely the starting point of the existentialists, and if the 
narration loses its hermeneutical anchor in the identity of Jesus Christ, then it once 
again quickly degenerates into “illusion or covert talk about the human self”.
92
  
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to Frei’s account of the content of God to attempt to 
describe the continued action of God the Holy Spirit into in our present history.  
Although of course, one must always bear in mind the provisional nature of such 
description. 
 
Frei starts by conceiving of the Holy Spirit in terms of the function the Spirit plays in 
the life of the believer.  In the classical Calvinistic sense, he uses ‘Spirit’ to define 
the difference between faith and nonbelief.  The nonbeliever, as we have seen, is at 
no disadvantage in reading scripture when it comes to the identity of Jesus Christ.  
Therefore, a nonbeliever can speak of the narratively-rendered cumulative identity of 
Jesus with perfect accuracy, even to the point of saying that according to the 
narrative, to think of Jesus as not present is not to think of him at all.   However, 
unless the gift of faith is given, perhaps even in and with the reading of the narrative, 
the nonbeliever cannot make that leap from Jesus as present according to the 
narrative, to Jesus as actually present now.  The narrative in itself has no power to 
make Jesus present to the reader, and nor does a right hermeneutic.  Rather, true to 
Calvin’s insight, the words on the page remain “dead letters”
93
 except as God gives 
them the capacity to speak now, by granting simultaneously the gift of the faith 
required for us to perceive their present referent.  Otherwise, Jesus’ identity for the 
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nonbeliever remains merely historical and/or ‘storied’ – and for the nonbeliever, that 
story has come to an end.   
 
For the believer, on the other hand, there can be no such ‘detached’ reading of the 
gospels.  This holds whether they are gifted with faith as they read the story for the 
first time, or whether this is the oft-repeated reading of a faithful Christian.  Rather, 
these tyrannical texts demand that a faithful reading is a ‘self-involving’ reading (an 
existentialist term), that is, a reading which responds to the narrative’s “factual 
affirmation” of the presence of Christ now with “commitment and love”.
94
  As Frei 
points out, while other facts may require the reader’s assent, the narrative’s factual 
affirmation of the presence of God in Jesus Christ requires something more: it 
requires the reader’s whole-hearted self-involvement.  For all that judgement as to 
the truth of Frei’s hypothesis must be suspended prior to exegesis, once that exegesis 
has been carried out, neutrality is no longer an option: only absolute acceptance or 
absolute rejection will do.   
 
Here we may have found a point of connection between Frei’s realistic narrative 
hermeneutic, and the existentialist emphasis on ‘decision’: 
 [Trust and love] are moral and attitudinal perspectives appropriate for other than merely 
 factual occasions.  They are reserved for the affective life and personal relations.  But in this 
 unique instance the distinction will not work.  For the believer to know who Jesus Christ is, 
 to affirm his presence, and to adore him are one and the same thing.  Just as Christ’s presence 
 and identity cannot be conceived apart, factual affirmation of him and commitment to him 
 cannot be conceived apart either.  Reference to the Spirit is the affirmation that the unique 
 unity of Jesus Christ’s identity and presence calls forth a similarly unique response. 
95 
This gift of faith that demands the self-involvement of the reader in the gospel 
narratives is where Frei locates the action of the Holy Spirit in the present.  At this 
point Frei can at last use the word ‘fact’ in a sense which owes nothing to 
Enlightenment rationality, and everything to the faith-encounter.  Faith, which is 
gifted by the Holy Spirit, must affirm the identity of Jesus Christ the Crucified and 
Risen Saviour as a ‘fact’ above and beyond the empirical facts of this world.  This is 
the same sense in which the ‘history-like’ narratives of the gospels are not ‘sub-
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history’ but ‘supra-history’, absorbing and transcending the “brute facts”
 96
 of the 
dialectically estranged world, so that the affirmation of the fact of the resurrection 
becomes an acknowledgement of the absolute reality of God’s revelation as 
perceived in faith.  The life of faith cannot abstract the existentially present 
encounter with God from the details of these ‘history-like’ narratives, but must root 
the indirect presence of Jesus Christ, which is the Holy Spirit, most firmly in his 
factual gospel identity. 
 
5. Eschatology and Identity 
5.1 The Presence of God to the Church 
It is therefore entirely consistent with Frei’s logic of belief to describe the content of 
God in terms of the action of the Holy Spirit in our present history.  However, as has 
been established, the presence of God, which is the identity of Jesus Christ, is always 
“elusive”, so that every attempt at description must be provisional.  This 
provisionality is located first of all in the elusiveness of the person, and secondly, in 
the unobjectifiable nature of the present moment.  But this provisionality also has a 
further basis, and that basis is the eschatological nature of the church.   
 
The work of God the Holy Spirit is most objectively available to us in the work of 
the church.  If Jesus’ presence has “a spatial and temporal basis”, and if presence 
“means something like physical proximity and verbal communication”, then the 
spatial and temporal nature of the church, as constituted by the physical proximity of 
sacrament and the verbal communication of word, is given to us as a fitting analogy 
of Christ’s direct presence to his disciples.  Frei regards the church as having a two-
fold office: first of all, that of witnessing to the presence of Christ; and secondly, that 
of being the communal form of Christ’s indirect presence.
97
  Remembering that the 
medium is not the thing, this means that neither the church, nor the word and 
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sacrament which constitute it, can be identified directly with the presence of Jesus 
Christ.  What Frei says below about sacrament is applicable to word also: 
 The Sacrament is not identical with his physical presence – for he is not physically present 
 now – but it is the self-communication in physical form of one who is self-focused to us who 
 cannot know self-focused presence except in physical form.
98 
Nevertheless, while the church is not Christ, yet “the form is founded in the content”: 
as the communal form of the presence of God in Christ, the church is founded in the 
content of the church’s message, which is the identity of Jesus Christ as narrated in 
the gospels.  And of course, in this “one unique case identity and presence are so 
completely one that to know who he is is to confront his presence”.
99
  This means 
that even as the church witnesses to the identity of Jesus as the content of its 
proclamation, Jesus is already present as the content of the church, witnessing in turn 
to the identity of the church as the fit analogy and medium of “that which it is 
not”.
100
  The unity of Father and Son in the resurrection, which is the Holy Spirit, 
makes possible the unity of the church’s “factual affirmation” of the identity and 





This theological actualism, combined with Frei’s very definite hermeneutical 
realism, has dramatic implications for the language of the church’s proclamation.  
Bultmann, of course, was deeply concerned about preaching, much more so than 
Frei, but was faced always with the task of ‘translating’ the mythical accounts of the 
gospels into contemporary language and myth.  This task brought with it an ever-
present worry about anthropomorphism, for the vagueness and uncertainty of what 
Hunsinger categorises as “expressivism”
102
, means that every statement, every 
metaphor used in preaching, must be accompanied by the caveat that we cannot truly 
describe God.  But where for expressivism, “the divine referent was essentially other 
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than metaphorically depicted”, for Barth, it is “essentially similar”.
103
  In other 
words, and from Frei’s point of view also, in Jesus Christ scripture has provided us 
with the metaphors, concepts, and analogies we need to describe God with relative 
confidence.  For Barth, this is because the scriptural anthropomorphic metaphors 
really do correspond by analogy to God, by means of divine grace – correspondence 
of “Die unbegreiflichen Ähnlichkeit”
104
, which Hunsinger renders as 
“incomprehensible similarity”.
105
  The metaphors work because they originate with 
God, who defines what it means to be a ‘person’, and bestows the definition upon us.  
Hence God is not the comparative: rather, it is our reality which is the weaker 
referent.  God governs God’s own predicates.   
 
To Barth’s account Frei adds the assurance, that Jesus made these metaphors his own 
precisely in the event of the resurrection, when God’s freedom to self-define is 
likewise given fully to him.  So, in contrast to Bultmann, preaching for Frei can 
proceed without worrying about anthropomorphism, for God’s revelation as the 
person of Jesus Christ has in effect sanctioned the human analogy, as long as 
‘human’ is defined by God, and not the other way around.  Furthermore, in Frei’s 
scheme, the use of such scripturally-founded analogies are further guaranteed to 
‘really refer’, in that not only do the scripture narratives fitly describe Jesus’ 
resurrected identity, but they also constitute it, and in doing so, confess him as 
actually present. 
 
5.2 The Presence of God to History 
In a cautious “certain parallel”, Frei finds that he can also describe the Holy Spirit as 
the principle of unity between the ‘fact’ of the indirect presence of Christ to the 
church, and Christ’s presence “in and to the shape of public events of the world and 
of human history”.
106
  In a fascinating statement, Frei declares how “Humanity at 
large is the neighbour given to the church, through whom Christ is present to the 
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church”.
107
  This confirms first of all the “elusiveness” of Christ’s presence, so that 
the church can never claim that his presence is exclusive to its administration of 
word and sacrament.  But more importantly here, Frei is also able to claim that Jesus 
is present to the church through “humanity at large” on the basis of God’s 
providential involvement in the linear process of history, as established at creation 
and sealed by the resurrection.  Thus, even while the church witnesses to Christ’s 
presence to the world, so too the world witnesses to Christ’s presence to the church, 
as events in history point in an analogous, parabolic sense to the grace and 
providence of God.  Indeed, as the preacher knows, images and parables derived 
from the history of the world at large may speak of the presence of Christ with far 
greater power than events simply in church history.  This is not to say that these 
world events constitute the identity of Jesus Christ in the same concrete way as do 
the gospel narratives.  Nevertheless, Jesus’ own use of parable and analogy, coupled 
with God’s gracious revelation in the medium of the chronologically linear historical 
narrative, mandates the analogical predication of world events to the presence of 
Christ.  Indeed, the unsubstitutability, particularly of the event of the resurrection, 
acts to guarantee the analogous unsubstitutability of all historical events and persons.  
This establishment of their uniqueness then frees them to point beyond their 
contemporariness, and to witness in figurative fashion to the work of the Holy Spirit 
in the world.  Thus Frei can state that, where the death of Jesus of Nazareth “has its 
own final and ineradicable “thereness,” after the fashion of all historical events”, so 
“the same is true of all terrible sacrifices dimly setting forth the same pattern”.
108
  
This is a clear counter to Kay’s contention, that Frei’s account of the identity of Jesus 
Christ fails to do “full justice to the claim of the New Testament that Jesus Christ 
continues to address hearers today through the preaching of his heralds”.
109
  Through 
the resurrection, the figurative narrative of the Bible does indeed extend into our time 
and beyond. 
 
Once again, this does not mean that historical events or persons have any power in 
themselves to be or to produce Christ’s presence to us.  Perhaps surprisingly, Frei 
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states that not even the passion and resurrection can “light up all history”, for “it is, 
in the first place, not a parable at all, but an event climactically summing up a long 
series of events”.
110
  In other words, before the resurrection can illumine our present, 
it is first and foremost an event in its own time, contingent and historical, the 
narrative climax of a whole series of contingent events and the summation of history 
up until that point.  This returns us to Frei’s point about figuration – and it seems 
accurate to read his use of “parable” here as a kind of synonym for ‘figure’.  Just as 
the Old Testament events and prophecies must be read first of all according to their 
own immediate referent; and just as their freedom in and for themselves must be 
confirmed before they can be ‘extended’ to refer prophetically to the event and 
person of Jesus Christ; so the events of the Passion must be read according to their 
own historical situatedness before they are ‘pressed forward’ into our time and 
beyond.  An event can only point to the future when it has first of all been itself, and 
then secondly, has been understood as fulfilling the past.  Or to put it another way, in 
the grammatical logic of belief, concrete reality as the subject must come first, and 
only then can figuration or parable be predicated.
111
  Hence Jesus Christ in his 
resurrection is first of all present to himself, and only on that basis can he then be 
present to us.   
 
The identity of the church is therefore constituted by this dual presence of Christ, 
first of all to word and sacrament, and then to the world.  Once again, this duality of 
identity is given its unity through the Holy Spirit, precisely in the continued narration 
of Christ’s acts in history as grounded in the resurrection.
112
  The Holy Spirit’s role 
here is vital, for the connection between Christ’s presence in word and sacrament on 
the one hand, and his activity in the world on the other, is not actually that obvious.  
Frei considers how a kind of doubt in the factuality of Christ’s narrative identity can 
lead to a disassociation of his presence from the church, and the concurrent re-
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association of his presence with the “causes of the disinherited” 113 in the world – 
another reference, perhaps, to the existentialist portrayal of Jesus as the archetype of 
human alienation.  On the other hand, a church which over-emphasises biblicism 
and/or sacramentalism is likely to find it hard to discern the presence of Christ to the 
world.  Church and world do not necessarily hang easily together, but depend upon 
the Spirit to unify Christ’s presence to both: 
 It is only by reference to the Spirit, i.e., to the complete unity of Jesus Christ’s identity and 
 presence given to us now indirectly, that Word and Sacrament cohere with passionate 
 Christian concern for the world and its mysterious passage from event to event ... The church 
 is founded on and sets forth the unity of both only through the presence of Jesus Christ.
114 
Hence it is entirely appropriate to think analogically of the church as the Body of 
Christ, given that the church’s identity, after Jesus’ own, is established through its 
intended actions and unintended passions in the public sphere.  Not that the church is 
the Body of Christ in anything other than an analogous sense: as Frei wrote, “The 
church must be a follower rather than a complete reiteration of its Lord”.
115
  
However, patterned after Jesus Christ, who is the content of its proclamation, the 
church has a similarly “elusive, persistent, and continuous”
116
 subject.  Indeed, 
through the Holy Spirit, the intended-actions of this analogous body of Christ are 
united with and included in the narrative that continues to identify Jesus Christ, 
whose self-manifestation is continuous then with now.  Therefore, the church can 
narrate its own identity after the same pattern, as continuous with the identity and 
presence of Jesus Christ, and by grace it is therefore established as a fit ‘form’ for the 
on-going revelation of the content of God. 
 
This identity of Jesus with his ‘body’, the church, is provisional also in an 
eschatological sense, and this precisely because the church is so historically situated.  
Once again, this eschatological focus is founded on the resurrection.  Where Jesus’ 
identity was still ambiguous until the resurrection, so too the ambiguous history of 
the church will some day culminate in a climactic revelatory event.  Moreover, 
because the church relates ‘forward’ to the second coming in a way analogous to 
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how Israel related ‘forward’ to the incarnation, so it is Jesus who will fulfil the 
church’s identity, just as he fulfilled the Law.  In a real sense, the story of the church 
is unfinished, and will finish only when, according to the pattern established by Jesus 
Christ in the resurrection, all of history climaxes in a new eschatological revelation 
of his identity: 
 The relation between the church and Jesus Christ is somewhat like that between Israel and 
 Jesus.  To describe the people of Israel is to narrate its history.  And to identify that people ... 
 with the identity of Jesus Christ is to narrate the history of Jesus ... in such a way that it is 
 seen as the individual and climactic summing up, incorporation, and identification of the 
 whole people, by which the people receive their identification.  The church likewise moves 
 towards an as yet undisclosed historical summing up that must be narrated, though it cannot 
 yet be because the story is unfinished...
117 
This parallel between the church and Israel suggests that history itself must be read 
through a ‘realistic narrative hermeneutic’ similar to that with which we have read 
the gospels.  Given that we have no more neutral a perspective on history than we 
have on scripture, this suggests likewise that our reading of history demands a 
commixture of a minimal interpretative scheme with Christian commitment and love. 
 
A further implication is that the identity of Jesus Christ cannot be rendered finally, 
not even through the gospel narratives, because after an eschatological mode of 
thinking, it is still incomplete.  This is not to say that the gospel accounts are 
deficient in any way, or that the storied identity which has been revealed to us is in 
any way not full.  Rather, it is the simple recognition that a living person has a 
history still to come.  Only those who are dead can have the story of their identity 
squared off and closed: only those who are dead can be objectified as an event which 
is in the past.  By contrast, the elusive living presence of Jesus Christ remains open 
to the further development of his identity.  This is because, in the linear logic of time, 
“the past cannot be an absolute clue to the future, if the future is a genuinely open 
one”.
118
  Frei is not saying that the future is unknown to Christ, or that his identity is 
somehow incomplete to himself.  Rather, he is saying that we humans will not know 
Jesus’ full historical identity until we can look back from the end of time and 
describe it thence.  And even then, we have the eternal perspective to deal with, in 
which there will be every new discoveries of the fullness of God.  Therefore, an 
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account of the identity of Jesus Christ “involves an inevitable appeal to the 
undisclosed future and, hence, to the mysterious, distinctive future mode of that 
presence”.
119
  This is an admission of the persistence, elusiveness, and ultimacy of 
the identity of Jesus Christ: quite how he will appear and be known by us when he 
becomes the “significant, incorporative summing up of history” - well, as Frei points 
out, we would be “fools to try to imagine or forecast [that] in literal fashion”.
120




Once again, although grammatically we must separate identity and presence in order 
to think about them, we have seen how they are not to be separated in actuality.  The 
presence of Jesus Christ is so intrinsic to his identity, that to conceive of him as not 
present, or as dead, “is the equivalent of not thinking of him at all.”
121
  Once again, 
while grammatical logic must say one thing prior to another, the actuality in terms of 
identity, and perhaps even of ontology, is one of unity and simultaneity.  
 
Moreover, Frei has established that this principle of unity, or non-separation of 
subject and predicate in the “unique case”
122
 of Jesus Christ, is to be understood as 
the Holy Spirit.  The doctrine of the Holy Spirit has perhaps emerged a little late in 
Frei’s ‘system’, but in terms of the logic of belief, this is because this doctrine, like 
all others, is founded on the full revelation of the co-identity of Jesus and God in the 
resurrection.  In other words, the Holy Spirit as the presence of God could not be 
predicated prior to the establishment of the identity of Jesus Christ.  However, now 
that the doctrine of the Spirit has been established, it is seen to be key to the whole 
principle of unity and simultaneity which pervades Frei’s theology: the unity of the 
biblical canon; the simultaneity of the two natures in one person; the unity of all 
disparate intended actions in one ascriptive subject; the unity of all historical events 
in one cumulative story; the simultaneity of subject and predicate, of being and 
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action, of deus and dixit; the unity of Jesus’ identity and presence; and the unity of 
the Father and the Son.  No doubt there are more. 
 
Nevertheless, even this principle of unity and simultaneity in the Holy Spirit can be 
maintained only by exegetical reference back to the events of the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.  As Barth puts it: 
 Our formulation is again and again that the Christian message (in all its content) means Jesus 
 Christ.  In the declaration and development of its whole content it always has reference to 
 Him.  His name, therefore, is not incidental to it ... He Himself is the whole.
123
   
Hence Frei’s insistence not only on the persistence and elusiveness of the identity of 
Jesus Christ, but also upon its ultimacy.   No other event but the crucifixion-
resurrection could form the central point from which we can view the line of history 
from creation to eschaton.  No other story but the story of Jesus Christ, past, present, 
and future, can unite the disparate events of public history with the eternal dialectical 
moments of God’s revelation, rescuing them from chaos and providing them in his 
own person with a providential order.  No other person but Christ could hold 
together, in unity and without strain, a fully divine and a fully human nature.  
Nothing can be said about God, or indeed analogically about humanity, apart from 
the concrete content of both that is embodied by this particular man, Jesus of 
Nazareth.  Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic has proved itself adequate to the task 
of demonstrating the truth of his hypothesis.  And so, the resurrection has been 
established as the starting point for our logic of belief, and the basis of every 
tentative theological  attempt to say something concrete about the content of God. 
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 Barth, CD IV/1, 57n20. 




This thesis has been concerned to trace Frei’s search for a way of speaking about 
God in which God is no metaphysical abstraction, but has a describable concrete 
content.  In this anti-metaphysical commitment, Frei has been located most firmly in 
his mid-20
th
 century context, this being a hallmark also of the dialectical “theology of 
crisis” which developed in the wake of Karl Barth’s second edition of Der 
Römerbrief.  Indeed, this rejection of speculative metaphysics marks one of the few 
locations of continuity between the krisis theologians and their 19
th
 century liberal 
forebears, who were likewise concerned to formulate a concept of God which had 
some concrete reality.  Accordingly, this thesis has taken pains to define some of the 




 centuries, and to trace 
some of the complex connections between them.  Frei understood these connections 
better than most, and chose his own theological standpoint with remarkable clear-
sightedness, positioning himself cautiously and provisionally alongside whatever 
seemed to him the most coherent at the time, but refusing to commit himself 
absolutely to any one theological ‘school’ or ‘system’.   
 
Continuity between the liberal and the krisis theologians can also be located in their 
central valuation of the doctrine of revelation for the theological task.  Of course, 
their treatment of the doctrine is so very different that in 1940, Niebuhr felt obliged 
to speak about its “reappearance in contemporary theological discussion”
1
: perhaps 
the concept of ‘immanent’ revelation had blurred Schleiermacher’s insistence that 
revelation nevertheless comes from ‘without’.  Be that as it may, it was demonstrated 
in Chapter 1 of this thesis that Barth, Niebuhr, and Schleiermacher all take the 
starting point of their theological projects to be a doctrine of revelation.   
 
                                                 
1
 Niebuhr, Meaning of Revelation, 1.  (my italics) 
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However, it was Frei’s insight, that simply beginning with ‘revelation’ posited in and 
of itself, ultimately does not lead to any concrete content that we can predicate of 
God.  Indeed, our examination of the doctrine demonstrated how each of the three 
theologians struggles in his own way to avoid the same metaphysical abstractions 
that he is reacting against.  Indeed, Frei’s opinion was that not even Barth’s strong 
actualism had managed to sidestep speculation altogether.  And in failing to do so, 
Frei judged that Barth had effectively opened the door to Frei’s theological bugbear: 
existentialist theology of the Neo-Orthodox variety.   
 
Frei’s examination of the doctrine of revelation, in his doctoral thesis and in his 
contribution to A Handbook of Christian Theology, crystallised into an insistence, 
that any account of God must have a concrete content.  But before he could work out 
for himself exactly how to frame his own account, he was obliged to deduce how it 
was that three supposedly ‘concrete’ accounts of revelation had yet given rise to at 
least two abstract accounts of God (Barth’s being a special case).  By the time he 
came to write his preface to The Identity of Jesus Christ, Frei had concluded that the 
problem was a grammatical one: that while their insights might be perfectly valid, 
they had said the wrong thing first, and so had started their ‘systems’ in the wrong 
place.  To compound matters, in the case of Schleiermacher and Niebuhr at least, 
they had mistaken this issue of the logical starting point with the subject of theology 
itself.  This meant that the problem went deeper even than questions of right and 
wrong order: for even should the logic of belief be ‘correct’, this did not mean that 
the grammar could be equated without residue with an ontological reality.   
 
Accordingly, Frei’s logic of belief makes three key points.  The first, as described 
above, is that grammar must not be confused with an ontological reality: the medium 
is not the thing.  The second is that grammar must nevertheless be fitting to that 
ontological reality: “the form is founded in the content”.  And the third is that the 
grammar works in one direction only, from subject to predicate, and is irreversible.   
 
This first issue in this logic of belief has been central to the argument of this thesis: 
that Frei was deeply concerned to “untangle” the theological confusions which result 
whenever grammatical logic is equated too directly with ontology and epistemology.  
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For dialectical theologians of whatever variety, these logical “tangles” begin with the 
priority given to the doctrine of revelation: with the claim that God has in some sense 
revealed in a concrete, this-worldly form.  Frei perceived that the vital difficulty with 
this claim is that the doctrine of revelation seems to offer epistemological access to 
the content of God, but in the event turns out to have no content whatsoever.  For 
doctrine is always and essentially grammar, concerned above all with the right 
ordering of theological statements.  Accordingly, in the dialectical logic of belief, 
revelation must be posited as the first of all doctrines, for from a purely logical point 
of view, we cannot even begin to talk about the Wholly Other God until that God has 
revealed to us.  Thus a doctrine of revelation is the necessary grammatical starting 
point for theology.   
 
That, on some level, the dialectical theologians knew about the contentless nature of 
revelation, is evident in Schleiermacher’s focus on the consciousness of God (rather 
than on God an sich), and also in the existentialist awareness of the absence of God.  
In that sense, they were absolutely right: the content of God is not given to us in the 
moment of revelation as such.  Rather, revelation should be understood as the logical 
precondition for the giving of the content of God.  However, what these theologians 
did not realise, is that the subsequent lack of content to God in their accounts was 
owing to the fact that they were treating the ‘medium’ as the ‘thing’.  In other words, 
they were treating this logical starting point for theology as if it were the whole of 
theology – the whole content of God – in itself.  The irony for the krisis theologians 
in particular, is that while they insisted that the event of revelation had no extension 
in time or space, they somehow did not recognise the doctrine of revelation for the 
single, non-extended, grammatical point that it is. 
 
In contrast to such logical tangles, and in contrast too to the abstractions of the 
hermeneutical circle, Frei advocates a much simpler model of both hermeneutics and 
theology: that of the ‘hermeneutical straight line’.  This is a key concept to the 
understanding of Frei.  The significance of the linear model is that – in contrast to a 
circle – a line must have a starting point.  The identification of that starting point is 
therefore the first task of theology.  From that basis, the logic of belief then proceeds, 
as one doctrine is unfolded after another, always seeking for the correct logical order 
in which to say things.  The effect is therefore cumulative rather that circular: we do 
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not understand the whole of the content of God in terms of the part, or the parts in 
terms of the whole, but rather, each detail unfolds out of the one before, so that we 
have before us an increasingly full description of the content of God.   
This cumulative and linear model for theology comes under our second point about 
theological grammar: that it must be fitting to the ontological reality which it seeks to 
describe.  The linear “form” has itself been established as appropriate precisely in the 
“content” of God, revealed in time as the storied person, Jesus Christ.  Therefore, the 
fittingness of a linear and cumulative logic of belief is “founded” in the 
chronologically linear progress of revelatory history.  In the same way, it is also 
founded in the linear structure of the biblical story; and in the storied identity from 
birth to death to resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. 
 
The third and last point about theological grammar is that in this linear model, it 
works in one direction only.  Once again, the principle here is to guard against 
metaphysical abstraction.  In the grammatical formulation, the subject comes before 
the predicate and “governs” the predicate: the predicate has no free-standing reality 
of its own, but has meaning only as meaning is granted to it by the subject.  In the 
case of God, this means that no predicate can be taken as defining of God’s essence: 
rather, it is God who defines the essence of the predicate.  The reality is all God’s, 
who then bestows that reality on everything else.  This is yet another reason why a 
doctrine of revelation, taken in and of itself, has no content: for it is God who gives 
the content to revelation, and not the other way round.   
 
This grammatical ordering of subject and predicate also applies in Frei’s scheme to 
intention and action, and to self and manifestation.  There is a logical order in which 
an intending subject-self must necessarily be posited as prior to the active predicate 
in which the self is manifested.  Yet, to return to our first principle, the grammatical 
formulation must not be loaded with too much ontological significance in itself.  Just 
because we must necessarily and fittingly speak of subject before predicate, of 
intention before action, of self before manifestation, this does not mean that we must 
conceptualise the subject, intention, and self as ontologically separate from their 
predicate, action, and manifestation.  A ‘being’, posited apart from its action and 
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self-manifestation in the world, is an abstraction, existing on a conceptual plane only, 
and having no reality in this world.   
 
In the same way, when it comes to the presence and the identity of Jesus Christ, Frei 
observes: 
 Talk about Christ’s identity and presence should be in that order, rather than the reverse, 
 even though identity and presence are one in him as he relates himself to us.
2
 
His exegesis of the gospel accounts of the resurrection, and his subsequent (though 
also ‘previous’) contention, that “knowing his identity is identical with having him 
present or being in his presence”, means that grammatically speaking, Jesus’ identity 
is the subject to which his presence is the predicate.  Yet in actuality, his presence is 
so contained in his identity that it becomes a logical nonsense to separate them – 
which is the very point of Frei’s ‘Anselmic’ formulation.  Accordingly, Frei refuses 
the actual separation of subject and predicate, but insists that for all their necessary 
and fitting grammatical ordering, they must nevertheless be held in absolute 
simultaneity.  This insight is very much at the heart of his criticism, both of 
Schleiermacherian liberalism and of existentialist theology: that they have inserted a 
wedge between God and God’s revelation, so that it was impossible for God to give 
content to revelation.  Then, to compound the error, they had focused their attention 
on the predicate, in the hope that they could then reverse the grammatical logic and 
work “upstream” to the subject.  It is little wonder that the subject simply 
disappeared on them.   
 
By contrast, whatever the weaknesses in Barth’s starting point, his strong actualism 
always held together the being and the action of God, so that positing God without 
revelation would be as meaningless as positing revelation without God.  In Frei’s 
very specifically resurrection-centric terms, this meant that God, and God’s 
revelation, Jesus, have to be held together in such simultaneity, that it is better to 
speak of them as one subject, rather than as subject and predicate.  Thus, for Frei as 
for Barth, the categories of ontology and epistemology become almost redundant, so 
merged are they into one.  Hence the suggestion at the end of Chapter 3, that 
“identity” is a much more useful category than ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’.   
                                                 
2
 Frei, Identity, 68. 
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2. Dialogue 
 
These complex details of Frei’s logic of belief were not worked out in isolation.  At 
each step of this exploration of his theological grammar, Frei has been placed in 
dialogue, firstly with his main theological influences, as discussed above; then with 
his contemporary opposition; and finally with his modern-day allies and critics.   
 
In the first case, Frei must absolutely be understood as a Barthian theologian.  At a 
time when Barth’s early dialectical theology had been pulled out of all shape by 
existentialist theology, Frei must have cut a solitary figure in the English-speaking 
theological world, given his rather unfashionable insistence on Barth’s objective 
realism.  Moreover, where Barth’s later theology was still largely being ignored, Frei 
was thoroughly familiar with it, in particular with Barth’s later development of a 
doctrine of analogy, (even if it is correct that Frei misinterpreted it in one of its 
aspects).  Thus his reputation as one of the foremost interpreters of Barth’s theology 
still stands, although it has been slightly tarnished in recent years by McCormack’s 
critique.  Of particular note is Frei’s analysis, from his doctoral thesis through to his 
last work in Types of Christian Theology, of Barth’s theological method.  Indeed, if 
Frei has had any influence on the ‘postliberal’ movement, it is in his championing of 
the notion of ‘ad hoc-ness’ in scriptural interpretation, and his insistence on the 
internal logic of Christian doctrinal statements.  That he may have been 
misappropriated, by Lindbeck in particular, should not have a bearing on an 
objective assessment of his interpretation of Barth. 
 
However, of more relevance here than the accuracy or otherwise of his reading of 
Barth, is Frei’s appropriation of Barthian principles for his own theological projects.  
If he is to be called a Barthian theologian, and not just an interpreter, it is because he 
used Barthian principles in his theology, extended Barth’s thinking with his own, and 
worked to counter the abstraction of Barth’s starting point.  As this thesis has 
demonstrated, the whole point of Frei’s hermeneutical project was to find a way of 
foregrounding the story of Jesus Christ in order to test his “basic conviction”, that the 
way to talk concretely about the content of God, was to talk concretely about the 
storied identity of Jesus Christ.  While Barth had of course derived his deus dixit 
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prolegomena precisely from his exegetical reading of the historical Jesus-event, he 
did not turn to the concrete content of that person and event until later in his Church 
Dogmatics.  Frei’s corrective to Barth was to insist that the content of God, as given 
in the resurrection, must be the concrete starting point in the logic of belief. 
 
Through a close reading of his theological output, this thesis has sought to 
demonstrate how even such a determinedly ad hoc theologian as Frei, who resisted 
theological system with all the might of his 20
th
 century dialectical context, 
nevertheless proceeds according to a theological logic which is coherent at every 
stage.  Frei is arguably most famous for the development of his biblical “realistic 
narrative” hermeneutic.  The key features of this ‘ad hoc’ hermeneutical method 
have been highlighted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, through a comparison with the 
‘universal’ method espoused by Schleiermacher.  Schleiermacher, of course, 
represented the liberal ‘enemy’ to early krisis theology, so that despite some 
appreciation of his aims and methods in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, Frei 
nevertheless joins in the general condemnation.  Be that as it may, the perceived 
failure of Schleiermacher’s general hermeneutic of understanding when it came to 
the gospel narratives was vital to the formation of Frei’s preferred approach.   
 
It has been shown how Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic does not stand in 
isolation, but is part of a theological approach which conceptualises the figurative 
unity of the scripture alongside the similarly figurative unity of the person, and 
indeed, of the entire scope of providential history.  As expounded in Eclipse, the 
realistic narrative hermeneutic simply refuses to treat the story of Jesus as 
dispensable.  This turns out to be vital far beyond even the strict literal confines of 
scripture, for not only does the Bible tell a story, but in a parallel fashion, the whole 
of providential history is a linear, cumulative story – as too is the life-story of every 
single individual who has lived in that history.  Thus Frei maintains the 
indispensability and “unsubstitutability” of every one of these interconnected 
narratives.  There is a profound ethical valuing of ‘world’ in Frei’s theology.
3
 
                                                 
3
 Mike Higton has explored this ethical and public dimension to Frei’s theology at length in Christ, 
Providence, and History. 
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In this way, we have sought to demonstrate by comparison the richness and 
complexity of Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic, despite the apparent simplicity 
of his concept of the “literal sense”.  The whole point of a story, and of the concept 
of a storied person, is that they can hold together without strain the most logically 
contradictory predicates.  Thus Frei neatly sidesteps the demand that theology be 
explanatory, and contends instead that its role is to be descriptive.  This is not 
reductionism, but is in fact its opposite: the many layers and levels of a realistic 
narrative, and the complex web of interactions which it describes, leave meaning 
open in a way that ‘translation’ cannot.  In the same way, particularly in the dialogue 
with William Placher in Chapter 4, we have illustrated the richness and complexity 
of every “ultimate” and “unsubstitutable” storied individual, none of whom are ever 
to be reduced to mere adjectival labels. 
 
But of course, the unity of scripture, of the person, and of history, are all alike 
predicated on the identity of Jesus Christ in the resurrection.  This has been central to 
the argument of this thesis, that the resurrection forms the logical and the actual 
starting point for all subsequent attempts to speak about God.  It is the logical 
starting point, for in itself it is the doctrine of revelation: we have no other 
permission to talk about God apart from this event, which alone underpins the 
analogical fitness of our language.  And it is the actual starting point, because it is so 
much more than a mere grammatical “frontier” for our talk: it is in fact the moment 
where the content of God is revealed as the presence of Jesus Christ.  Therefore, as 
Frei himself writes, although the grammatical exercise, “in one sense, [is] merely 





On this very point of order, it is conceded that it has been necessary to explain Frei’s 
conception of figurative unity, before proceeding to the centrality of the resurrection.  
Frei himself admits a similar difficulty with the ordering of his own project.  
                                                 
4
 Frei, Identity, 67. 
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However, and once again, this grammatical ordering should not be confused with 
actuality: 
 I want to warn the reader that my procedure may appear to be the reverse of the program just 
 set forth.  In fact, I shall first examine the notions of presence and of the presence of Jesus 
 Christ, trying to indicate in the process that reflection about Christ’s presence leads us neither 
 to that presence nor to an understanding of his identity.
5
 
Our point is the same as his, that sometimes a ‘clearing of the decks’ of ‘mistaken’ 
assumptions must be done before the positive theology can proceed.  Nevertheless, 
the resurrection forms the logical and actual starting point for conceptualising this 
figurative unity of scripture, person, and history.  This is because it is only as the 
identity of Jesus is fully revealed that he can hold together in his unique story and 
person all other stories and persons.  Thus in the resurrection he bestows the unity of 
his identity upon scripture, upon history, and upon each individual person, so that 
each lives, and moves, and has their being in him.  This is why, as N.T. Wright 
points out, the resurrection for Frei is the point from which all other realities are 
viewed, but upon which itself there can be no perspective.  For Frei does not have a 
system.  Unlike Barth, he does not even have a dogmatics.  Rather, Frei has a story.  
Frei has a person.  Frei has Jesus. 
 
This is how Frei attempted to underpin the Barthian prolegomena of the revelation-
event with a concrete account of the identity of Jesus Christ.  Therefore, for all that 
his engagement with Barth was often critical, Frei’s intent was always to champion 
Barth’s strong actualism as the way forward for theology.  In particular, if he could 
fill in the gaps left by Barth, or illustrate where Barth had been misinterpreted, then 
that might be the best way for him to counter existentialist or Neo-Orthodox theology 
– by attacking it right at its supposedly Barthian roots.   
 
The juxtaposition in this thesis of Frei with his contemporary opposition, particularly 
in the shape of Tillich and Bultmann, has not been helped by the lack of direct 
attention Frei has given them in print (although his lecture notes reveal a continuous 
engagement).  Moreover, it took many years for the early Frei to work out his stance 
on Christian existentialism; while the later Frei was generous rather than 
                                                 
5
 Frei, Identity, 68. 
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condemnatory in his assessment of others.  Nevertheless, there are enough direct 
references, and even more allusions, to identify at what points he is most opposed to 
existentialist theology.  As it has turned out, our detailed consideration of Tillich on 
the resurrection, and of Bultmann on presence, has usefully thrown into relief Frei’s 
own position on these matters.  Indeed, it is a conclusion of this thesis, that it is 
difficult to understand the aims and objectives of Frei’s theology and methodology 
apart from this mid-20
th
 century existentialist context.  That is not to say that the 
significance of Frei must be confined to his own time.  On the contrary, as the 21
st
 
century establishes itself, we badly need the clarity of Frei’s perspective on our own 
theological inheritance.   
 
Accordingly, in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of this thesis, consideration was given to the 
continuing relevance and appropriation of Frei to modern theological controversies.  
The first of these current theological issues is the very abstruse debate about the 
relation between the logos asarkos and the logos ensarkos.  Without commenting on 
the accuracy of anyone’s interpretation of Barth, the suggestion was made here that 
Frei’s insights into the relation between grammar and ontology might have 
something important to contribute, to the clarity of the debate if nothing else.  It was 
also suggested that Frei’s position might have been closer to that of Bruce 
McCormack’s, although he would have been suitably wary of McCormack’s 
‘reversal’ of the theological grammar, and the resulting tendency to abstraction. 
 
Frei’s realistic narrative hermeneutic has been applied much more directly to another 
of these current issues, which is concerned with the relation (or non-relation) 
between historical biblical studies and the theological significance of Jesus Christ.  
Frei is regarded as something of a father-figure in this particular debate, but can 
sometimes be invoked carelessly: interestingly, he has been better understood by his 
‘opposition’, in the figure of the historical biblical theologian N. T. Wright, than he 
has been by his ‘supporters’.  A more careful invocation of his methodologies would 
demonstrate that Frei’s avoidance of the issue of historical referent remains vital, if 
the debate is not to become hopelessly speculative.  This emphasis, however, needs 
to be balanced with an indignant denial that Frei has effectively replaced the 
historically past and present referent with a literary depiction.  And finally, Frei’s 
realistic narrative identity description needs to be revisited and re-understood, if the 
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neo-existentialist Tillichian option of “reception history” is not to be allowed to 
divorce Jesus once more from his predicates.   
 
At the end, in Chapter 5, the focus was on the continued relevance of Frei’s 
theological grammar for the church and the world.  Where James Kay was 
disappointed in the lack of practical explanation of Jesus’ presence, nevertheless the 
co-positing of that presence with the identity of Jesus Christ does achieve at least 
three practical outcomes.  Firstly, it releases churches from the anxiety of having to 
explain the mode of his presence now, permitting them simply to describe it by the 
traditional doctrine of the Holy Spirit.  (Sometimes, the shelving of explanatory 
systems in favour of doctrinal affirmation comes as a blessed relief.)  Secondly, 
Frei’s theological grammar grounds the church’s affirmation of the presence of 
Christ – otherwise such a nebulous concept – in the concrete events of the 
resurrection: ‘He who cannot be conceived of as not living’ may be a minimal 
description, but it is a vital and a reassuring one.  And thirdly, Frei’s realistic 
narrative hermeneutic reaffirms the centrality of scripture to the very existence of the 
church, giving permission once again to read it simply and literally, while not 
confusing the medium with the thing in itself.  In the face of biblical inerrancy on the 
one hand, and the abstractions of myth and symbol on the other, Frei is in effect 
handing the interpretation of scripture back to the historical community of faith. 
 
Lastly, Frei’s concept of the figurative unity given by the resurrection to all history 
has important practical consequences for the relation of the church to the world.  
Despite the tendencies of Lindbeck, Hauerwas, and much of the postliberal school 
towards a self-contained confessional community, Frei’s concept of history 
effectively disallows sectarianism, demanding instead that even as it witnesses to the 
world, the church also listens to the witness of the world to God’s providence and 
presence.  In our time, where the church has been defeated “in its secondary vocation 
of providing ideological coherence, foundation, and stability to Western culture”
6
, 
this is a positive concept of the relation of the two, as church and world together 
point to their future fulfilment in Jesus Christ. 
                                                 
6
 Frei, “Literal Reading”, 149. 
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3. Doxology 
 
It is therefore entirely fitting that The Identity of Jesus Christ ends in a kind of 
doxological affirmation, both of the dialectical “veil” of revelation, and of “the 
story’s embrace of both sides of it”.  Nevertheless, Frei concludes his account of 
identity and presence – the unity of the two and the right order for thinking about 
them – with a poetic meditation by George Herbert upon the sacrament: 
 Love is that liquor sweet and most divine 
 Which my God feels as blood, and I as wine.
7
 
The mystery which is at the heart of the story and the person of God means that all 
our theology rightfully ends as it begins: with worship and adoration of the indirect 
presence of Christ in sacrament, in word, and in world.   
 
This is what is ultimately meant by the ‘within faith’ perspective which Frei 
espouses: that we exist within the story and being of God, and have no external 
perspective on either his or on our own reality.  Hence our study of theological 
grammar has been conducted all along within the all-encompassing boundary of 
God’s reality, so that our logic of belief ends as it begins, with the content of God in 
the resurrection.  Therefore, as Frei observes, the theological experiment is no dry 
academic exercise, but is itself an offering of worship: 
 By and large, then, reflection about the presence of Christ is, for the believer, a pleasurable 
 exercise in arranging or, as I should prefer to say, ordering his thinking about his faith and – 
 in a certain sense – a praise of God by use of the analytical capacities.
8
 
Indeed, the pleasure of the study of theological grammar is in its analogical kinship 
to revelation itself: for just as revelation reveals and conceals, so too does theological 
grammar reveal and conceal.  Thus we have faithfully followed Frei’s logic of belief 
through this “exercise of ordering and praise”
9
 until we have reached this point.  And 
here we must stop, for we have arrived at the grammatical “frontier” which is the 
content of God, beyond which there is nothing to say. 
 
                                                 
7
 Frei, Identity, 201. 
8
 Ibid. 68. 
9
 Ibid. 
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